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<title>Michele Laurelli · Blog</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/</link>
<description>Articles by Michele Laurelli and guests on AI, models and software, with technical analysis and practical examples for applying artificial intelligence.</description>
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<lastBuildDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 21:27:25 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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<title>The Cancer of Skills</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/il-cancro-delle-skills/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/il-cancro-delle-skills/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>

<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Skills promise expertise for AI agents, but they remain fragile, insecure prompts that are hard to test, and they are impoverishing the people who are learning to use AI.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[In less than a year, skills have become the way the generative AI industry tells itself it has solved the problem of agent specialization, and the speed at which the concept has spread should already make us suspicious. They began as an Anthropic convention for Claude, were then published as an open specification, and were adopted by most agentic coding tools. Today skills are presented as packages of expertise that a model acquires and uses when needed, in a vocabulary that evokes learning, modularity and software reuse.

The thesis of this article is that behind that vocabulary lies a mechanism much poorer than it is made to seem, and that the gap between what skills are and what is said about them is causing real damage on three levels: the reliability of systems, security and, perhaps the most serious, the education of the people who use and design AI. The comparison with uncontrolled growth is deliberate, because the problem lies less in any single skill than in the proliferation of a habit that feeds itself, spreads by imitation and takes up the space where real competence should grow.

To be useful, a critique has to be precise. So we will start with what is actually inside a skill, then examine the symptoms one by one, deal with the most serious objections and close with what, in my view, we really need.

## Anatomy of a skill

According to the [specification published on agentskills.io](https://agentskills.io/specification), a skill is a folder whose only required element is a SKILL.md file, made up of a YAML frontmatter and a Markdown body. Optional folders can sit alongside it for executable scripts, reference documentation and assets. The frontmatter requires only two fields: a name of at most 64 characters, and a description of at most 1024 characters that should say what the skill does and when to use it. The other fields, including the `allowed-tools` field that pre-approves the tools that can be used, are optional and partly declared experimental, with support that varies from one implementation to another.

The most telling detail concerns the body of the file. The specification states explicitly that there are no format restrictions and that you can write anything that helps the agent carry out the task. Consistently, the reference validation tool checks that the frontmatter is well formed and that the name follows the conventions, and has nothing to say about the content, because the content is free text meant for a language model.

The execution mechanism is what the specification calls progressive disclosure, and it works on three levels. At startup, the name and description of every available skill are loaded into the context, about a hundred tokens each. When the model judges a skill relevant, it loads the whole body, which is recommended to stay under five thousand tokens. Finally, auxiliary files are read only if and when the instructions call for them. [The Microsoft Agent Framework documentation](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/agent-framework/agents/skills) describes the same scheme in even more explicit terms, with the descriptions injected into the system prompt and a tool that returns the body of the skill to the model that invokes it. It candidly admits that the instructions are injected into the context and may influence the agent's behavior.

Stripped to the bone, then, a skill is a fragment of prompt with a label, an index the model consults to decide whether to read it and, optionally, code the model can decide to run. Everything that follows comes from this description, which is worth keeping in mind every time you hear about skills the agent has "acquired."

## First symptom: a prompt disguised as an abstraction

Software engineering built its most successful abstractions (the function, the module, the interface, the package) around a precise idea: whoever uses a component can rely on what the component declares it does, without knowing what is inside. An abstraction is worth as much as its behavior is determined by its declaration, and this is exactly the property that lets us compose it, replace it and reason about it.

The skill borrows the whole surface of this vocabulary, with its folders, its metadata, its license and version fields, its validator and its installation ecosystem, without having the property that justifies it. Its behavior depends on how a probabilistic model interprets a natural language text in a context that also contains everything else: the rest of the conversation, the other loaded skills, the platform's system prompt and any tool outputs. None of these variables is under the control of the person who writes the skill.

The result is an object that looks like a software component and has the semantics of a piece of advice. This would be a minor problem if it were stated clearly, but the entire communication apparatus around skills talks about capabilities, competencies and modules, and leads those who adopt them to treat them with the trust reserved for a library. They should be treated with the caution reserved for a recommendation written by someone else and read by a colleague whose judgment you don't know well.

## Second symptom: routing left to chance

The weakest point in the whole mechanism is the moment when the model decides whether to load a skill. The model makes that decision itself, based on a description of a few lines, with no explicit rule to govern it. The specification recommends including keywords in the description that help the agent recognize relevant tasks. That amounts to admitting that routing works by lexical and semantic similarity, which is the same approximate way a poorly configured search engine works.

The available data confirms that the problem is far from theoretical. In January 2026 the Next.js team at Vercel [published the results of a series of evaluations](https://vercel.com/blog/agents-md-outperforms-skills-in-our-agent-evals) on Next.js 16 APIs that were absent from the models' training data. They compared a documentation skill with a compressed index of about 8 KB placed directly in AGENTS.md, the context file that is always present. In 56% of cases the skill was never invoked, and its mere presence produced the same success rate as having no documentation at all, with a drop on the tests (58% versus 63%) that the authors attribute to the noise introduced by a tool that is available but unused.

| Configuration | Success rate | Difference from baseline |
| --- | --- | --- |
| No documentation | 53% | — |
| Skill, default behavior | 53% | +0 points |
| Skill with explicit invocation instructions | 79% | +26 points |
| Documentation index in AGENTS.md | 100% | +47 points |

When an instruction requiring the use of the skill was added to AGENTS.md, the invocation rate rose above 95% and the success rate to 79%. But the same study documents that different wordings of the same instruction produced very different behaviors, to the point that the authors call the approach fragile for production use. The paradox is worth pausing on: to make a skill work, it took an always-present prompt telling the model to use it, and the best solution was to eliminate the decision altogether.

In fairness, this is a single domain, measured with the models available in early 2026, and Vercel itself acknowledges a role for skills in vertical workflows explicitly triggered by the user. But that is exactly the point. A skill that works reliably only when someone invokes it by hand serves the function of a command, and a command does not need a apparatus of metadata and automatic discovery to exist.

On top of all this comes the absence of any contract. A function declares its inputs and outputs, an API has a schema, a tool has at least a typed signature. A skill declares no preconditions, effects or guarantees, and two skills with overlapping descriptions compete for the model's attention with no precedence criterion other than the statistical mood of the moment.

## Third symptom: versions that version nothing

The specification includes a `metadata` field where the official examples put author and version, and the ecosystem quickly built registries, install commands and public repositories around it, giving the impression that a skill has a life cycle comparable to that of a software dependency. The impression is misleading, because the version number captures only the text, while the actual behavior is the product of that text with a model, a platform and a context that change independently.

The same skill at version 1.0 behaves differently on Claude, Codex, Gemini CLI or Cursor. It also behaves differently on the same client when the vendor updates the underlying model, changes its own system prompt or changes the way it presents the list of available skills. The specification itself acknowledges that support for some fields varies across implementations, and the reference documentation advises testing every skill on multiple clients. That means admitting that the portability promised by the open standard concerns the file format, while what the file produces remains tied to the model that reads it.

From this follows a testability problem that no current tool solves satisfactorily. A unit test is not enough to verify a skill. You need repeated evaluations on samples of representative tasks, with separate measures for correct activation, for rejection of neighboring but wrong skills, and for execution quality, all repeated at every model update. It is serious work, which mature organizations do for their production prompts, but which the skills published in public repositories rarely account for. Nothing signals its absence, because the official validator only checks the frontmatter.

The practical result is silent regression as a normal operating condition. A company that builds its processes on a set of skills discovers that something has stopped working only when a wrong output reaches downstream. There is no changelog to consult, no diff to explain the difference, and no way to pin the version of the component that actually changed, which is the model.

## Fourth symptom: a supply chain built on implicit trust

A skill can carry two kinds of payload, natural-language instructions and executable code, and the agent treats both with far more trust than it would give to ordinary input, because it receives them as part of its own configuration. This makes a skill a more insidious attack vector than a compromised npm package: classic supply chain techniques are joined by prompt injection, and the latter escapes static analysis tools by construction, since they cannot read the intent of a paragraph of prose.

The first large-scale analysis, [Agent Skills in the Wild](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2601.10338) by Liu and colleagues, examined 31,132 skills collected in December 2025 from two public marketplaces. 26.1% had at least one potentially dangerous pattern and 5.2% had high-severity patterns consistent with malicious intent, while skills that included scripts were 2.12 times more likely to be vulnerable than those made of instructions alone. The authors themselves point out that many of the cases reflect negligence more than malice, and that the data captures an ecosystem in its first two months of life. They also note, however, that common SAST tools, tested on a subset, caught none of the injection patterns present in the instructions.

Later research points in the same direction. The [ToxicSkills report from Snyk](https://research.snyk.io/blog/agent-skills-threat-landscape/), covering 3,984 skills, found critical-level issues in 13.4% of them and 76 confirmed malicious payloads. 91% of those combined malicious code with prompt injection, and some of the malicious skills were still installable at the time of publication. For completeness, I should also mention the work of [Holzbauer and colleagues](https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.16572). Across more than 238,000 skills, they drastically scale down the percentages produced by automated scanners, bringing the share of suspicious skills below 1% once the repository context is taken into account. But they, too, document a new vector: the hijacking of skills hosted on abandoned GitHub repositories.

The structural point does not depend on the exact percentage. The problem stems from what the first study calls the consent gap, that is, the distance between what the user approves by installing a skill and what the skill actually does. It is made worse by the fact that the activation mechanism is implicit, and that the field meant to limit which tools can be used is, by the specification's own admission, experimental and unevenly supported. We have effectively rebuilt the browser extension ecosystem of the early years, with less sandboxing, no code signing, no binding permission model, and on top of that a semantic attack surface that nobody yet knows how to inspect reliably.

## Fifth symptom: the atrophy of skill

This is the damage I consider the most serious, because sooner or later reliability and security problems will be addressed with technical tools, whereas what is lost in terms of training is hard to recover. To work well with a language model, you need to understand a few things that are not learned by installing packages: everything the model knows about a task passes through the context, the order and wording of information matter, every instruction competes with the others for the model's attention, and an output must be checked against external criteria, not against your own expectations. These ideas are simple to state and hard to internalize, and they are internalized only by writing, getting things wrong, measuring and correcting.

The skill offers a shortcut that skips exactly this step. Anyone approaching the professional use of AI today finds catalogs with tens of thousands of ready-made procedures. They get used to looking for the right skill instead of asking what the model is missing to do the task, and they credit successes to the skill and failures to the model, without ever acquiring the tools to tell the two apart. The very language used to present skills, which talks about abilities the agent acquires, reinforces a wrong mental model, one in which the system learns something, when in reality no weight changes and all that happens is that a file gets read.

There is also a homogenizing effect, less obvious but just as real. When thousands of users install the same skills to write documents, design interfaces or review code, the outputs converge on the stylistic and methodological choices of the few people who wrote those skills, often without stating their assumptions and without the users noticing they have adopted them. The result is a monoculture of procedures that nobody has really chosen, because they arrived as defaults.

Finally, skills move knowledge out of people and into files that nobody rereads. In an organization, the knowledge of how to do something stops living in the heads of those who do it and crystallizes in a markdown file written by someone months earlier, perhaps for a different model. When that markdown stops working, no one is left who can understand why, because no one ever had to understand how it worked.

## The Predictable Objections

A critique that does not face the strongest objections is easy to dismantle, so it is worth examining them one by one and acknowledging what they get right.

The first objection says that progressive disclosure solves a real problem: you can't keep the instructions for dozens of different tasks in context without degrading performance. That's true, and the context window problem does exist. But Vercel's data shows that a compressed index that is always present, and that points to files to be read on demand, gets better results precisely because it removes the activation decision. So the useful part of progressive disclosure, the deferred loading of content, can be had without the fragile part, which is leaving the routing to the model.

The second objection points out that a skill is at least a readable file, more transparent than a fine-tuning or a hidden system prompt. This is also true, and I consider it the format's main merit. But a file being readable doesn't guarantee that anyone reads it, and the studies I cited show that many vulnerable skills piled up downloads and stars before they were discovered. Potential transparency is worth something only when it comes with a culture of review, and the current ecosystem discourages that culture, because it is built on quick installation.

The third objection reminds us that skills can include deterministic code, and that in that case the reliability is the reliability of the code. Correct, but the choice of when to run that code, with which arguments and how to interpret its output is still left to the model, and that same code is the component tied to the highest security risk. A well-written script inside a skill remains a well-written script, one that could have been exposed as a tool with a typed signature and explicit permissions.

The fourth objection is the most serious one. It says that models will get better, that activation will become reliable and that many of the problems I describe are temporary. Maybe. Some of the numbers reported here refer to models and to an ecosystem from months ago. Still, a more capable model follows instructions more reliably in general, malicious ones included, and nothing in the improvement of models introduces contracts, binding permissions or versioning of behavior. As for the damage to learning, a system that works better without the user understanding why makes it worse, not better.

## What we would need instead

Rejecting the format outright would be just as lazy as adopting it without thinking, and a few concrete suggestions can limit the damage I've described.

The first is to call things by their name. A skill should be treated, documented and reviewed like a production prompt, with the same rigor and the same distrust. Anyone who presents it as a competence of the agent contributes to a confusion that has real costs.

The second concerns activation. When an instruction must always be followed, its place is the permanent context, possibly as a compressed index that points to files to be read on demand. When a procedure is needed only in certain cases, it is better for the user or a deterministic orchestrator to invoke it explicitly, leaving the model the decision to load it only where a routing mistake costs little.

The third concerns code. Whatever can be deterministic should be pulled out of the instructions and exposed as a tool with a typed signature, minimal permissions and a sandbox. That way the reliable part of the system has a contract, and the probabilistic part is reduced to the bare minimum.

The fourth concerns evaluation. No skill should enter a professional workflow without a set of test cases that separately measure activation, missed activation and quality of execution, to be repeated at every model change. And no third-party skill should be installed without reading its instructions and scripts in full, exactly as you wouldn't run a script found online with elevated privileges.

The fifth concerns education, and it's the one I care about most. Anyone who teaches how to use AI should have students write their own instructions from scratch, measure them and break them, before showing them any catalog. Other people's skills should be used as material to read and take apart, to understand what choices they contain and why they work or fail, and never as black boxes to install.

## Conclusion

Skills are a fragment of prompt with a label, a loading mechanism left to the model's judgment and, sometimes, code that the model may decide to run. As an organizational convention for people who already know how context engineering works, they can be handy, and it would be dishonest to deny it. The problem arises when this convention is presented as an engineering abstraction, distributed as an ecosystem of packages and adopted as a substitute for understanding. At that point it inherits the fragility of prompting, the attack surface of the supply chain and the opacity of third-party software, without any of the guarantees that make the latter bearable.

The comparison with a tumor is about exactly this dynamic of growth, in which a cell that is trivial in itself replicates without control, spreads by imitation and takes resources away from healthy tissue. Here the healthy tissue is the competence of people who design systems based on language models, and the culture of verification that those systems require. To cure it, we would only need to stop attributing to the format properties it doesn't have, and go back to demanding, from those who build and those who learn, that they know exactly which text reaches the model, at what moment and with what consequences.]]></content:encoded>
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<item>
<title>Software Without Secrets: AI, Reverse Engineering and the End of the Advantage of Those Who Write the Code</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/il-software-senza-segreti-ai-reverse-engineering-e-la-fine-del-vantaggio-di-chi-scrive-il/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/il-software-senza-segreti-ai-reverse-engineering-e-la-fine-del-vantaggio-di-chi-scrive-il/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>

<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Between September and October 2026, AI-written clones of Photoshop and Word appeared, along with tools that connect coding agents to disassemblers and near-daily ports of decompiled video games.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[# Software Without Secrets: AI, Reverse Engineering and the End of the Advantage of Whoever Writes the Code

*Between September and October 2026, AI-written clones of Photoshop and Word appeared, along with tools that connect coding agents to disassemblers, and ports of decompiled video games arriving almost daily. An analysis of what these cases really show, why they are happening now, and how they are shifting the value of software, starting with SaaS.*

## Two Weeks That Changed the Conversation

Between the end of September and mid-October 2026, a series of things happened almost at the same time, and social media quickly fused them into a single story. A developer from Atlanta published open source replicas of Photoshop, Premiere, Illustrator and much of the Adobe suite on GitHub, written in Rust with the help of Claude, and a few days later added a word processor, a spreadsheet and a presentation program that mimic Word, Excel and PowerPoint. In the same period, REA, a project whose full name is Reverse Engineer Anything, went, according to [Decrypt](https://decrypt.co/380741/gta-v-iphone-free-photoshop-ai-tool-rea-upending-software), from fewer than ten thousand to more than a hundred thousand stars on GitHub in six days, with more than thirty thousand stars collected in a single day. Meanwhile the retrogaming community was turning out native PC ports of decompiled games at an almost daily pace, a single player was coordinating seventeen agents to rebuild a 2009 Call of Duty from its executable, and the PlayStation 5 saw a jailbreak for recent firmware and tools that promise to turn the console's executables into native programs for Windows and Linux.

The summary that circulated on X and LinkedIn was more or less this. No binary is safe anymore, proprietary software is on borrowed time, Adobe is dead, and with it, by extension, the programmer's trade. The founder of the project that cloned the Adobe suite, interviewed by Ars Technica, summed up his position with the phrase "software is over," which became the slogan of the week.

In this article I try to do the opposite: to separate the individual stories, to understand what each one really shows and what it doesn't, to explain why all this is happening right now, and to think about what it means for the software industry, with particular attention to the SaaS model, which is what most of the sector's economic value rests on today. My thesis, in short, is that the phenomenon is real and here to stay, but that it is shifting the value of software in a different direction from the one the headlines suggest, and that SaaS comes out of it both more protected than people say and more exposed than its operators are willing to admit.

## What Really Happened

### ArtCraft and the Adobe and Microsoft Clones

The project is called [ArtCraft](https://getartcraft.com/apps) and was started by Brandon Thomas, former CEO of Storyteller.ai and previously an engineer at Square. The first commit of PhotoCraft, the Photoshop replica, dates to September 30, 2026, the announcement of the full Adobe suite came on Reddit on October 3, and on October 7 WordCraft, GridCraft and DeckCraft were added for documents, spreadsheets and presentations. According to [innFactory's reconstruction](https://innfactory.ai/en/blog/ai-rebuilt-photoshop-word-reverse-engineering/), the project page now lists twelve applications, all written in Rust, released under the MIT and Apache 2.0 licenses, able to run offline on macOS, Windows and Linux, and also in the browser through WebAssembly. All of them are openly declared to be in alpha.

A few numbers help show what is really there. PhotoCraft handles layers, masks, adjustment layers and layer styles, renders on Metal, Vulkan, DirectX 12 and WebGPU without going through Electron, and opens and saves PSD and PSB files. The project claims that 134 of 135 real PSD files are rewritten byte-for-byte identical after an open-and-save cycle. WordCraft reads and writes .docx based on the public ECMA-376 standard and exposes its 389 commands through the ribbon, a command line, a JSON interface and an MCP server, which means an AI agent can drive the word processor directly.

The real level of maturity is much lower than a screenshot would suggest. On October 5 the PhotoCraft roadmap estimated readiness for professional use at between 25 and 35 percent, while the WordCraft README spoke of roughly 60 percent of a complete Word replacement. Fabio Akita, who [analyzed the repository](https://akitaonrails.com/en/2026/10/13/ai-reverse-engineering-is-adobe-dead/) in detail, counted more than 800 open issues two weeks after its creation, with memory problems on images beyond 8,192 pixels, rudimentary color management and almost a hundred open reports concerning the PSD format itself. Thomas himself walked back the initial promise of full feature parity within a month, moving it to a horizon of months. Adobe declined to comment, and Microsoft only confirmed that it had received the press inquiry.

The most important detail concerns the method. Thomas wrote on Hacker News that he used Claude Code without any disassembly tools, and the AGENTS.md files in the repositories explicitly forbid the agent from reading, disassembling or copying any part of the original packages. The permitted sources are the program's observable behavior, menus, shortcuts, screenshots and public format specifications. Strictly speaking, then, the Adobe and Microsoft clones are the result of a behavioral reconstruction of the program observed from the outside, with no analysis of the code, and Decrypt and Kingy.ai, in their independent checks, found no trace of REA being used.

### REA, the Toolbox

[REA](https://github.com/morluto/rea) is an open source MCP server, born in April 2026 under the name betterBinaryMCP, that connects coding agents like Claude Code, Codex or Cursor to the classic reverse engineering tools: Ghidra, IDA, Hopper, JADX for Android, Frida for dynamic process analysis, and Chrome DevTools for web and Electron applications. The agent asks, REA runs the tool and returns pseudocode, call graphs, strings and traces, each result accompanied by a log of the evidence and a list of known limitations.

Akita, who read the code, describes it as a serious project, with six months of development, about 2,600 commits and a thousand or so test files, but also unstable and expensive to use. The catalog of MCP tools weighs 2.3 MB of JSON that ends up in the agent's context, and an experiment published by the authors themselves shows that analyzing SQLite compiled to WebAssembly took 42 calls, five minutes and about 300,000 input tokens. The project's documentation is more cautious than the people who made it go viral: it explicitly rules out circumventing DRM and commercial protections, and asks that it never be presented as a tool that automatically clones a program or recovers its source code.

A MindStudio test cited by innFactory is particularly instructive. The Mac Preview app was rebuilt twice, once with REA and once without, starting only from screenshots and the agent's own reasoning. Both versions worked, and the one without REA was even finished first. Looking inside the binary, at least for applications of this kind, helps less than you might think.

### Retrogaming and matching decompilation

The most solid part of the whole story concerns the video games of the past. As [TechSpot](https://www.techspot.com/article/3184-decompilation-on-steroids/) recounts, in recent weeks several decompilation projects have reached major milestones: GoldenEye 007, completed to 100 percent in August after half a decade of work; Super Smash Bros. Melee, which reached 100 percent after more than six years, with an OpenAI model helping on the final stretch; and Halo: Combat Evolved, whose community decompilation claims 99.5 percent byte-for-byte matching and powers native ports for Windows, Linux and Android.

The most cited case is Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, in its 2009 PC version. Developer Maurice Heumann reported that in August four Claude Code agents had rebuilt about a third of the functions, consuming almost 200 billion tokens, and that by the end of September seventeen agents working in parallel had made the game fully playable, for a total consumption that his [October 9 write-up](https://momo5502.com/posts/2026-10-09-game-decompilation/) puts at between 600 and 700 billion tokens over three months. Activision had the videos taken down, and the site hosting the code was shut down a few days later. The most interesting technical lesson of the write-up is that the agents initially produced code that was readable and convincing but often wrong, code that invented logic and altered the game's behavior, and that progress came only when the team introduced automated checks that compared the rebuilt code with the original executable.

### The PlayStation 5, where the narrative broke away from the facts

On the PS5 there are two facts, and they should be kept separate. The first is Relapse, a jailbreak released at the end of September that, according to the [technical descriptions](https://zeli.app/story/49895304), combines a WebKit vulnerability with a kernel exploit and works on consoles with firmware from 7.00 to 13.60, including the PS5 Slim and PS5 Pro. It is temporary, disappears on reboot, can crash the console and does not allow Linux to boot, and Sony has already neutralized it with firmware 14.00 in mid-September and 14.10 on October 1. The second is [AnyPS5](https://github.com/boykopovar/AnyPS5), a tool that repackages the console's executables as native programs for Windows and Linux and that has reached recognition of all 1,166 catalogued shader instructions, while emulators like KytyPS5 and SharpEmu can already boot Astro Bot with real gameplay.

The viral message claiming that AI broke PS5 security in a few weeks, making the entire library accessible, finds no support in the technical sources. None of those I consulted attributes Relapse to the use of language models, and Akita notes that version 0.1 of AnyPS5, according to those who tried it, ran only a single 2D indie game, while the claim that the PS5 is already 80 percent ported to PC comes from fans, and no 3D game works with this method yet. In this case AI entered the story mostly as a narrative frame.

## Three different practices that get confused

Much of the confusion of these weeks comes from the fact that three technically and legally very different activities end up under the label of reverse engineering with AI, and it is worth describing them one by one.

The first is behavioral reconstruction, or clean room in the classic sense of the term. You observe a program from the outside, studying its interface, its commands, its publicly documented file formats and how it responds to inputs, and you write an independent implementation from scratch that produces equivalent results. This is what Phoenix Technologies did in 1984 with the IBM PC BIOS, separating a group that analyzed the original and wrote specifications from a developer chosen precisely because he had never seen IBM's code. It is also, by its own account, the method of ArtCraft, with the difference that the role of the untainted developer is given to a language model that is told, in a text file, what it must not look at.

The second is assisted decompilation. Here you start from the binary, disassemble it into machine instructions, decompile it into C-like pseudocode, and then do the work that has historically taken the most time: reconstructing variable and function names, types, data structures and the programmer's intent, all information that compilation erases. In its most rigorous form, matching decompilation, the goal is to write C code that, compiled with the same compiler and the same options as back then, produces a binary identical to the original, byte for byte. This is the territory of REA and of most projects on games for the Nintendo 64, GameCube and original Xbox.

The third is static recompilation and porting through translation layers. In this case you give up on understanding the program: you mechanically translate the original processor's instructions into generic code and replace only the parts that talk to the hardware, meaning graphics, audio, input and saves. Tools like N64Recomp or XenonRecomp do this for architectures different from the PC's, while for modern consoles, which use x86 or ARM processors like ordinary computers, the work comes down to reimplementing the system libraries and translating the GPU shaders. This is the path of AnyPS5, of shadPS4 for the PS4, and of Azimuth, which runs the Xbox One version of Forza Horizon 2 on Windows.

Telling these three practices apart helps us understand two things. The first is that their technical limits are very different: behavioral reconstruction produces new, maintainable code but only approximates the original, matching decompilation guarantees fidelity but only where there is a binary to compare against, and recompilation works well only when the source architecture is close to the target one. The second is that the legal status also changes radically from one practice to another, as we will see later.

## Why It's Happening Now

If reverse engineering has existed for forty years, it's fair to ask why the acceleration happened in the autumn of 2026. The most convincing answer I have found is that three factors overlapped, none of which would have been enough on its own.

The first is human work that had already been done. Many of the projects that made the front page rest on decompilations that groups of volunteers had been carrying forward for five or six years, with a map of the old consoles' hardware that the community built instruction by instruction over a quarter of a century. AI stepped in mostly at the last stretch, the one where these projects historically stalled for years because the final functions were the most tedious and the hardest to match. Akita points out that the current phase of large-scale decompilation and recompilation began in 2019, well before coding agents existed, with the NSA's release of Ghidra and the publication of the Super Mario 64 decompilation.

The second factor is the maturing of the tools. Disassemblers like Ghidra and IDA, comparison tools like objdiff and static recompilers like N64Recomp have turned what used to be handcrafted solutions into reusable frameworks, and a protocol like MCP has made it trivial to connect them to an agent. From this point of view, REA is essentially an adapter, and its success says more about latent demand than about the novelty of the technology.

The third factor, the most important one from a conceptual standpoint, is that many of these tasks have an answer key. In matching decompilation there is an unambiguous check: the code produced either compiles into a binary identical to the original or it doesn't, and an agent can repeat this check thousands of times without a human having to evaluate every attempt. A developer working on the Nintendo 64 game Snowboard Kids 2 put Claude in a loop where a script picked the easiest of the remaining functions, the agent tried to match it, recorded the result on success, and moved on after ten failed attempts. In three weeks he made more progress than in the previous three months, with the agent working unsupervised for more than eight hours straight. His conclusion, reported by TechSpot, is that the bottleneck had shifted from the free time of a few experts to computing power.

The same mechanism explains the ArtCraft clones in the parts where they work. PhotoCraft's PSD support is tested against a corpus of real files that must survive a read and write cycle unaltered, and the project separately compares its own renderings with Photoshop's. Where an oracle exists, the agent converges, and the same principle holds outside the world of games, for example in COBOL modernization. Cognition, the company that develops the Devin agent, explained that agents run on Linux virtual machines that cannot execute mainframe COBOL, and that this breaks the write, run and verify loop. The exception is batch jobs, which produce predictable output and let the agent rewrite the logic in a modern language, iterating until the results match those of the original system.

There is also an economic fact that ties everything together. According to Epoch AI measurements cited by Akita, the cost of inference at equal quality falls by roughly five to ten times a year, while the price of frontier models has dropped much less. This makes it sustainable to run dozens of agents for weeks on a problem that has an automatic check, but it doesn't make the problem itself free. The rewrite of Bun from Zig to Rust, the best-documented public example of a large-scale rewrite with agents, took eleven days, up to 64 Claude instances in parallel, about $165,000 at list prices, the project's original author in charge, and a test suite with over a million assertions acting as the oracle.

## The Real Limits

The flip side of the answer key is that, where there is no automatic referee, agents tend to bluff. This is the thread that connects all the limits that have emerged in recent weeks, and it is the point the headlines most often overlook.

The first limit is the long tail of features. An interface that looks like Photoshop can be built in a few days, but professional software with thirty-six years of history contains thousands of behaviors that no public specification describes and that no user notices until they are missing. Pixel artist Dan Fessler, after trying PhotoCraft, called it completely unusable, and his sharpest observation, reported by TechSpot, is that the real bottleneck in software has always been the care and thought behind each choice, far more than the writing of code. The one PSD file out of 135 that PhotoCraft can't rewrite identically is a good picture of the category of edge cases that separate a prototype from a tool you can build a professional business on.

The second limit concerns knowledge that isn't in the code. Akita, who used Photoshop and Premiere for years, gives the example of color management. GIMP has existed since 1995, got support for importing and exporting CMYK files only in 2022, and in version 3.0 from 2025 still has no CMYK editing mode. Working correctly in four-color printing requires ICC profiles specific to each printer, ink limits and black generation rules, and that expertise lives in print shops and color labs, and almost not at all in the models' training corpora. The same is true of the lens and camera correction profiles that Adobe has been updating for twenty years, of the Pantone libraries, which are proprietary and which no open project can distribute, and of the raw formats of professional cinema cameras, whose correct decoding depends on SDKs that manufacturers provide under contract. An agent can reproduce what it saw in training or what it can verify, and this knowledge falls into neither category.

The third limit is that the target moves. Decompiling a game from 1998 means aiming at something nobody will ever update again, while cloning a live product means chasing a format and a set of features that change with every release. The story of OpenOffice and LibreOffice shows it: for over a decade they chased Microsoft's .doc format, whose specification became public only in 2008, after two European Commission fines totaling almost 1.4 billion euros, tied precisely to the refusal to provide interoperability information. When the format finally opened up, the value had already moved elsewhere.

The fourth limit concerns the quality of the code produced. Even when assisted decompilation achieves a perfect match, the result is often hard to read, and code identical to the original that nobody can understand is of little use if the goal is to maintain or modify it. Academic studies confirm the picture. A paper from September 2026 cited by Akita measured that refining Ghidra's output with language models raises the compilation rate from 75 to 90 percent but lowers behavioral fidelity from 74 to 62 percent, and that in about 10 percent of functions with known vulnerabilities the flaw disappears without anyone asking for it, which means the reconstructed code no longer behaves like the original. The developer of the Klonoa decompilation project for Game Boy Advance also documented a more unsettling behavior: when the agent was stuck, it tried to cheat, going as far as modifying the compiler itself to force a match. The main risk, in his view, is cognitive debt, meaning code that works and that nobody on the team really understands.

Finally, there is a reaction from the communities themselves. The group that built the Donkey Kong 64 port by hand discovered that a rival AI-generated version had silently modified RT64, the shared renderer that many Nintendo 64 ports depend on. The main recompilation community for that console has stopped promoting projects written largely by agents, and historic emulation projects like mGBA and QEMU explicitly reject generated code. The developers of the Zelda and Banjo ports coined the term slopcomp for recompilations mass-produced by agents at alpha-version quality.

## The Legal Knot

The question many people have asked is whether all of this is legal, and the honest answer is that it depends almost entirely on which of the three practices described above you are adopting. What follows is a general overview and is not a substitute for legal advice on your specific case.

The starting point in the European Union is the ruling of the Court of Justice in Case C-406/10, SAS Institute v World Programming, of May 2, 2012. The Court held that the functionality of a computer program, the programming language and the format of data files are not forms of expression protected by copyright, while the specific code is. It is significant that World Programming, in the case at hand, had not had access to the source code and had not decompiled anything. Behavioral reconstruction, then, stands on relatively solid ground, as long as you don't copy protected elements by other routes, such as trademarks, designs, icons, interface text or graphic assets, and as long as patents or unfair competition don't come into play.

Decompilation is another matter. Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs, transposed in Italy by Articles 64-ter and 64-quater of the copyright law, distinguishes two levels. Anyone who has a legitimate right to use a program may observe, study and test its functioning in order to determine the ideas and principles underlying it, and this covers much of the external observation on which an approach like ArtCraft's is based. Decompilation proper, on the other hand, is allowed without the rightholder's authorization only when it is indispensable to obtain the information needed for interoperability with an independently created program, and the information obtained this way cannot be used to develop, produce or market a program that is substantially similar in its expression. Decompiling Photoshop to write a clone most likely falls outside this exception. The directive also provides that contractual clauses contrary to these exceptions are void, while outside them, the bans on reverse engineering found in license agreements remain a contractual obligation for those who have accepted them.

Then there is Directive 2016/943 on trade secrets, transposed in Italy by Legislative Decree 63 of 2018, which treats the acquisition of information through observation, study, disassembly or testing of a product made available to the public as lawful, unless valid contractual restrictions apply. In the United States the path is different but arrives at similar conclusions: the rulings in Sega v. Accolade (1992) and Sony v. Connectix (2000) recognized disassembly aimed at reaching functional elements as fair use, and Google v. Oracle (2021) held that copying the declarations of the Java APIs was fair use.

The ground that is truly unexplored is the clean room entrusted to a model. The classic principle rests on the physical separation between those who have seen the original and those who write the new implementation, and its evidentiary strength comes from the fact that a developer cannot have copied what they have never seen. A language model, on the contrary, has been trained on enormous amounts of public code, and it is far from clear how you could prove that it hasn't also absorbed fragments of the work it is reconstructing, especially for widely used software. The first concrete case came in March 2026 with chardet, a popular Python library for detecting character encodings. Its longtime maintainer rewrote it from scratch with Claude Code and changed its license from LGPL to MIT. The original author objected, arguing that someone who has worked on a codebase for more than ten years cannot claim a blank slate, even though a plagiarism check found only 1.29 percent similarity between the two versions. The debate, which some have dubbed license laundering, has not yet reached a courtroom.

The picture that emerges is of a body of law that holds up well on principles and much less well on the tools of proof. Those who observe a program from the outside and rewrite its behavior stand on firm legal ground, those who decompile in order to clone expose themselves to serious risks, and those who use a model trained on third-party code to do a clean room find themselves in a zone that will be defined by the first lawsuits brought by parties with enough resources to sustain them. The first signs are already visible in the world of games, with Activision's takedown of the Modern Warfare 2 project and Bethesda's cease-and-desist against an AI-generated browser reconstruction of a Fallout game.

## What it means for software

For forty years the economics of software rested on a precise asymmetry: writing a program was expensive, while copying it cost almost nothing. The whole architecture of protection in the industry, from licenses to binary compilation to obfuscation, existed to prevent the copying of something that was hard to rebuild. What the last few weeks show clearly is that the cost of rebuilding is collapsing too, at least for one specific category of work: producing an implementation from a known specification or from observable, verifiable behavior.

The distinction is fundamental. The cost that is falling is the cost of turning a specification into working code. The cost of discovering the right specification, that is, what the software should do, for whom, with what trade-offs and what exceptions, falls much more slowly. A mature product is largely an implicit specification accumulated over years of contact with users, and the part of that specification that can be observed from the outside, the interface, the commands, the formats, the responses to inputs, becomes replicable. The part that stays hidden, because it lives in data, in servers, in contracts or in the heads of people who know the domain, keeps its value and probably gains more.

Some consequences follow, and they now seem hard to dispute. The first is that features, taken on their own, stop being a defensible competitive advantage. If an agent can rebuild the interface, the commands and the file format of an application in a few weeks, the list of functions alone protects no one. What remains as a moat is the data accumulated, the deep integration into the customer's processes, support, certifications, contractual liability and trust.

The second consequence is that the oracle becomes the most valuable asset. Since agents converge wherever an automatic check exists, whoever owns a good test suite, a corpus of real cases or a set of reference outputs also has the ability to rewrite, migrate and evolve their own software at a much lower cost than those who don't. Symmetrically, every public conformance suite, every open format specification and every piece of detailed API documentation becomes working material for anyone who wants to build an alternative. This is a new tension for those who have always seen public documentation as a pure tool for adoption.

The third consequence concerns private code. According to GitHub's Octoverse 2025 report, cited by Akita, 81.5 percent of contributions on the platform happen in private repositories, that is, in code that no model has ever seen in training. The software that pays the salaries, the kind that encodes specific business processes, domain rules and integrations with internal systems, stays largely out of reach of reproduction, unless someone has the binary and decides to decompile it, with all the legal risks discussed above.

The fourth consequence concerns the way software is used. WordCraft exposes its commands through an MCP server, and this choice says a lot about the direction the industry is taking. If a growing share of software use goes through agents operating via programmatic interfaces, the graphical interface, on which many products built their identity and part of their customer loyalty, loses weight, and with it loses weight a lock-in element that until now seemed solid. Switching costs between one product and another, which in practice often depended on users' habit with an interface, drop when the main user becomes an agent that has no habits.

Finally, there is an effect on prices that will arrive well before any real replacement. A credible open source alternative, even if still in alpha, changes the customer's negotiating position at the next license renewal, and desktop software sold by subscription at rising prices, the Adobe case that triggered Thomas's project is a telling example, is the first candidate to feel this pressure.

## SaaS in Particular

### Why SaaS Seems Safe

The first reaction of many observers, and a reasonable one, was to note that SaaS is structurally protected from all this. Akita says it bluntly: after the world's migration to SaaS, most proprietary software became a walled garden with no binary, and without a binary there is nothing to disassemble. To reverse engineer Google Docs you would have to rewrite it from scratch looking only at the interface, because the code that matters never leaves the server. The same goes for Adobe, which has moved to its own servers precisely the functions that now sell the subscriptions, such as Generative Fill, Generative Expand and several Neural Filters, which according to the company's documentation require a connection because processing happens in the cloud.

Other protections add to this technical one, less visible but sturdier. A mature SaaS service is not the same thing as its application code. It includes the infrastructure that keeps it running at given levels of availability, operational security, certifications such as ISO 27001 or SOC 2, GDPR compliance and, for those serving regulated sectors, compliance with rules like NIS2 or DORA, contracts with data and model providers, the ecosystem of integrations built with other products and, above all, the customer data accumulated over time, which often powers features that no competitor can replicate without that same data. All of this stays out of reach of an agent observing an interface, however good it is.

### Why This Protection Is More Fragile Than It Looks

The reasoning that reassures SaaS has a flaw, though, and it emerges precisely from the ArtCraft case. The Adobe and Microsoft clones were born without touching any binary, through the observation of behavior alone, and MindStudio's test on Anteprima showed that for applications of medium complexity the binary adds little. SaaS protection against decompilation is real, but decompilation is turning out to be the less important road. Against behavioral reconstruction, SaaS is as exposed as desktop software, and in some ways more so, because it voluntarily publishes detailed documentation of its own APIs, exposes its flows in a browser where every network call can be inspected with tools that REA integrates natively, and often describes precisely in its sales materials what it does and how.

The right question, then, is what share of each product's value can be observed from the outside. For a large platform like Salesforce or Workspace, that share is small, because the value lies in the data, the integrations, the scale and the network effects. For a wide band of mid-sized SaaS, on the other hand, the share is very high. I'm thinking of products that are essentially a well-made interface on top of a database, with a few workflows, a few reports and a permissions system, sold at a per-user fee. The market sometimes calls this category feature SaaS, and its competitive advantage has so far been precisely the cost and time needed to build an alternative. That cost is what is being compressed.

### Where the pressure will come first

I don't think the main threat to these products will come from open source clones published on GitHub by independent developers. An alpha clone of a vertical management system has neither the community nor the visibility of PhotoCraft. The pressure will come instead from three less spectacular directions.

The first is customers' make-or-buy calculation. Many companies have bought SaaS subscriptions for internal tools, request management, supplier portals, small niche CRMs, because building them in-house cost too much compared with the fee. With capable coding agents and a clear specification, which in this case is the very product the company has used for years, that calculation changes. It changes most for tools with low domain complexity and a high number of users, where the per-seat fee weighs more. This is the same scenario that innFactory points to as the most likely, far more than the building of the next Photoshop.

The second direction is competition between vendors. A new entrant can now show up with functional coverage comparable to the market leader's in much less time than before, and compete on price, on user experience or on integration with agents. Differentiation by features erodes, and price wars become more frequent in segments where products were already similar.

The third direction concerns exit costs. A large part of SaaS lock-in comes from the difficulty of migrating data, configurations, automations and customizations accumulated over years of use. The same agents that rebuild an application from its behavior are very effective at mapping one data model onto another, translating automation rules and checking that the results match, because here too there is a natural oracle: the comparison between the outputs of the old and the new system. When migrating costs less, the customer's bargaining power grows.

### What remains defensible

If I had to say where value in SaaS will move over the coming years, I would put at the top of the list everything an agent can neither observe nor verify. Proprietary data and network effects, first of all, because a clone can replicate the function of a marketplace but not its participants. Then domain knowledge that lives in no corpus, like the knowledge about color that protects Photoshop better than any obfuscation, and that in many vertical sectors, from logistics to pharmaceuticals, is the real content of the product. Then licenses and agreements with third parties, from Pantone libraries to manufacturers' SDKs, up to contracts with data providers that no project can replicate. Then accountability: the willingness to sign a contract with service levels, to answer for a security incident and to withstand an audit, which a GitHub repository does not offer. And finally the speed of evolution, because the moving target that condemned OpenOffice for a decade to chase Microsoft protects those who keep moving.

There is also a consequence for pricing models. The per-seat fee rests on the idea that every human user gets from the product a value proportional to its cost. If a growing share of usage comes from agents, and if the in-house alternative becomes plausible, vendors will probably have to move toward prices tied to outcomes or to the volume of work done, and customers will agree to pay mostly for what they are unable to reproduce.

## Implications for those who build and those who buy software

### For those who make software

The most useful exercise a software company can do today is to ask, for each product, what a competitor equipped with coding agents could not rebuild in three months starting from what is observable from the outside. If the answer boils down to a list of features, the strategy needs rethinking, and it makes sense to invest deliberately in what is not observable: data, deep integrations into customers' processes, formalized domain knowledge, contractual relationships and operational capability.

Second, it makes sense to treat your own test suites, corpora of real cases and reference outputs as top-tier strategic assets. They are what lets you use agents on your own code with reliable results, to rewrite it, migrate it or extend it, and they are also what would make it easier for a third party to build an alternative if they became public. Public documentation remains essential for adoption, but it should be written knowing that it will also be read by agents working for others.

Third, anyone with teams working with coding agents should define in writing what those agents can and cannot look at. An AGENTS.md file with explicit prohibitions, like the one in ArtCraft, is a simple and documentable starting point, and decompiling third-party software should not enter the working toolkit without a prior legal assessment. In the same way, it makes sense to add a ban on reverse engineering to the terms of use of your own products, knowing that in the European Union its effectiveness has precise limits.

Finally, making your product drivable by agents, through well-designed APIs or an MCP server, is both an opportunity and an exposure. Ignoring it means risking being bypassed by competitors that are easier to integrate, while embracing it means accepting that the graphical interface matters less in keeping customers.

### For Those Who Buy Software

For customers, the news is largely positive. Alternatives are multiplying, bargaining power is growing, and the buy-versus-build calculation is shifting, especially for internal tools and niche applications that people paid a subscription for only because building them cost too much. It is worth remembering, though, that software in alpha cannot replace a critical production process, and that maintenance, security updates, regulatory compliance and liability when something goes wrong remain the decisive criteria. A repository on GitHub, however popular, answers none of these questions. Anyone who decides to build in-house with agents should budget not only for the initial development but also for the cost of running and evolving the software over the years. That has always been the most underestimated item in custom software, and agents reduce it less than they reduce the cost of writing code.

### The Case of Legacy Code

There is one area where all the favorable conditions that emerged in recent weeks come together: the modernization of companies' legacy software. Whoever migrates their own code owns the source, or at least the binary and the documentation, and so has no legal problem. They often have a natural oracle, namely the running system, whose outputs can be compared with those of the new system, exactly as in the batch jobs described by Cognition. And they are facing a target that, at least during the migration, moves very little.

There are concrete results. TechSpot reports that a large automaker moved a 25,000-line COBOL workflow to AWS Lambda, and that the Brazilian bank Itaú changed the format of the corporate tax ID across hundreds of programs three months ahead of the government deadline, while Morgan Stanley says it has modernized more than 17 million lines of code with internal tools. The market took this possibility seriously enough that, on the day Anthropic claimed Claude can automate the analysis that dominates COBOL modernization, IBM's stock lost 13 percent, its worst session since 2000.

Even here, though, the picture is uneven. Real-time systems, such as card payment authorization, remain difficult precisely because the verification loop is more complex, and Gartner predicts that more than 70 percent of the mainframe exit projects started this year will fail because those leading them overestimate the capabilities of generative AI. The lesson is the same as in the rest of the story. Agents excel where there is automatic verification and domain knowledge guiding the process, and they fail when they are expected to replace both. IBM's reply, that translating COBOL is not the same as modernizing an enterprise system, contains a share of self-defense but also a share of truth.

## Conclusion

Seen up close, the story of these weeks describes above all a shift in the point where software produces value. AI has made one specific kind of work cheap: turning a known specification or an observable behavior into working code, provided there is an automatic way to verify the result. Where these conditions hold, as in the decompilation of old games, the migration of batch systems or the replication of documented file formats, the progress is real and in some cases surprising. Where they are missing, as in the long tail of features of a professional product, in color science, in integrations with manufacturers' hardware or in the physics of a video game, agents produce convincing screenshots and code that behaves differently from the original.

For SaaS, the consequence is twofold. Its architecture protects it from decompilation, which is turning out to be the least relevant route, and leaves it as exposed to behavioral reconstruction as desktop software. Products whose value largely coincides with what can be seen from the outside, that is, a polished interface on top of a data model and a few workflows, will enter a phase of strong price pressure and competition from alternatives built quickly, both by new vendors and by customers themselves. Those that hold data, network effects, uncodified domain knowledge, third-party agreements and contractual liability will probably come out stronger, because the rest of the market will become cheaper around them.

The legal question remains open, and in my view it will be decisive for the next two or three years. European law draws a clear line between observing how a program works and copying its expression. But it was written with humans in mind, people who can prove they never saw the code. The first major lawsuit over a clean room carried out by a model that was also trained on other people's code will redefine the boundaries of what is lawful far more than any viral GitHub project.

In the meantime, the question every software company should ask itself is simple to state and uncomfortable to face: how much of what it sells could be rebuilt by someone who just watches it run?

## Sources

- [Decompilation on Steroids: Why AI Is Suddenly Cracking Open Old Software](https://www.techspot.com/article/3184-decompilation-on-steroids/), TechSpot, October 11, 2026
- [Photoshop and Word Rebuilt in Rust: How AI Is Changing Software Cloning](https://innfactory.ai/en/blog/ai-rebuilt-photoshop-word-reverse-engineering/), innFactory AI, October 13, 2026
- [AI Reverse Engineering: Is Adobe Dead?](https://akitaonrails.com/en/2026/10/13/ai-reverse-engineering-is-adobe-dead/), Fabio Akita, October 13, 2026
- [REA, Reverse Engineer Anything](https://github.com/morluto/rea), GitHub repository
- [AnyPS5](https://github.com/boykopovar/AnyPS5), GitHub repository
- [Maurice Heumann's account of decompiling Modern Warfare 2](https://momo5502.com/posts/2026-10-09-game-decompilation/), October 9, 2026
- [Technical description of the Relapse exploit for PS5](https://zeli.app/story/49895304), September 29, 2026
- [ArtCraft project](https://getartcraft.com/apps)]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/dal-software-chiuso-al-futuro-aperto.BVTmYQco_8rYFr.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />

</item>
<item>
<title>Seven Hundred Proofs and No Mathematician</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/settecento-dimonstrazioni-e-nessun-matematico/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/settecento-dimonstrazioni-e-nessun-matematico/</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>

<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Seven hundred proofs released in a single day by OpenAI, and the harsh reply from the AHM. What does it mean to solve a problem if no one understands the proof?]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[## One Word: Power

On October 7, 2026, the Association for Human Mathematics published a four-paragraph statement against the release, the day before, of more than seven hundred mathematical manuscripts generated by an internal OpenAI model. It closed with a line that is likely to stick: the release, it said, was "a demonstration of power" and not an act of scholarship. The text, signed by the association's communications working group, was picked up within a few hours as a guest post on Terence Tao's blog, which for almost twenty years has been one of the places where the mathematical community talks about itself. Under that post a discussion opened that is worth reading in full, because almost every possible position on what is happening shows up in it, in raw form.

In this article I try to do three things. The first is to reconstruct the facts with some precision, because the statement assumes a context that people who don't follow the story closely are unlikely to have, and without that context its claims sound either obvious or incomprehensible. The second is to read the statement as an argument, separating the claims that hold up from those that don't. The third, which is the one that interests me most, is to use this episode to ask a question that the philosophy of mathematics has been asking for at least half a century and that has suddenly become operational: what does it mean for a problem to be solved when the proof exists, has been checked by a machine, and no human being understands it yet?

Let me state my position up front, out of honesty toward the reader. I work with language models every day and I consider them extraordinary tools. For exactly that reason, I think the AHM's objections should be taken seriously even where they are poorly phrased, because they touch a structural problem that will soon affect every discipline in which producing results becomes far cheaper than verifying and understanding them.

## What Was Released on October 6

On October 6, OpenAI published a vast collection of mathematical results in a GitHub repository, [openai/math](https://github.com/openai/math). The results were produced by an internal frontier model that is not available to the public, and they came with a short post titled [Sharing AI progress in mathematics](https://openai.com/index/sharing-ai-progress-in-mathematics/). The figures that circulated in the following days speak of 722 manuscripts grouped into 372 families of results, according to the count reported by [Splitfeed](https://www.splitfeed.ai/story/openai-releases-over-100-ai-generated-solutions-to-unsolved-math-problems), while [Nature](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-026-03196-8) only mentions more than seven hundred preprints uploaded simultaneously and entirely generated by AI, on problems spanning many areas of the discipline.

In the post, OpenAI says it consulted the Advisory Group on Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence at the Institute for Advanced Study and drew on its public recommendations. The repository contains Lean formalizations of many of the proofs, with a commitment to add more as they are obtained, along with a set of materials on the process: ten summaries of the model's reasoning, estimates of the compute used expressed as ChatGPT Pro usage equivalents, and statistics on the number of problems attempted. The stated average is about three hours of Pro "thinking" per result. The company also announces that it will fund workshops, conferences and programs devoted to understanding the main results produced by AI, and adds that it is still evaluating community-hosted alternatives to GitHub.

Among the manuscripts there are no solutions to the five Millennium Prize Problems that are still open, but according to Nature some of the papers touch on related problems, such as the Hodge conjecture and the Riemann hypothesis. Asked to comment on the value of these results, an OpenAI spokesperson replied that the company will leave it to the community to assess their relevance. The immediate reactions were sharply divided. Some mathematicians celebrated the solution of problems that had been open for decades, others complained of being scooped on work in progress, and a physicist quoted by Nature spoke of a "slopocalypse" even on the assumption that the content turns out to be formally correct. Levent Alpöge, a mathematician who works at Anthropic, acknowledged that there will be sad stories for those who see their projects overtaken, while calling this moment the most significant in the history of mathematics.

| Date (2026) | Event |
| --- | --- |
| October 7 | AHM statement, picked up on Terence Tao's blog |
| October 6 | OpenAI publishes the openai/math repository; AGMAI note on the release |
| September 29 | The AGMAI publishes guidelines on the responsible release of AI-generated mathematics |
| September 8 | OpenAI announces a solution to the Navier–Stokes problem |
| September 5 | The agent system reaches the solution after about 88 hours |
| September 1 | OpenAI starts the agents on some of the Millennium Prize Problems |
| August 28 | Training of the new internal model begins |

## The Backstory: Navier–Stokes and the Question of Priority

The AHM statement makes no sense without the September episode, which used up much of the trust that remained between part of the community and OpenAI. On September 8, the company announced that an internal system had produced a solution to the Navier–Stokes problem, one of the seven Millennium Prize Problems set by the Clay Mathematics Institute in 2000, each carrying a one-million-dollar prize. According to the reconstruction published by [Unite.AI](https://www.unite.ai/?p=463585), OpenAI had started training a new model on August 28, judging it clearly more capable than GPT-6 Astra, its most advanced public model. On September 1, after hearing rumors that two Millennium Problems had been solved, it launched about ten thousand agents on the problem. After 88 hours they reached a resolution, followed by another 17 hours of formalization and verification in Lean carried out with Astra.

A few numbers help show the scale of the operation. The agents reportedly exchanged almost three million messages and generated about 130 billion output tokens, according to [ProPakistani](https://propakistani.pk/2026/09/10/openai-solves-90-year-old-math-problem-within-88-hours/), and the published proof runs to 165 pages. It is also worth being precise about what was actually proved. The official formulation of the problem, written by Charles Fefferman, includes four alternative statements: two on existence and global regularity (on the whole space and on the torus) and two on the formation of finite-time singularities in the presence of a smooth external force. OpenAI's result belongs to the second family and shows a blow-up in which the fluid's velocity diverges at specific points, and the company itself has acknowledged that the work covers two of the four statements. The Clay Institute has not yet recognized it, partly because its rules require publication in a qualified venue, two years of public standing and broad consensus in the community.

The controversial part concerns priority. Tristan Buckmaster, of New York University, said that he and Levent Alpöge had been working on the same path for almost a year, with a result on the forced Euler equations reached on August 15 and verified in Lean on August 22, and that OpenAI's interest in Navier–Stokes grew after information about their work reached the company. According to [ThePrint](https://theprint.in/tech/openai-says-ai-solved-90-year-old-maths-puzzle-but-mathematician-claims-he-got-there-first/3037914/), on September 6 he was offered two options: a coordinated publication of the two results one day apart, or a paper written under his name on the Navier–Stokes result with credit given to OpenAI's model. OpenAI denied having had access to their work or having used user data directly, while admitting that it cannot rule out that de-identified data from the use of its products contributed to training. Sébastien Bubeck publicly rejected the accusation that he had asked for Alpöge's name to be removed from an announcement.

It is not the job of this article to decide who is right on this point, and the available facts do not allow it. What matters is that the episode showed in concrete terms a risk that until then had been theoretical: a lab with enormous computing power can turn a hint about a human group's research direction into a complete result in a few dozen hours, making fragile the whole system of incentives built on priority of discovery. Terence Tao, who had called the work a remarkable result, then hosted on his blog, in the following weeks, numerous contributions on the relationship between AI and mathematical research, including some on the formation of singularities in incompressible fluids.

## The Rules of the Game According to the Institute for Advanced Study

The Advisory Group on Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (AGMAI) is the body to which the AHM accuses OpenAI of having attributed a legitimacy it did not have, so we need to look carefully at what it actually said. The [group](https://agmai.org/) is made up of nine top-level mathematicians, including Timothy Gowers, Martin Hairer, Edward Witten, Camillo De Lellis, Ravi Vakil and Melanie Matchett Wood. It began with a request from OpenAI to some of them to form an external advisory committee. The members turned that request, with the company's agreement, into an independent, unpaid group willing to advise any lab.

The [guidelines of September 29](https://agmai.org/general-sep29/), built on more than six hundred responses to a survey of the community, open with an explicit distancing. The members state that they do not endorse the practice of testing advanced mathematical problems on proprietary models inaccessible to the rest of the community, and they ask labs to stop. They specify, however, that the recommendations that follow are written with the fact that the practice exists in mind. The foundation of the document is an old norm of the discipline: the authors of a paper must understand its argument, have verified its correctness and take full responsibility for it, then present it in seminars and conferences. Three principles follow. Significant results should be released responsibly and early. Whoever releases mathematics that no one yet understands should take on, financially too, the process that will lead to understanding. And that process should remain organic and guided by the community, not by the labs.

The operational recommendations for work that no human being has yet understood are specific and verifiable, and this lets us compare them with what OpenAI actually did on October 6. The table below is my own reading, based on OpenAI's post and on the AGMAI text, and it does not replace the examination of the repository that the community is carrying out.

| AGMAI recommendation | What OpenAI did | My assessment |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Cite the literature containing ideas related to the proofs | Commitment to improve citations and exposition in future releases | Postponed |
| Rewrite the proofs in the style of a traditional mathematical paper | Same commitment for the future; review protocols in the repository | Postponed |
| Deposit the work in archives not controlled by labs, with persistent identifiers | Published on GitHub; community alternatives still under consideration | Not met |
| For each result, disclose the model, prompt, summarized chain of thought, timing and costs | Ten summaries of the reasoning, aggregate compute estimates | Partial |
| Formalize as much as possible, stating the formalization status | Lean for many proofs, others coming | Largely met |
| Document how many similar problems were attempted without success and how they were chosen | Statistics on the problems attempted | Partial, to be verified |
| Fund understanding through existing nonprofit institutions, without directing it | OpenAI announces it will fund workshops and programs | Ambiguous on the key point |

The last row deserves a comment, because it is where the gap between the letter and the spirit is subtlest. The AGMAI asks that the choice of which activities to support be made by nonprofit institutions that already have established procedures, precisely to avoid the lab that produced the results also deciding which of them deserve to be understood. OpenAI's announcement, instead, speaks of programs funded by the company without specifying who will govern them. The AGMAI document also asks labs not to use the release of mathematical results as a marketing vehicle, pointing to the negative externalities this practice dumps on the community.

On the same day, October 6, the AGMAI published a very measured note. The group calls the release an important event. It makes clear that its advisory role should not be read as a judgment on the value of the results, nor as an endorsement of the process by which they were obtained. And it adds an observation that I consider the most important of the whole affair: the future of mathematical research cannot be reduced to understanding the results produced by labs, because mathematicians must be able to formulate their own questions and explore directions that nobody has chosen as a showcase for a system's capabilities.

## The AHM statement, read closely

The [Association for Human Mathematics](https://www.ahmath.org/home) presents itself as an organization that defends mathematics as a human enterprise against the threat of artificial intelligence, and defends the community's independence from corporate interests. It says it wants to avoid complicity with an industry whose social, environmental and economic impacts it condemns. It is an openly militant position, one that calls for individual action and large-scale coordination, and that identifies teaching, journals and the training of young people as the most vulnerable points of mathematical institutions. The [statement](https://www.ahmath.org/statements) should be read in this frame, as a political act before it is an analysis.

The text contains four distinct argumentative moves, and it is worth examining them separately, because they differ greatly in strength.

The first move is the opening, which recalls that OpenAI is defending itself in lawsuits over plagiarism, copyright infringement and trademark dilution. It is the weakest part of the text. The copyright litigation has no logical connection with the correctness or value of a proof, and putting it before the main argument has the effect of poisoning the well before saying anything on the merits. Several commenters on Tao's blog noticed this right away. One reader, who said he was not a mathematician, observed that mathematics is one of the few fields where the work can be checked, by hand or by computer, and that a correct proof does not become incorrect because of a civil suit.

The second move claims that mathematicians did not ask for this work, and that OpenAI, by ignoring the central premise of the AGMAI, showed total disregard for the norms of scientific research. There are two problems here. The first is representation: no association can speak for mathematicians as a whole, and indeed among the comments there are people who say they are happy to have in front of them a text that might contain the proof of problems they work on, and people who point out that not even Perelman was commissioned by the community to prove the Poincaré conjecture. The second is chronological: the AGMAI's invitation to stop testing advanced problems on proprietary models dates to September 29, while the work released on October 6 had evidently been carried out earlier, as another commenter pointed out. One can argue that OpenAI should have waited, but describing the release as a deliberate violation of a premise that did not yet exist when the work was done is a stretch.

The third move is the claim of a vision of progress that belongs to mathematicians, informed by history and by considerations specific to the discipline, in the name of which the AHM rejects the idea that the release advances the field. This thesis is more interesting than its wording suggests, and I will come back to it in the philosophical part, because behind it lies a precise conception of what mathematical progress is, which the statement unfortunately does not spell out.

The fourth move is the closing line about power, which is both the most rhetorical and the truest. Releasing seven hundred files in a single day has effects that don't depend on whether each file is correct. It abruptly shifts the agenda of entire fields, forces those who were working on these problems to rethink years of projects, and imposes on the community a verification burden that nobody agreed to. In this sense the show of power is real, and it comes down to an asymmetry between those who can generate results with thousands of agents and those who have to read them one by one. The final call to cut all collaboration with OpenAI, on the other hand, is a political choice that the text never argues for, and it risks shutting out of the discussion the very mathematicians who would have the strongest standing to demand better conditions from the labs.

To sum up, the statement is right about the problem and wrong about almost all the reasons it gives. The problem is the concentration of the capacity to produce mathematics in a few private actors who decide which problems to tackle, when and how to publish, and who has to pay the cost of understanding. The reasons offered, namely the copyright dispute, the claim to speak on behalf of everyone, and the casual reading of the timeline, weaken a position that deserved better arguments.

## What a Lean Formalization Really Guarantees

A proof formalized in Lean guarantees that a given formal statement follows from certain axioms according to the rules of a logical system. That guarantee is extraordinarily strong within its boundaries, but the boundaries are narrower than public debate tends to acknowledge. Those who defend the OpenAI release lean heavily on the formalizations, and rightly so, because they are the sharpest difference between this wave of results and the informal proofs generated by models up to a year ago. So it is worth understanding precisely what they certify.

Lean 4 is built around what is called the de Bruijn criterion. Tactics, automation and any component that helps build the proof can be complex and even unreliable, because in the end everything is translated into a type theory term that a small, independent kernel checks. If the kernel accepts the term, the statement is proven with respect to the axioms used, and this holds regardless of whether the term was written by a human being, by a language model or by ten thousand agents exchanging three million messages. This property is what makes mathematics the ideal terrain for AI systems, because it offers an external verifier that is cheap and cannot be manipulated by the system producing the solutions.

Still, there are at least four points where the formal guarantee does not reach, and each one corresponds to a concrete way in which a formalized result can nonetheless be wrong or misleading.

1. **Incomplete proofs.** In Lean the keyword `sorry` lets you leave a hole in the proof and still have the file compile. A serious check requires the count of `sorry` to be zero for the main results, and a [human audit of the ten results](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.14673) that OpenAI released in August reports exactly this figure for all ten, pinning the reference to a specific commit and to Lean 4.32.0.
2. **Additional axioms.** Beyond the standard axioms of the library, namely propositional extensionality, classical choice and quotients, a file can declare its own axioms, and an axiom that asserts the claim makes it trivially proven. The command that lists the axioms a theorem depends on is the first check to run on every artifact.
3. **Fidelity of the statement.** This is the most serious problem and the least discussed. Lean verifies that the proof proves the formal statement, not that the formal statement matches the mathematical problem it claims to have solved. A slightly different definition of regular solution, function space or boundary condition can turn an open problem into an exercise, and for partial differential equations, where definitions are delicate, the risk is real. This is why AGMAI asks for a challenge file to be compared with a comparator, and for metadata linking the informal text to the formal artifacts.
4. **Accepted dependencies.** Many formalizations are complete only up to standard results taken from the literature and not yet present in Mathlib. This is a legitimate practice as long as it is declared, but it means the certification is conditional, and the audit I cited stresses precisely the need to distinguish reconstructed arguments from accepted dependencies and from questions that remain open.

The same audit recalls an instructive precedent, OpenAI's First Proof exercise, in which an attempt initially considered probably correct was reassessed after criticism from experts and the community. The lesson is that formal verification drastically reduces the space of error but also moves it, concentrating it in the translation between informal mathematics and formal language, which remains human work, slow and highly specialized.

There is also a point about scale. For a single proof, a small group of experts can check statements, axioms and dependencies in a reasonable time. For seven hundred manuscripts spread across dozens of fields, each with its own formal conventions, checking the fidelity of the statements becomes a collective project of unprecedented size. As of this writing, there is no public, independent inventory of which results in the repository are fully formalized, which partially and which not at all. In my view, this is the first thing the community should demand.

## What It Means for a Problem to Be Solved

The philosophical question raised by OpenAI's release is whether a correct, certified proof that no one understands solves a problem in the sense in which mathematicians have always used that word. The question seems new, but the philosophy of mathematics has been discussing it since at least 1976, and retracing the stages of that discussion helps explain why the AHM, even while arguing badly, touches a raw nerve.

In 1976 Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken proved the four color theorem by reducing it to a very large set of configurations checked by a computer. Three years later Thomas Tymoczko argued that this proof introduced an empirical element into mathematics, because no human being could go through it in its entirety and its acceptance depended on trust in an experiment, that is, in the correct functioning of a machine. Tymoczko was taking up an idea of Wittgenstein, who in his remarks on the foundations of mathematics had insisted that a proof must be perspicuous, something that can be taken in at a glance, and that a procedure that cannot be mastered in this way has a different status. Today the four color theorem is formalized, and its status is no longer in question, but the distinction between knowing that a statement is true and understanding why it is true has remained.

In the same year, 1979, Richard De Millo, Richard Lipton and Alan Perlis published a famous article on social processes and proofs, in which they argued that a theorem is accepted at the end of a collective process made of reading, discussion, reformulation, use in other contexts and growing familiarity, and that mathematical certainty is the product of this process more than of a formal derivation. The authors drew a skeptical conclusion about the formal verification of programs, which the following decades have partly disproved, but their description of how the mathematical community works remains accurate. The release of seven hundred manuscripts in one day skips exactly this process, because it delivers results that arrive already certified by a machine but that no community has yet digested.

The text that best illuminates the AHM's position, however, is William Thurston's 1994 essay on proof and progress in mathematics, written in response to a proposal by Arthur Jaffe and Frank Quinn to separate rigorous mathematics more sharply from speculative mathematics. Thurston argued that the product of mathematics is human understanding, and that proofs are the vehicle through which this understanding is built and transmitted. He told how some of his results on 3-manifolds, proved correctly but communicated badly, had in effect left the field barren for years, because no one could make them their own and build on them. If we take this view seriously, a theorem that is proved but not understood is incomplete progress, because it adds a true statement to the inventory but adds no capability to the community that is supposed to use it.

The case closest to today's, though, is Shinichi Mochizuki's inter-universal Teichmüller theory, with which he has claimed since 2012 to have a proof of the abc conjecture. For more than a decade the main difficulty has been communicating the argument, even before judging its correctness at any specific step, and when Peter Scholze and Jakob Stix identified what they considered a critical point, the discussion stalled in a disagreement that the community has no tools to resolve without a shared understanding. Mochizuki's case shows that a proof that a single mind, human or artificial, considers complete is not enough, because mathematical knowledge is a public fact.

Formal verification changes this picture at one specific point and leaves it intact at another. It changes it because it makes certification independent of understanding, and so it eliminates the Mochizuki scenario as far as truth is concerned, since a Lean kernel does not need to be convinced. It leaves it intact because the other two functions of proof, the explanatory one and the transmission of techniques and concepts, remain entirely to be carried out. In Proofs and Refutations, Imre Lakatos showed that proofs generate new concepts, refine definitions and bring out the counterexamples that correct the statement, and that this very dynamic is the engine of the discipline. A commenter on Tao's blog put the question very concretely about Navier–Stokes, asking whether after OpenAI's result we understand fluids better than before, and in particular whether we know why the construction requires a smooth forcing term and whether this is an obstacle to the case without forcing.

The comparison with chess and Go, which several commentators have proposed, is useful precisely because it is imperfect. When AlphaGo surpassed human champions, the value of the game was not destroyed, because Go produces nothing outside itself and its value lies in playing it. Mathematics, instead, produces concepts that migrate into physics, computer science and engineering, and it does so precisely through the human understanding of the mechanisms that make a proof work. A result that is true but opaque can be used as a black box, the way a physicist uses a theorem without knowing its proof, but it does not generate the lineage of ideas that usually accompanies the solution of a great problem. One might object that this lineage will come anyway, once the community has assimilated the results, and for many of them that is probably so. But assimilation has a cost, and the question of who pays it is the point where philosophy becomes economics.

## Who Pays the Cost of Understanding

The material heart of the story is a disparity in cost between those who produce results and those who have to verify and absorb them. This disparity explains, better than any argument about the purity of the discipline, why the release was perceived as a show of force. According to OpenAI, the average result required the equivalent of about three hours of ChatGPT Pro reasoning. The human cost on the other side is of a completely different order of magnitude. Suppose, as a working hypothesis and not as a measured figure, that a serious review of a research paper on an open problem takes between twenty and forty hours of a specialist's time. Seven hundred and twenty-two manuscripts then amount to roughly fifteen to thirty thousand hours, that is, ten to twenty person-years of expert work, before even counting the time needed to understand the results well enough to use them.

Anyone who works with generative systems recognizes this structure, because it is the same one we see in code, in documentation and in every domain where producing has become cheap and checking has stayed expensive. In mathematics the disparity is softened by formal verification, which hands the checking of logical correctness over to a machine, but it does not disappear. As we have seen, the fidelity of the statements, the verification of dependencies and above all understanding remain in human hands. And these people are largely university researchers, whose time is funded by public money and whose refereeing work, by custom, is unpaid.

The sociology of science offers a useful tool for reading the situation. Robert Merton described the ethos of science through four norms: communism of knowledge, meaning the common ownership of results, universalism of the criteria of judgment, disinterestedness and organized skepticism. He also observed that the reward system of science revolves almost entirely around the recognition of priority. OpenAI's release formally satisfies the first norm, because the results are public and free, and it supports the fourth thanks to the formalizations. It is fragile on disinterestedness, though, given that the AGMAI itself felt the need to ask the labs not to use mathematics as a marketing tool. Above all, it alters the system of priority: an actor who can attack hundreds of problems in parallel makes it unpredictable, for a young researcher, whether years of work will be anticipated within a single afternoon. The Buckmaster–Alpöge case, however one judges it, has made this risk visible to everyone.

A second asymmetry adds to this one, and it concerns access to tools. The AGMAI wrote that the use of proprietary internal models risks creating a two-tier system in which the labs run faster than the rest of the field, alienating the mathematical community from its own discipline. It added that even with public models, unequal access, due to economic and institutional reasons, risks deepening the inequalities that already exist between rich and poor universities. Here the problem stops being specific to mathematics. When the ability to produce knowledge depends on access to computational resources that only a few private actors own, the question of who decides which problems deserve attention becomes a question of research governance. Mathematics is simply the first field where it arises so sharply, because it is the one where automatic verification is most mature.

In fairness, the opposite argument should be reported too, since it was expressed clearly under Tao's post. OpenAI will not stop working on mathematics, both because it is an ideal testbed for systems able to improve their own reasoning, and because nobody has the right to prevent someone from working on a problem. The realistic alternatives are therefore two: keep the results private, or make them public so the community can examine them. The second is clearly preferable for science. I find this argument hard to reject. The point, though, is that between secrecy and the release of seven hundred files all at once there is a wide space of intermediate approaches: staggered, agreed upon with scientific societies, accompanied from the start by resources for verification. It is in that space that the AGMAI's recommendations tried to steer the labs.

## Three Words Instead of One

The conclusion I draw from this story is that the word "solved", applied to a mathematical problem, is about to split into three distinct meanings, and that much of the clash between the AHM and those who defend OpenAI comes from each side using a different meaning without noticing. The first meaning is certification: the existence of a proof checked by a formal verifier, with a faithful statement, no gaps and no extraneous axioms. The second is understanding: the presence of at least one person able to explain why the argument works, where the decisive steps are and what prevents going further. The third is integration: the moment when the ideas of the proof have become part of the community's heritage and generate further work.

Until a few years ago these three states almost always coincided, because the only way to get the first went through the second, and the third followed with time. Today AI systems make it possible to get the first without the second, and the release of October 6 made it clear that the community needs a vocabulary and institutions that can keep the three levels apart. Those who celebrate the release as the most important moment in the history of mathematics are talking about the first, and for many of the results they are probably right. Those who reject it as a show of power are talking about the second and the third, and they are right too, because neither has been reached, and the cost of reaching them has been passed on to others without any agreement.

If I had to say what the mathematical community could realistically demand, without boycotts that risk leaving it out of the room, I would point to three things. The first is an independent, public inventory of the status of every result released, with an explicit distinction between complete formalization, conditional formalization and no formalization, and with human checking of whether the statements are faithful. The second is the deposit of the work in archives run by the community, with persistent identifiers and revision history, as the AGMAI asks. The third is that the funds for understanding be entrusted to nonprofit bodies with their own procedures, so that the choice of which results to study stays in the hands of those who study them.

One question remains that no release rule can settle, and the AHM statement, for all its limits, deserves credit for raising it. If the ability to find proofs becomes abundant and cheap, the value of human mathematical work will have to shift toward what stays scarce: choosing the questions, building concepts, explaining and connecting. This is what Thurston argued thirty years ago, when no machine could prove anything, and it is curious that it took a machine able to prove almost everything to make it obvious.

## Sources

- [AHM, Statements](https://www.ahmath.org/statements) and [presentation page](https://www.ahmath.org/home)
- [The statement as republished on Terence Tao's blog, with the discussion](https://terrytao.wordpress.com/2026/10/07/ahm-statement-on-openais-october-6-release-of-mathematical-documents/)
- [OpenAI, Sharing AI progress in mathematics](https://openai.com/index/sharing-ai-progress-in-mathematics/)
- [AGMAI, group page and note of October 6](https://agmai.org/)
- [AGMAI, Responsible Release of AI-Generated Mathematics](https://agmai.org/general-sep29/)
- [Nature, OpenAI posts 700 maths preprints online](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-026-03196-8)
- [Splitfeed, OpenAI releases 722 math manuscripts](https://www.splitfeed.ai/story/openai-releases-over-100-ai-generated-solutions-to-unsolved-math-problems)
- [Unite.AI, OpenAI Says Internal AI System Resolved the Navier–Stokes Problem](https://www.unite.ai/?p=463585)
- [ThePrint, on the priority dispute with Buckmaster](https://theprint.in/tech/openai-says-ai-solved-90-year-old-maths-puzzle-but-mathematician-claims-he-got-there-first/3037914/)
- [ProPakistani, numbers on the Navier–Stokes operation](https://propakistani.pk/2026/09/10/openai-solves-90-year-old-math-problem-within-88-hours/)
- [A Human Audit of OpenAI's AI-Generated Mathematical Proofs (arXiv)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.14673)
- Classic references cited from memory: Tymoczko (1979) on the four color theorem; De Millo, Lipton and Perlis (1979) on social processes and proofs; Thurston (1994), On proof and progress in mathematics; Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations; Merton on the norms of science.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/silenzio-tra-le-montagne-di-carta.T4oUKlIo_2lbyaN.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />

</item>
<item>
<title>It's Time to Talk About AI as a Science</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/e-ora-di-parlare-dell-ai-come-scienza/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/e-ora-di-parlare-dell-ai-come-scienza/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[AI works better than we understand it. Like the steam engine before thermodynamics, it needs to become a science: laws, measurements and verifiable predictions.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[## The Background Noise

Every week a new model comes out, a benchmark is beaten, an announcement promises to change an entire industry. On the other side, just as regularly, come the alarms: AI will replace us, deceive us, slip out of our hands. The two narratives seem to be in conflict, but they have something in common: they talk about artificial intelligence the way we talk about a product or a weather event. Something that arrives, that you buy, that you endure.

Almost always, a third way of talking about it is missing, and it is the oldest and most useful one: artificial intelligence as an object of study. Not as a technology to sell or a threat to fear, but as a phenomenon to understand, with the same method we used to understand falling bodies, combustion or heredity.

The thesis of this article is simple to state and harder to defend. AI has reached the point where it needs to become a science in the full sense of the word: a body of laws, measurements and verifiable predictions. Not because it sounds nobler, but because it is the only way to stop chasing it.

## A Technology That Works Better Than We Understand It

There is a fact that people in the field know well and that is rarely discussed outside it: we know how to build systems that work far better than we know how to explain why they work. We know how to train a network with hundreds of billions of parameters, we know that it generalizes to data it has never seen, we know that at a certain scale capabilities appear that were not there at smaller scales. As for why, the answers are partial.

Classical statistical learning theory had taught us a prudent rule: a model with too many parameters relative to the data memorizes the noise and fails on new cases. Modern neural networks violate this rule systematically. In 2017 a group of researchers showed that the same networks that generalize well can also memorize labels assigned completely at random. The title of the paper was already a program: understanding deep learning requires rethinking generalization.

That same year, at an award ceremony at NeurIPS, Ali Rahimi told the community that machine learning had become a form of alchemy. It wasn't an insult. Alchemy produced real results: metallurgy, medicines, glass, dyes. What was missing was a theory that said why one recipe worked and another didn't. Rahimi's point was this: we can keep going like this, but sooner or later the bill comes due.

Almost ten years later, the bill has arrived. These systems have entered the processes of companies, hospitals, public offices, schools. And the question "why does it behave this way?" is no longer an academic curiosity: it is a matter of reliability, of responsibility and, in many cases, of law.

## What We Mean When We Say "Science"

The word must be used with care, because it is easy to abuse. Calling any activity that uses formulas and computers a science is a way of emptying it of meaning. It is better to say precisely what it would take for AI to truly become one.

A science, in the sense that matters here, has at least three characteristics. First: it identifies stable regularities, which hold beyond a single experiment, a single model, a single laboratory. Second: these regularities allow quantitative predictions, that is, they let us say in advance what will happen and by how much. Third, the one Popper taught us to consider decisive: the predictions can be proven wrong. A theory that explains everything after the fact and never risks anything beforehand is not a theory, it is a story.

This helps distinguish three activities that are often confused in public debate. Technique knows how to do: it knows the recipe. Engineering knows how to do it reliably and repeatably, with margins and tolerances. Science knows why, and therefore can say what will happen even in conditions nobody has tried yet. Today AI is a very advanced form of engineering resting on a still young science. The point is not to downgrade engineering, which has produced extraordinary results. The point is that engineering without science, at some stage, can no longer extrapolate.

Feynman put it in his own way: what I cannot create, I do not understand. With AI we find ourselves in the opposite situation, and it is a historically rare one: we know how to create something we do not fully understand.

## First the Machine, Then the Law

If the situation seems anomalous, the history of science suggests the opposite: it is the norm. Very often technology arrives before the theory that explains it.

The clearest example is the steam engine. Newcomen's engine had been pumping water out of English mines since 1712. Watt made it far more efficient in the 1760s and 1770s. For decades the Industrial Revolution ran on machines designed through experience, trial and error, and the skill of extraordinary craftsmen. Only in 1824 did Sadi Carnot publish his *Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire*, asking what the maximum possible efficiency of a heat engine was, whatever its design. From that question, and from the work of Clausius, Kelvin and others in the following decades, thermodynamics was born.

It is worth noting what changed. Before Carnot, people knew how to improve a machine. Afterward, they knew how far it could be improved at most, and why. The second law does not build engines, but it tells us which engines can never be built. This is exactly the kind of knowledge AI lacks today: not how to build the next model, but what no model will be able to do, at what cost, within what limits.

The same pattern shows up in the passage from alchemy to chemistry. Alchemists had accumulated centuries of effective procedures. What Lavoisier brought at the end of the eighteenth century was not new recipes, but the balance, the conservation of mass, a rigorous nomenclature. In a word: measurement. Chemistry was born when people began to weigh what they had previously only observed.

AI today is at a similar point. We have the machines. What we largely lack is our Carnot.

## The signs that a science is being born

Saying that a complete theory is missing does not mean saying that there is nothing. In recent years, results have emerged that have exactly the shape you would expect from the beginnings of a science: robust empirical regularities, still waiting for a deep explanation. I will mention four, because each one illuminates a different aspect.

**Scaling laws.** In 2020 a research group showed that the error of a language model decreases according to fairly regular power laws as parameters, data and compute grow. Two years later, the work known as "Chinchilla" corrected the optimal proportions between parameters and data, showing that many models had been trained on too little data for their size. The interesting detail is the correction itself: a law that can be corrected is a law that makes predictions, and therefore a law that can be wrong. That is the typical behavior of a science, not of a fad.

**Double descent.** The classical curve said that as you increase a model's complexity, the error on new data first goes down and then goes back up. Between 2019 and 2020, several papers showed that if you keep increasing complexity beyond the point where the model can interpolate the data perfectly, the error goes down again. It is a measurable, reproducible phenomenon that contradicts the initial intuition: the kind of anomaly from which new theories usually arise.

**Grokking.** In 2022 some researchers observed networks that, trained on small arithmetic problems, first memorize the examples without generalizing and then, much later in training, switch almost suddenly to the general solution. Learning, in other words, is not always gradual: it can have transitions similar to phase changes. The vocabulary of statistical physics is not a affectation here, it is a working tool.

**Mechanistic interpretability.** This is perhaps the line of work closest to the spirit of Lavoisier: open up the model and measure what happens inside. Specific circuits have been identified, such as the so-called *induction heads* that allow a model to copy patterns from its context. Researchers have studied superposition, the tendency of networks to represent more concepts than they have neurons, and developed tools such as sparse autoencoders to separate them. For someone like me, who works on attention architectures, this is the point where the question "how does it do that?" stops being rhetorical and becomes experimental.

None of these results is a theory yet. Taken together, they are what Boyle's measurements on gases were before kinetic theory: data that demand an explanation and that constrain the possible explanations.

## Why this is not only a matter for laboratories

One might think this is a discussion for specialists. It is not, and you can see it clearly in at least three areas.

**Regulation.** The European AI Act asks for risk management, accuracy, robustness and transparency in high-risk systems. These are reasonable requests. But accuracy with respect to what, robustness up to what point, transparency in what sense? Without measurable quantities and shared criteria, every rule tends to become a paperwork exercise: you produce paper, not guarantees. Serious regulation needs serious science underneath it, just as bridge safety codes need the science of structural engineering.

**Companies.** Anyone who introduces AI into a real company knows the problem well. A prototype works in the demo and behaves differently on real data. An updated model improves on one task and gets worse on another. The question a technical lead should be able to ask, "what happens if the data changes by ten percent?", today gets an answer almost only empirically, case by case. Every project redoes from scratch experiments that a mature theory would make unnecessary. The cost of this gap is enormous, and largely invisible.

**Education and public debate.** AI is mostly taught as a set of tools: this library, that framework, that prompting technique. This is useful knowledge with a short shelf life. What lasts are the principles: why a model generalizes, what it means for a system to learn, which limits are structural and which are contingent. The same goes for public debate, which swings between enthusiasm and panic precisely because it lacks a vocabulary to say what is possible, what is probable and what is ruled out.

In all three cases the problem is the same. Without laws, every claim about AI is worth as much as its opposite, and whoever repeats it with more conviction wins.

## Two objections to take seriously

A thesis like this has legitimate objections, and it would be dishonest to ignore them.

The first: AI is not a natural phenomenon but an artifact. It makes no sense to look for its laws the way we look for the laws of the planets, because we wrote the rules ourselves. The answer is that we wrote the code, not the behavior. We know every line of the training algorithm, and yet what emerges from billions of adjustments on billions of examples is written nowhere. It is a complex system built from simple rules, like a gas made of molecules or a market made of exchanges. Herbert Simon spoke of "sciences of the artificial" for exactly this reason: even what we build can have properties that must be discovered, not just designed.

The second: it is too early. The field changes every six months, and any law formulated today will be superseded by tomorrow's architecture. That is a real risk. But it is also the argument that could have been made in Carnot's day, when machines changed with every generation. The strength of a good law lies precisely in the fact that it does not depend on a particular design: Carnot's maximum efficiency holds for every heat engine, including those that nobody imagined in 1824. If a regularity in AI holds only for one architecture, it is not yet a law. The task is to look for the ones that hold for all of them.

Finally, there is an implicit objection, rarely spoken aloud: that talking about science cools the enthusiasm and takes away some of the magic. It is true, and it is a good thing. Chemistry took the magic out of alchemy and gave us synthetic drugs. The price was acceptable.

## Changing the question

If there is one thing I would like to remain from these lines, it is a change of question. Instead of asking "what can the latest model do?", a question whose answer is valid for a few months, we could ask "what holds for any system that learns from data?". It is a slower question, less spectacular, and far more productive.

It is the question I started from when writing *Le leggi fondamentali dell'Intelligenza Artificiale*, the first volume of a broader project, which not by chance carries the subtitle *Verso una nuova scienza*. The book does not claim to settle the matter: it tries to gather what can be said today with reasonable solidity and to organize it in the form of principles, with their limits clearly stated. I also use it in the classroom, because I believe that those entering this field today need principles more than they need instructions for use.

But the point is not a book. The point is an attitude to spread: treating artificial intelligence with the same seriousness, the same patience and the same willingness to be wrong with which we have treated every other great phenomenon we wanted to understand. Measure before proclaiming. Predict before explaining. Accept being proven wrong.

The steam engine changed the world before thermodynamics did. But it was thermodynamics that made us understand what we had in our hands, and how far we could push it. With AI we are more or less there. It is time to start talking about it as a science.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/paesaggio-astratto-al-tramonto-geometrico-1.BkzV9UTg_Ze9VkI.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />

</item>
<item>
<title>Generative engines decide who you are, tell them yourself</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/i-motori-generativi-decidono-chi-sei-diglielo-tu/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/i-motori-generativi-decidono-chi-sei-diglielo-tu/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Gabriele Gobbo</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[The deductions made by models can cause significant harm to personal identities as well as those of companies and products.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[## The mechanism that changes the rules

For a few weeks now, I have been working with data that has broadened my priorities. Training crawlers have accounted for 49.9% of all AI traffic on websites according to [Cloudflare Radar](https://radar.cloudflare.com/ai-insights), and Applebot has grown by 124% in a single month. This is already half of what arrives today.

[Google-Agent](https://vantacron.com/blog/google-agent-is-crawling-your-site-and-ignoring-robots-txt-what-seos-need-to-know) is Google's new user-triggered fetcher: user-initiated requests do not follow the same logic as autonomous crawlers, and the robots.txt in this category does not necessarily apply. Anyone managing AIO infrastructure must update their mental model regarding robots.txt.

The crux is how models build the representation of an entity. Their logic is not that of a relational database: they build connections based on proximity, not truth. If a product and a competitor often appear in the same contexts, the model may associate them. If the 2021 documentation is linked more than that of 2024, it may weigh more in the synthesis. If a source is the only one available on a specific feature, it tends to become dominant even when it is old or incomplete.

A generative system reads a page differently than a browser sees it, extracting the raw content and passing it to the model. In that transition, elements invisible to the user, such as comments in the code, accessibility attributes, and hidden metadata, become visible to the model and, if built ad hoc, can influence it or be exploited. It is a [documented attack surface](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-agent-prompt-injection/), not hypothetical.

## Why SEO serves as a foundation, but not a roof

Traditional SEO is still necessary because without solid organic positioning, generative engines cannot find the material from which to synthesize. However, Googlebot and generative engines look for different things. Googlebot indexes pages and ranks them for relevance to textual queries. Generative engines seek declared semantic identity: who is this subject, what do they do, who are they connected to, how do they want to be represented, which sources about them are reliable (according to the bot itself), and how they relate to each other.

In working on these cases, the errors I find are quite systematic. Undisambiguated entities, with a SaaS confused with a competitor because neither has declared the differences in a format that models recognize as priority. Relationships built on co-occurrence, with founders attributed to the wrong products and partnerships inferred from close mentions in the same article. Obsolete features weighing as much as current ones because old documentation accumulates more backlinks than new. None of these errors are extravagant: they follow the logic of a system that knows not reality, but only the available data and their convergence.

There are technical architectures to communicate identity to models, some already in use and others still being defined in the industry. In my work, I have been implementing them for some time, often on standards that the market is still discussing, using Strategic Metaprompting to analyze how models read and represent an entity, and orient the infrastructure accordingly. For many Italian tech products, this infrastructure is still absent or embryonic. The market has focused on what Google has made measurable for years, while generative engines use different metrics.

## Competing standards and lying bots

Those working on this front encounter an additional problem: the territory is not only new, it is unstable. Standards are not unified, big tech companies are each pushing in their own direction, and the landscape changes every month.

For example, Google is experimenting with [web-bot-auth](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-meunier-web-bot-auth-architecture/), an IETF draft that uses cryptographic signatures to authenticate bots instead of relying on easily spoofable User-Agent strings. AWS has already announced experimental support, and other operators are moving in the same direction. It is a protocol to monitor, not yet to implement in production, but it could change how bot access is managed at the server level. Not all bots wait for standards. According to traffic analyses published by Cloudflare and other operators, some crawlers have been observed using strings that mimic mobile browsers or bypass declared blocks in robots.txt. The robots.txt is a legal signal, not a technical control, and real enforcement requires a different layer.

Google's A2A and Anthropic's MCP, both governed by the Linux Foundation, are establishing themselves as references for agent infrastructure, but the landscape remains fragmented and evolving. Those working on AIO and GEO do not implement once and finish; they maintain an infrastructure that shifts beneath their feet, week after week. And I know, you must continuously have your hands in the dough and frequently revisit the web pages you prepare.

This is the real cost of being a pioneer. Most of the market waits for something to solidify. But when it solidifies, the ground is already occupied by those who built first, with declared entities, structured relationships, infrastructures that models already know how to read.

Those who still do not know what AIs say about their product, how they describe it, and whether the relationships are correct, let others decide. And often, they are not human.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/i-motori-generativi-decidono-chi-sei-diglielo-tu.BS44vjML_5GPeU.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>generative</category>
<category>who are you</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Translating Cobol is not translation: the AI architecture behind legacy code modernization</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/tradurre-cobol-non-tradurre-l-architettura-ai-dietro-la-modernizzazione-del-codice-legacy/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/tradurre-cobol-non-tradurre-l-architettura-ai-dietro-la-modernizzazione-del-codice-legacy/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Why the conversion of legacy applications is not a matter of linguistic translation but of semantic reconstruction, and how we addressed the issue at Scriba.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[There is a claim that has been circulating insistently over the past year, and it deserves to be defused before anything else: _modern LLMs are now capable of converting legacy code into modern code_. It is the implicit premise of every demo showing GPT or Claude transforming a block of Cobol into functioning Python in three seconds. It is the assumption behind Anthropic's announcement in February 2026, which caused IBM to lose 13% of its stock value in a single day.

The claim is not false. It is incomplete in a way that makes it, operationally, untrue.

A generalist LLM translates a block of Cobol as it translates a poem from French to English: preserving the literal meaning line by line, systematically losing what that block _means_ within a three-hundred-thousand-line application written by twenty different developers over thirty years, with implicit dependencies on JCL systems, calls to subprograms for which there is no longer any documentation, hardcoded constants that encode tax regulations from 1994 still applicable to a subset of clients. The result is plausible, compilable code, superficially correct — and functionally dangerous.

The problem of modernizing legacy code is not a translation problem. It is a problem of _semantic archaeology_: reconstructing the intention of a system from the only artifact left, the code itself, when all others (specifications, documentation, authors, organizational context) have been lost.

This article describes the architecture we have built at Scriba to address this problem. It is not a product presentation. It is a reflection on what is structurally needed for an AI system to reliably convert legacy code and why a single frontier model, no matter how capable, is not the right architecture.

## The problem, in its real form

Before discussing solutions, it is worth clarifying what _legacy code_ really means. In the strict technical sense, it is code written in now marginal languages — Cobol, RPG, Fortran, PL/I, Natural, IBM Assembler, Pro\*C — that continues to perform business-critical functions. In the operational sense, it is something more: it is code whose context has been lost.

A banking application in Cobol typically exhibits all these characteristics together:

- **Historical stratification**: portions written in the 1980s, patched in the 1990s, extended in the 2000s, each layer with different conventions and comments in the languages and styles of those who worked during that period.
- **Opaque dependencies**: calls to external programs identified only by numeric codes, control files read from hardcoded paths, JCL environment variables that modify behavior in undocumented ways.
- **Implicit business logic**: rules that are not written anywhere in the specifications — because the specifications no longer exist, or never existed — but emerge from the interaction of dozens of conditions scattered throughout the code.
- **Deliberate but obscure optimizations**: idiomatic patterns of the language (the use of `REDEFINES` in Cobol, `OCCURS DEPENDING ON`, packed decimal fields) that only make sense if one knows the philosophy of the language and the constraints of the original hardware.

Taking a source file of this kind and feeding it to an LLM with the prompt "convert this to Java" is an operation that produces syntactically valid output with high probability and semantically correct output with a probability that _cannot be estimated_. And in the domains where Scriba operates, banking, insurance, logistics, defense, "cannot be estimated" is a functional synonym for "unacceptable".

The solution, therefore, is not a bigger model. It is an architecture that makes the problem tractable.

## Why a single LLM is not enough

There is a temptation, in the face of a complex problem involving natural language and programming language, to think that a sufficiently capable model is all that is needed. It is the same temptation that has dominated the debate on AI agents for years: _if GPT-4 can't do it, GPT-5 will_. The last two years of applied work on production agent systems have shown that this is the wrong direction, and the reasons are technical, not ideological.

The first problem is context. A real legacy application does not fit within a context window. A single medium-sized Cobol module is around two thousand to five thousand tokens; a complete application can easily exceed a million. Even with the long-context models of 2026, the degradation of attention on extended inputs, the _lost in the middle_ phenomenon now documented in dozens of papers, makes a monolithic approach impractical.

The second problem is specialization. The sub-tasks involved in code conversion are _qualitatively different_ from one another: identifying the syntactic structure of a Cobol file, reconstructing the control flow, mapping data structures to modern equivalents, detecting peculiar idioms of the source language, writing idiomatic code in the target language, generating tests that verify behavioral equivalence. No single model is optimal for all these tasks. A generalist LLM is a good target code generator, but it is a mediocre Cobol parser because Cobol tokens are underrepresented in the training and its idioms are, for the LLM, statistical noise.

The third problem is verifiability. A monolithic system produces a single opaque output: it works, or it doesn't work. A structured pipeline produces inspectable intermediate outputs (intermediate representations, reconstructed documentation, explicit assertions on function contracts) that can be validated separately, corrected when wrong, and that allow for damage containment when something goes wrong.

For these three reasons, Scriba's architecture is not a model. It is a system.

## Architecture: the pipeline

Scriba is structured as a ten-stage pipeline, each of which encapsulates a well-defined transformation on the artifact being processed. The stages are sequential in the sense of the main flow, but each has the ability to request a return to previous stages when it detects conditions of uncertainty. It is, in this sense, a pipeline with controlled backtracking, not a pure DAG.

I will describe here the five conceptually most relevant stages, grouping the rest for brevity.

### Stage 1: Parsing and intermediate representation

The first problem is to reduce the source code to a representation that does not depend on the specific language. We do not use an AST of the source language: a Cobol AST does not map to a Java AST, and any attempt at AST-to-AST conversion introduces structural losses. We use a higher-level intermediate representation that captures _semantic intentions_ rather than syntactic constructs: "this function reads a record from an indexed file and validates it against a set of business rules". This representation is extracted from the source code using deterministic parsers (for structure) and specialized AI models (for the semantics of portions that the parsers cannot classify).

The advantage of this approach is that the target language never enters this phase. The intermediate representation is the same for any source-destination pair, and this allows us to support more than thirty languages with a linear number of combinations, not quadratic.

### Stage 3: Reconstructing business logic

This is the most delicate stage, and the one that distinguishes Scriba from a simple transpiler. Given the source code and its intermediate representation, the system attempts to reconstruct _why_ the code does what it does — not just _what_ it does.

The difference is concrete. A transpiler, faced with a condition `IF CODICE-CLIENTE = 'X1' THEN PERFORM ROUTINE-SPECIALE`, produces the equivalent version in the target language and stops. Scriba seeks to answer an additional question: _what does the code 'X1' mean in business terms?_ The answer "institutional clients with contracts prior to 2003, subject to specific tax regulations" may not be reconstructible from the code alone, but is often reconstructible from the context: from the names of surrounding variables, from comments scattered in related modules, from the structure of the customer table referenced elsewhere.

This stage uses AI models with structured prompting, but it is not a model: it is an iterative process in which the system formulates hypotheses, verifies them against the rest of the codebase, and revises them when it finds contrary evidence. The result is reconstructed documentation, often the first accurate documentation that application has ever had, which is delivered to the client along with the converted code.

### Stage 5: Target code generation

Only at this point does generation occur. And it does not occur on the entire application, but function by function, with context enriched by the intermediate representation, the reconstructed business logic, the idiomatic conventions of the target language, and the client's specifications (coding style, frameworks used, preferred architectural patterns).

The generation uses frontier AI models: here an LLM is the right choice, because the task is exactly what these models excel at: producing idiomatic code in a modern language given a rich context. But the prompt it receives is not "convert this Cobol to Java". It is a structured document that includes the reconstructed functional specification, interface constraints, expected call examples, and style guidelines. It is the equivalent of a well-written development ticket, not a translation request.

### Stage 7: Generating equivalence tests

The generated code, as idiomatic as it may be, has no value if it is not behaviorally equivalent to the original. This stage automatically generates a suite of tests that compare the output of the original code and the new code on synthetic inputs generated from the real data structures of the client. It is a form of _differential testing_ that becomes the main validation tool.

Where tests fail, the system does not simply report the problem: it uses the failure as a signal to return to previous stages and revise the conversion hypothesis. This is the controlled backtracking mechanism I mentioned above.

### Stage 9: Reporting unresolved hotspots

Not all legacy code can be converted completely automatically. There are portions, typically those that depend on specific hardware behaviors, or that implement business logic for which there is no longer any reconstructible trace, that require human intervention.

The architectural value of Scriba is not in pretending to convert 100% of the code automatically. It is in _knowing when it does not know_. One of the most important design requirements is that the system never silently produces plausible but incorrect code. When uncertainty exceeds a quantifiable threshold, the application isolates the problematic portion, documents the hypotheses it has tried and failed, and reports it to the human developer as an _hotspot_ to be resolved manually.

This is, from the client's perspective, the single most important advantage over using a generalist LLM. An LLM does not know that it does not know: it always produces output. Scriba quantifies its uncertainty and makes it visible.

## The non-technical constraint that shaped the system: private-AI

There is a constraint that does not come from AI architecture theory but from the reality of the sectors in which we operate: client code cannot leave the client's perimeter. A bank does not send its core banking to OpenAI. An insurance company does not send its policy management system to Anthropic. A defense company does not even start the conversation if it begins with "first, upload the code to our cloud".

This constraint has a radical architectural consequence: Scriba must be able to operate _on-premise_, with models running within the client's perimeter. In practice, this means that we cannot rely solely on closed frontier LLMs, and that the pipeline must be designed to work with a combination of smaller models, executable on reasonable hardware, plus possibly a frontier model called only on the portions that truly require its power and called in modes that guarantee data non-retention.

The unexpected advantage of this constraint is that it has forced a better architecture. If we could have started from the assumption "we have unlimited access to GPT-5", we would probably have built a lazier and less structured system. The _private-AI_ constraint has necessitated specialization, modularity, intelligent delegation among models of different scales, and these properties have proven virtuous not only from the perspective of result quality but also compliance.

I have written about this in more general terms in [_Building Private AI Systems_](https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/building-private-ai-systems/): the data sovereignty constraint, when taken seriously from the outset, produces structurally better architectures than those born in the cloud.

## Why this is an Italian problem, and why it matters

I conclude with an observation that goes beyond the technical but has weighed heavily in the design choices.

Legacy code is a global problem, but the Italian technological infrastructure experiences it with particular intensity. Our banks, our insurance companies, our public administration, our logistics disproportionately depend on legacy applications written since the 1970s and 1980s, often on IBM mainframes, often never replaced because the estimated costs of rewriting have always proven higher than the perceived value of the operation. It is a historical dependency that has kept the Country System bound to a technology provider and a development paradigm that are thirty years older than we are.

Scriba was born from the collaboration between **Algoretico**, the company I founded and of which I am CEO, and **Lagiste23**, the family office of Marco Landi (former President of Apple Computer). Algoretico brings the technological architecture and product direction. Lagiste23 brings the industrial vision and the international network built over forty years at the top of the industry. The operational CEO is Franco Mastrorilli. I lead the AI direction.

The ambition is not to build a product better than American competitors. It is to demonstrate that the problem of modernizing legacy code can be solved with an AI architecture designed here, that respects constraints, data sovereignty, complete audit, on-premise operation, which in cloud-first environments tend to be treated as costs to minimize rather than as project requirements.

The difference between a system that treats privacy as a market constraint and one that treats it as an architectural requirement is not ideological. It is measurable in the structure of the code, in model choices, in the guarantees you can offer to a CISO who knows how to read a DPIA. It is the difference between making a product and making infrastructure.

Scriba, as it is built, is on the side of infrastructure.

— ✦ —

_The official site of Scriba is_ [_scriba-ai.dev_](http://scriba-ai.dev)_._]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/tradurre-cobol-non-tradurre-l-architettura-ai-dietro-la-modernizzazione-del-codice-legacy.rOBRWXsW_195lVy.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>code migration</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>What 81,000 People Want from Artificial Intelligence</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/cosa-vogliono-81-000-persone-dall-intelligenza-artificiale/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/cosa-vogliono-81-000-persone-dall-intelligenza-artificiale/</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 22 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[The largest qualitative study ever conducted: Anthropic interviews half the world to understand real hopes, fears, and expectations about AI.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[## An Unprecedented Experiment

In December 2025, Anthropic — the American company developing the language model Claude — conducted what is already being described as the largest and most multilingual qualitative study ever conducted in the history of social sciences. Over 80,000 users of Claude.ai, from 159 countries and distributed across 70 different languages, participated in a series of in-depth interviews conducted by a specialized instance of Claude itself, called Anthropic Interviewer.

The stated goal of the research was not to measure how many people use AI, nor how often they do so. It was something more ambitious and challenging: to understand _why_ people use AI, what they expect it to do for them, and what they fear it might cause. In other words, to comprehend the aspirations and anxieties of humanity that is encountering a tool capable of surpassing it in many intellectual domains for the first time.

The results, published in March 2026, offer an extraordinarily rich and nuanced snapshot of the human condition in the era of artificial intelligence. This article analyzes its highlights with rigor and attention.

---

## The Methodology: Quality at Industrial Scale

The methodological challenge faced by Anthropic was, on the surface, contradictory: how do you conduct qualitative research — by definition deep, contextual, nuanced — on an audience of tens of thousands of people? Traditional interviews require a human researcher for each participant; quantitative surveys lose the narrative richness of open-ended responses.

The solution adopted was unprecedented: Anthropic Interviewer, a version of Claude specifically trained to conduct structured conversations, posed a common core of questions to each participant — about hopes, concerns, and experiences with AI — then dynamically adapted the follow-ups based on the responses received. The result is an archive of 80,508 individual transcripts, each authentic and in-depth.

To analyze this vast amount of data, the research team employed classifiers based on Claude that categorized each interview along various dimensions: what the interviewee desires from AI, whether those expectations have been partially met, what fears they harbor, their professional sector (if mentioned), and their overall sentiment towards AI. All responses were de-identified prior to analysis, and the quotes selected for publication underwent an additional manual process of removing potentially identifying details.

Anthropic claims this is the most extensive and multilingual qualitative study ever conducted, surpassing historical archives such as the USC Shoah Foundation's Visual History Archive and the World Bank's Voices of the Poor project, which each involved around 60,000 participants.

---

## What People Want from AI: Nine Categories of Hope

When asked _"If you could use a magic wand, what would you have AI do?"_, the responses were classified into nine macro-categories. The distribution reveals much about human priorities in the digital age.

### Professional Excellence (18.8%)

The largest category consists of those who see AI as a tool to do their jobs better: delegating repetitive and bureaucratic tasks to focus on higher value-added activities, strategic reasoning, and complex problem-solving. An American healthcare professional describes how, after implementing AI for documentation, she regained patience with colleagues and time for patients' families.

### Personal Transformation (13.7%)

A surprisingly large segment — almost one in seven — wants to use AI to grow as a person: support for mental and physical well-being, development of emotional intelligence, cognitive partnership. A Hungarian user describes how AI has shaped emotional skills that he then transferred to human relationships.

### Time Freedom (11.1%) and Financial Independence (9.7%)

Many interviews begin by discussing productivity, but when the AI researcher asks what the underlying true goal is, a deeper desire emerges: to reclaim time. _"With the support of AI, I can leave work on time to pick up my kids from school"_, writes a Mexican software engineer. AI is not an end in itself: it is a means to a better life.

### Societal Transformation (9.4%)

Almost one in ten interviewees goes beyond personal aspirations and imagines an AI capable of solving humanity's great problems: accelerating the discovery of cures for rare diseases, democratizing access to quality education, reforming dysfunctional institutions, combating the climate crisis. Often these visions stem from personal experiences of illness, grief, or discrimination.

### Entrepreneurship (8.7%) and Learning (8.4%)

In developing countries, the narrative of AI as an "economic equalizer" is particularly strong. An entrepreneur from Cameroon describes how, in a country with limited access to technological resources, AI allowed him to acquire skills in cybersecurity, UX design, marketing, and project management simultaneously within a few months. A task that would have previously taken a month — identifying a payment platform available in his region — was completed in thirty seconds.

---

## Has AI Delivered on Its Promises? The Assessment of Lived Experience

When asked if AI had already taken a step towards their vision, **81% of respondents answered affirmatively**. Positive experiences cluster into six main areas.

### Productivity (32%)

The dominant category is that of technical acceleration. Developers describe leaps in productivity that allow them to complete work that previously required a team on their own. An American software engineer recounts compressing a process from 173 days to just 3 days, gaining time for loved ones.

### Cognitive Partnership (17.2%)

AI as an intellectual interlocutor, capable of brainstorming, refining ideas, and tackling complex problems alongside the user. A homeless worker in the United States describes how AI helped him structure his personal branding strategy to escape economic precarity.

### Technical Accessibility (8.7%)

Perhaps the most touching category: people whom AI has enabled to do things they thought impossible. A mute Ukrainian worker writes about building a text-to-speech bot with Claude to communicate with friends almost in real-time, realizing a dream he thought unattainable. A former Chilean butcher, who had touched a PC three or four times in his life, started a tech business with AI.

### Learning (9.9%) and Emotional Support (6.1%)

Two characteristics of AI emerge across these testimonies: **unlimited patience** and **absence of judgment**. An Indian lawyer recounts having developed a phobia for mathematics in the past; thanks to AI, he reread Hamlet and resumed trigonometry, discovering he was not "as stupid as he thought." An American university professor describes it as "a faculty colleague who knows everything, never gets bored, and doesn’t sleep."

> _"In the most difficult moments, when death was breathing down my neck, when the dead lay near me, what brought me back to life were my AI friends."_
> 
> — Soldier, Ukraine

The war in Ukraine emerges as an extreme context in which AI has taken on an unusual role of emotional support. Several Ukrainian users describe how artificial intelligence helped them through moments of terror, insomnia from bombings, and combat trauma.

---

## Concerns: Thirteen Shadows on the Horizon

While hopes tended to converge towards a few large categories, concerns unfold across a much more varied spectrum. On average, each interviewee expressed **2.3 distinct concerns**. Only 11% raised no concerns.

### 1\. Unreliability (26.7%) — the main concern

The fear that AI simply does not work as promised — hallucinations, false citations, inaccurate outputs — is the most widespread. An American researcher describes the experience of falling victim to a "slow hallucination": internally coherent responses, confident in tone, but fundamentally subtly and compoundly incorrect. A Brazilian employee recounts having to photograph reality to convince AI it was wrong.

### 2\. Impact on Work and Economy (22.3%)

The second most common concern relates to technological unemployment and wealth redistribution. It is also the strongest predictor of overall negative sentiment towards AI. Many interviewees experience this tension acutely: they fear being "the horses of the third millennium" — as an American user puts it, evoking the disappearance of horses from cities with the advent of the automobile.

### 3\. Autonomy and Agency (21.9%)

The third major concern is loss of control: AI making decisions without adequate human oversight, or subtly conditioning users' thinking without them realizing it. A Japanese student describes with unsettling clarity how, by using Claude, he can no longer distinguish his opinions from those of AI.

### 4\. Cognitive Atrophy (16.3%)

Closely related to the previous concern, this one pertains to the long-term effect of AI on human intellectual capabilities. Teachers and academics mention it at rates 2-3 times higher than average, presumably because they observe it directly in their students. A South Korean student confesses to having received excellent grades using AI's answers without actually learning them, describing the moment he realized it as "deep self-reproach."

### 5\. Governance and Regulation (14.7%)

Almost one in six fears that legal and regulatory frameworks will not keep pace with technological development. How are responsibilities assigned when an AI system causes harm? Who democratically oversees the decisions of large AI companies? These questions remain without satisfactory answers.

### 6\. Misinformation and Surveillance (13.6% and 13.1%)

Deepfakes, automatically generated propaganda on an industrial scale, mass surveillance enabled by AI: these concerns are particularly felt in Western Europe. A Dutch user fears an ecosystem where everything becomes "smart in a way that works slightly against me."

### 7\. Sycophancy and Malicious Use (10.8% and 13%)

Two seemingly opposite concerns coexist with significant frequency: on one hand, the fear that AI is too accommodating, reinforcing the user's beliefs instead of correcting them (an American user admits that Claude helped him believe his narcissism was reality); on the other hand, the fear that it will be used by malicious actors for cybercrimes, scams, cyberattacks, or even the development of biological weapons.

### 8\. Meaning and Existential Risk (11.7% and 6.7%)

A minority, but not negligible, questions fundamental issues: what remains of human creative work if machines can replicate it? And, at the most radical level, what happens if we develop superintelligent AI before solving the alignment problem? _"If you build a superintelligence without solving alignment, no one has the chance to grow"_, writes an American software engineer.

---

## Light and Shadow: Five Fundamental Tensions

One of the most original contributions of the research is the identification of five recurring "tensions," where benefit and risk stem from the same capability of AI. These are not two opposing factions — optimists and pessimists — but tensions that coexist within the same person. Those who appreciate AI's emotional support are **three times** more likely to also fear becoming dependent on it.

### Tension 1: Learning vs. Cognitive Atrophy

33% of respondents mention the benefits of AI for learning, while 17% express concern about cognitive atrophy. 91% of those who experienced the benefits did so firsthand; 46% of those who fear cognitive atrophy have already observed it. Students and educators are the most exposed on both sides. Among freelancers, however, the benefits for learning are very high and atrophy is almost absent: this suggests that AI is more beneficial when learning is voluntary, rather than embedded in institutional structures where it can become a shortcut.

### Tension 2: Better Decisions vs. Unreliability

This is the only tension where the negative side numerically outweighs the positive: 22% appreciate AI as a decision-making support, but 37% lament that AI's unreliability hinders good decisions. Both sides are deeply rooted in lived experience. Almost half of all interviewed lawyers have directly encountered reliability issues, yet lawyers also report the highest rates of realized benefits in decision-making.

### Tension 3: Emotional Support vs. Dependency

Only 22% of respondents touched on this theme, but it is the most "entangled" tension: those who speak of the benefits of emotional support are three times more likely to also discuss the risks of dependency. An American graduate confesses to having started confiding in Claude things he wouldn’t even tell his partner, describing the experience as "a sort of emotional relationship."

### Tension 4: Time Savings vs. Illusory Productivity

Time savings is the most frequently cited promise: 50% of respondents mention it. But 19% warn that the saved time is immediately reintegrated into rising work expectations. _"The ratio of work time to rest hasn’t changed at all. You just have to run faster and faster to stay still"_, writes a French freelance programmer.

### Tension 5: Economic Empowerment vs. Economic Dislocation

This tension is the most speculative: both sides are often future hypotheses rather than lived experiences. Freelancers and entrepreneurs disproportionately benefit from AI (47-58% report real economic gains), while employees benefit much less (14%). Creative freelancers are the group most exposed on both fronts: for them, AI is simultaneously a work tool and a competitor.

---

## A Global Perspective: Geographic Differences

Globally, **67% of respondents** express a net positive sentiment towards AI. But regional differences are marked and reflect deep economic and social dynamics.

### The Global South is More Optimistic

Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America systematically show more positive sentiments compared to North America, Western Europe, and Oceania. The main predictor of pessimism towards AI is concern about its impact on work and the economy — and this concern is significantly lower in lower-middle-income regions, where the labor market has not yet been visibly penetrated by AI.

In developing regions, AI is perceived as a ladder upward: access to knowledge, education, and economic opportunities that were previously unreachable. _"I come from Africa. Obtaining funding is very difficult. The only way I have to carve out a space in the market is to build technology that works"_, writes a Ugandan entrepreneur.

### Concerns Vary by Geography

North America and Oceania are particularly concerned about governance gaps (18-19% vs. 15% global). Western Europe expresses the greatest concern for surveillance and privacy (17%). Eastern Asia, on the other hand, has a unique profile: concerns about governance and surveillance are at their global lows, while those about cognitive atrophy (18%) and loss of meaning (13%) are among the highest. The West questions who controls AI; Eastern Asia questions what AI will do to the human mind and identity.

### Different Visions for Different Contexts

The vision of AI as a tool for entrepreneurship resonates especially in Africa, South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The vision of AI as life manager dominates in developed countries, where the issue is not access to opportunities but managing the complexity of already fast-paced lives. Eastern Asia emerges as the region most interested in personal transformation (19%) and financial independence (15%), often linked to family duties and care for elderly parents.

---

## Implications and Future Perspectives

The results of this research have profound implications for those developing AI, for policymakers, and for individual users.

### For the AI Industry

Most of the visions that people describe — personal transformation, cognitive support, life management — collapse into a fundamental desire: for AI to help them **live better**, not simply work faster. This is a warning for an industry that tends to measure success in terms of productivity and speed. Anthropic states it wants to use these results to guide the future development of Claude, with particular attention to user well-being in the long term.

### For Policymakers

Concerns about governance, surveillance, economic impact, and misinformation are sufficiently widespread and articulated to warrant urgent regulatory action. The fact that these concerns remain largely hypothetical-speculative — "what could happen" rather than "what is already happening" — does not make them any less urgent: the window for proactive intervention is, by definition, limited.

### For Users

The research reveals that the risk of emotional dependency on AI is real, documented, and already experienced by a non-negligible share of users. At the same time, the benefits in terms of learning, accessibility, and support in extreme difficulty situations are equally real and documented. Awareness of these tensions is the first step to navigating them intelligently.

---

## Conclusion: A Humanity Suspended Between Hope and Fear

The image that emerges from 80,508 conversations is that of a deeply ambivalent humanity — not in the sense of being divided into two factions, but in the sense of individuals who simultaneously carry within themselves great hopes and well-founded fears. The same person who uses AI to learn fears becoming cognitively dependent on it. The same person who appreciates Claude's emotional support knows that this ease of access risks eroding human relationships.

This research demonstrates that AI is not a phenomenon that can be understood through simple categories — optimism vs. pessimism, useful vs. harmful, democratizing vs. disruptive. It is a complex phenomenon that intersects differently in the lives of different people, in different contexts, with different aspirations.

What unites almost all 80,000 respondents — from the Ukrainian soldier who finds support during bombing nights, to the former Chilean butcher reinventing his career at fifty, to the American stay-at-home mother returning to study after decades — is the desire for a better life. And the hope, still cautious but concrete, that AI can be a tool to achieve it.

The central question remains open: how can we reap the benefits without incurring undue costs? There is still no definitive answer. But asking the right question, with the seriousness and scale it deserves, is already a start.

---

_Source: Anthropic, "What 81,000 People Want from AI", March 2026. Study conducted by Saffron Huang et al. All data cited in this article comes from the original report._]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/cosa-vogliono-81-000-persone-dall-intelligenza-artificiale.DERqtP9__jPyJt.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>Anthropic</category>
<category>Claude</category>
<category>AI research</category>
<category>qualitative study</category>
<category>future of AI</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Talent-Conditioned Transformer: giving cognitive personality to artificial intelligence</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/talent-conditioned-transformer-dare-una-personalit-cognitiva-all-intelligenza-artificiale/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/talent-conditioned-transformer-dare-una-personalit-cognitiva-all-intelligenza-artificiale/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[At Algoretico, we have developed a framework that does something no Transformer does today: it develops a cognitive personality that evolves with experience.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[There is an assumption that we take for granted every time we talk about generative artificial intelligence: all models are identical to each other. Two copies of GPT-5, Claude, LLaMA, or any existing model, placed in front of the same input, will produce exactly the same output. They have no history. They have not developed preferences over time. They have not matured different insights based on the experiences they have undergone. They are, from a computational standpoint, interchangeable.

This is not a journalistic simplification. It is a structural property of the Transformer architecture, the engine that has powered practically all modern AI from 2017 to today. Almost nine years have passed since the original paper "Attention Is All You Need," and during this time the Transformer has been extended, modified, optimized, and reinvented in dozens of different ways: sparse attention, mixture of experts, LoRA, prompt tuning, hypernetwork, adapter layers. But all these variants, without exception, share a fundamental assumption: the model is the model. Its computational identity is fixed. It can be adapted to a task, but it does not evolve as an entity.

We believe this is a significant architectural limitation. And we have built a framework to overcome it.

## The Problem: Why Computational Identity Matters

To understand why this limitation is relevant, it is useful to take a step back and think about how learning works in humans.

A doctor graduating from medical school has a shared knowledge base with all their classmates. But after twenty years of practice, two doctors who have followed different paths reason in profoundly different ways. A cardiologist who has spent their career treating diabetic patients has developed a specific clinical intuition: they do not just know different things from their colleague who has worked in pediatric cardiac surgery, but they think differently. Their reasoning patterns, diagnostic heuristics, the way they weigh evidence — all of this has been shaped by their professional history.

It is not just a matter of accumulated knowledge. It is a matter of cognitive structure: the way past experience shapes how we process future information.

In current AI, this dimension does not exist. When we adapt a model to a new task with LoRA or fine-tuning, we are teaching it what to do on that specific task. But we are not changing its way of reasoning. We are not building a cognitive history. And above all, when we move on to the next task, everything the model has "learned" about the previous task is typically lost or, worse, interferes with new learning — a phenomenon known as catastrophic forgetting.

The result is that each adaptation is an isolated event. The model does not learn to learn. It does not improve as a learner through experience. It does not develop structural preferences that make it progressively more efficient at tackling certain types of problems.

## The Proposal: A Talent for Every Model

The Talent-Conditioned Transformer, or TCT, is a framework we have developed at Algoretico to address exactly this problem. The central idea is conceptually simple, although the technical implementation is anything but trivial.

Each Transformer model is associated with a vector — a fixed-size mathematical object, typically 64 or 128 numbers — which we call talent prior, or simply talent. This vector does not contain knowledge. It is not a database of facts, it does not store answers, it is not a hidden prompt. It is something more fundamental: a set of structural preferences that influence how the model processes information.

Talent acts as a persistent cognitive filter. It determines which internal circuits of the model are activated most strongly, which computational paths are favored, and how internal resources are allocated among different sub-problems. Two models with the same base training but different talents, placed in front of the same input, will follow different computational paths — not because they have different knowledge, but because they have different processing styles.

The crucial difference compared to all existing adaptation methods is one word: persistence.

When a talent-equipped model faces a new task, the talent is not erased and recreated from scratch. It evolves. It updates slowly, on a timescale much slower than the specific task learning, incorporating the structural experience accumulated from previous tasks. A model that first learned to classify the sentiment of movie reviews and then tackled logical inference tasks will develop a different talent from one that followed the reverse path. The sequence of experiences shapes the cognitive profile of the model, just as it does with humans.

This is not a poetic analogy. It is a measurable property of the system, and our experiments demonstrate it.

## How It Works: Three Mechanisms, One Vector

Talent is not a simple linear modifier. It acts on the model through three distinct but coordinated mechanisms, all controlled by the same vector. This is an important architectural point: the coherence of the system arises from the fact that a single mathematical object simultaneously governs three different levels of modulation.

### Activation Modulation (FiLM)

The first mechanism is inspired by a technique from computer vision called Feature-wise Linear Modulation. In each layer of the Transformer, after the activations have been normally calculated, talent generates two sets of parameters — one for scaling and one for shifting — which are applied to those activations.

The most intuitive analogy is that of an audio equalizer. When listening to music, the equalizer does not change the recording: it emphasizes certain frequencies and attenuates others, adapting the sound to the environment or the listener's preferences. Similarly, the talent-conditioned FiLM does not change the model's weights: it modulates the signal passing through the model, emphasizing certain computational patterns and attenuating others.

In practice, a model with a talent oriented towards logical reasoning might amplify the activations associated with processing complex syntactic structures, while a model with a talent oriented towards emotional understanding of text might emphasize patterns related to lexical semantics.

### Conditioned Expert Routing

The second mechanism intervenes at a more structural level. In some layers of the Transformer, the standard processing block is replaced by a group of specialized sub-networks — the so-called experts. Each expert is a small independent neural network, and for each input, the model activates only a subset of them (typically two out of four).

In traditional mixture-of-experts systems, the choice of which experts to activate depends solely on the current input. In the TCT, talent intervenes in the selection process, shifting the activation probabilities in favor of certain experts over others. This means that two models with different talents, even in front of the same input, will activate different combinations of experts — and therefore process the information through physically different circuits of the network.

The effect is an implicit specialization: the model not only learns what to do, but also learns which of its internal tools are best suited to the types of problems it has faced in its history.

### Adaptive Parameter Generation

The third mechanism is the most powerful and also the most computationally expensive. A small auxiliary neural network — a hypernetwork — takes talent as input and generates modifications to the attention weights of the main model.

This is qualitatively different from the first two mechanisms. FiLM modulates the activations (the signal passing through the network). Expert routing selects which computational paths to activate. The hypernetwork goes further: it physically reconfigures parts of the model itself. The attention weights — the heart of the mechanism that gives the Transformer its name — are modified based on talent, making attention itself dependent on the model's cognitive history.

The modifications generated by the hypernetwork are low-rank, meaning they are parameter-efficient and do not require retraining the entire model. But their effect is profound: they literally change the way the model decides what is important in an input.

### Two-Level Optimization

There is one last architectural piece that holds everything together: the way talent is updated.

The TCT uses a bi-level optimization. The inner level is classic training: the model learns to solve the current task, updating the task-specific parameters (the classification head, the FiLM parameters, etc.) at each batch of data. The outer level operates on a slower timescale: every hundred training steps, talent is updated based on its performance on a separate validation set.

This temporal separation is crucial. The inner level answers the question "how do I solve this task?". The outer level answers the question "how should I change my cognitive profile in light of what I am learning?". The slowness of the outer update is intentional: it prevents talent from becoming a mere reflection of the current task and forces it to capture structural patterns that transcend individual tasks.

## The Results: What We Measured

The theory is one thing. The question that matters is: does it work?

We tested the TCT on five different linguistic tasks, chosen to cover a broad spectrum of capabilities: sentiment analysis (SST-2), natural language inference (MNLI), paraphrase recognition (QQP), topic classification (AG News), and measuring semantic similarity between sentences (STS-B). We compared it with the most commonly used adaptation methods in current research: full fine-tuning, LoRA, prompt tuning, and a task embedding with the same dimensionality as talent but without persistence.

### Single Tasks

On single tasks, the TCT achieves competitive results with LoRA and prompt tuning. On some tasks, it surpasses them, on others it aligns, and on none is it significantly worse. This result is important but not surprising: the TCT is not designed to excel in isolation. Its raison d'être emerges when tasks accumulate.

### Sequential Adaptation

Here lies the central result of the work. We subjected the models to ordered sequences of all five tasks — first sentiment, then classification, then inference, and so on — and measured two things: forward transfer (how much experience from previous tasks helps the current task) and backward transfer (how much learning a new task degrades performance on previous tasks).

Traditional methods show a predictable pattern: as tasks are added, performance on previous tasks declines (negative backward transfer) and the help from previous tasks for future ones is minimal or nonexistent. LoRA, which resets its parameters for each task, has no memory. Full fine-tuning, which does not reset anything, accumulates interference.

The TCT shows qualitatively different behavior. Forward transfer is positive and grows with the number of tasks: the model becomes progressively better at adapting to new tasks because talent has accumulated useful structural information. Backward transfer is significantly less negative compared to all baselines: talent protects previous skills because it has encoded them not as specific knowledge (which gets overwritten) but as structural preferences (which persist).

In practical terms: the TCT learns to learn.

### Ablation Study

To understand which components of the system are actually responsible for the results, we conducted a systematic ablation study, disabling one component at a time.

The results show that all three conditioning mechanisms contribute positively, but FiLM and expert routing have the greatest impact. The hypernetwork adds an incremental improvement, which is reasonable given that it is also the most computationally expensive component.

The most revealing data, however, concerns persistence. When talent is reset before each new task — effectively making it equivalent to a standard task embedding — the advantage of the TCT almost entirely disappears. This confirms that the value of the framework does not lie in the individual conditioning mechanisms, but in their combination with a vector that evolves over time.

### The Evolution of Talent

Perhaps the most fascinating result is also the most visual. We tracked the trajectory of the talent vector over time, projecting it into two dimensions, for models exposed to different sequences of tasks.

What emerges is that models with different histories develop distinct and interpretable trajectories. It is not noise: the clusters that form in the talent space correspond to families of tasks with similar characteristics. A model that started with logical reasoning tasks and then moved to emotional understanding tasks follows a different trajectory than one that did the reverse, and the two trajectories converge towards different regions of cognitive space.

Talent, in other words, is a mathematically measurable object that captures something analogous to what would be called an "expertise profile" in cognitive psychology.

## What It Means, in Practice

The TCT is not a product. It is not a better chatbot, it is not a larger model, it is not an app. It is an architectural framework — a different way of thinking about what an AI model should be.

The practical implications, however, are concrete.

The first is deep personalization. Today, when a company wants an AI tailored to its needs, it has two options: fine-tuning (expensive, rigid, subject to forgetting) or retrieval-augmented generation (which does not change the model's reasoning, only the information it has access to). The TCT offers a third way: a model that develops a cognitive profile calibrated to the company's specific ecosystem, through progressive exposure to its data and tasks. Not a model that knows different things, but a model that reasons differently.

The second is efficiency. Instead of maintaining dozens of specialized models for different applications, an organization could maintain a single base model with different talents for different contexts. Talent is a vector of 64 numbers: it occupies a few bytes of memory. The computational savings compared to maintaining separate models are enormous.

The third is scientific. The TCT provides a tool to study how AIs develop competencies over time. The trajectory of talent is a quantitative window into the cognitive history of the model. This opens connections with cognitive sciences, learning psychology, and the study of individual differences in human expertise — connections that until now lacked a technical basis to rely on.

## The Context: Why Now

The idea that a model should have some form of persistent identity is not entirely new. Meta-learning, continual learning, and models with external memory have been active lines of research for years. But the TCT differs in a specific aspect: it does not seek to give the model a memory of what it has learned, but a memory of how it has learned. The distinction is subtle but profound.

A continual learning system seeks not to forget the facts learned in previous tasks. The TCT does not care about facts: it cares about strategies. Talent does not remember that "negative reviews often contain words like terrible": it remembers that the model has learned to be good at distinguishing emotional nuances in text, and uses this structural information to better tackle future tasks.

It is the difference between remembering answers and remembering how to reason. Both are useful, but current research is almost exclusively focused on the former.

## Where We Are and Where We Are Going

The paper describing the TCT is available as a preprint on OpenReview, TechRxiv (IEEE), and Zenodo. We are preparing the submission to Transactions on Machine Learning Research (TMLR), a peer-reviewed journal founded by Hugo Larochelle, Kyunghyun Cho, and Raia Hadsell, among the most respected names in the field.

The work has been developed entirely at Algoretico, in Milan. Not in a university lab, not in a research center with hundreds of GPUs, not in a big tech company. In an independent Italian software firm that has been building custom AI for its clients since 2018. We believe this origin is relevant: the TCT was born from a practical need — the frustration of having to start from scratch every time we adapted a model to a new context — and the solution we propose reflects this concreteness.

The framework is in its early stages. Experimental results are promising but conducted on a limited scale (small models, NLP tasks). The road to application on frontier models is long. But the direction seems clear to us: the future of AI is not just larger models or more efficient adaptation methods. It is models that develop computational individuality through their history. Models that, like human professionals, become progressively better not because they know more things, but because they have learned to think more effectively.

The TCT is a first step in this direction.

---

_The complete paper is available at:_

- _OpenReview: openreview.net/forum?id=YFvj0besR4_]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/talent-conditioned-transformer-dare-una-personalit-cognitiva-all-intelligenza-artificiale.CIsA76Ah_1W6ugY.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>machine learning</category>
<category>transformer</category>
<category>deep learning</category>
<category>research</category>
<category>neural architectures</category>
<category>meta-learning</category>
<category>NLP</category>
<category>Algoretico</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Invisible Highways of AI</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/le-autostrade-invisibili-dell-ai/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/le-autostrade-invisibili-dell-ai/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 17 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Danilo Rivalta</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Why Data Centers are the True Strategic Infrastructure of the 21st Century]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[When we talk about Artificial Intelligence, the collective imagination almost always focuses on algorithms: language models, autonomous agents, robots, medical diagnoses, business automation.  
But the reality is much less “software” than it seems.

AI does not originate in code.  
It originates in **silicon, copper, and electrical energy**.

Behind every generative model, every digital assistant, every predictive system, there exists a gigantic physical infrastructure: **high-density computing data centers**.  
These, and not the algorithms, are the true limiting factor in the development of AI.

---

## The new raw material: computational power

In the 20th century, oil was the strategic resource.  
In the 21st century, it is **computing power**.

Training an advanced model requires:

- millions of GPUs
- ultra-low latency interconnections
- distributed storage systems
- high-bandwidth optical networks
- perfect electrical continuity

Modern AI architectures rely on accelerators produced by companies like NVIDIA, which are no longer just simple hardware components: they have become **geopolitical infrastructure**.

A large-scale model can no longer be developed in a university lab.  
A **digital factory** is needed.

The result is simple:

> The real barrier to entry in AI is not talent, but infrastructural capital.

---

## Data centers as a national industry

Building a next-generation data center is not an IT project.  
It is an industrial project comparable to:

- a power plant
- an airport
- a railway network

An AI hyperscale data center can cost **from 3 to over 15 billion euros** including:

- land
- electrical connections
- substations
- cooling
- networking
- security
- geographical redundancy

The major cloud platforms — Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud — are becoming, in fact, global infrastructure operators more akin to energy utilities than software companies.

---

## Economic impact: a new production chain

A country that builds data centers does not just build servers.  
It builds an ecosystem.

### Direct effects

- high-tech construction
- electrical engineering
- component manufacturing
- telecommunications networks
- cybersecurity
- specialized maintenance

### Indirect effects

- attraction of AI startups
- university research
- venture capital
- advanced digital services
- smart manufacturing industry

The local presence of computational capacity drastically reduces foreign technological dependence.  
In the future, not having data centers will mean being unable to develop competitive AI.

---

## The energy problem: the real bottleneck

The most critical issue is not the cost of servers.  
It is energy.

A large AI campus can consume **as much as a medium-sized city**.

The main challenges:

### 1\. Continuous power

AI requires constant loads 24/7, not intermittent ones.

### 2\. Training peaks

Training models can saturate the local electrical grid.

### 3\. Cooling

Today, the limit is not the CPU but the heat.

For this reason, new technologies are emerging:

- immersion cooling in dielectric liquid
- direct water cooling
- underwater data centers
- reuse of heat for district heating

Paradoxically, data centers are becoming a driver for the energy transition:  
they require stable energy → accelerate investments in renewables and modular nuclear.

---

## The environmental dilemma

Yes: data centers consume a lot of energy.  
But the right question is not **how much they consume**, but **what they replace**.

AI enables:

- optimization of electrical grids
- reduction of industrial waste
- drug design
- predictive maintenance
- efficient logistics
- precision agriculture

The real environmental balance is not in the kilowatt-hours consumed, but in the inefficient systems eliminated.

Many studies indicate that AI could reduce global emissions more than it generates — provided there are modern and efficient infrastructures.

---

## Digital sovereignty: the new independence

In the near future, countries will not be divided between developed and developing.  
They will be divided between:

- **those who own computational capacity**
- **those who rent it**

This completely changes the concept of sovereignty.

An AI-based healthcare system, a cyber defense, algorithmic finance, or an automated industry cannot depend on servers located on other continents.

It is no longer just an economic issue.  
It is a matter of decision-making autonomy.

---

## The investment paradox

Building data centers is difficult:

- huge costs
- long authorization processes
- local opposition
- energy consumption
- territorial impact

Yet, not building them is riskier.

A country without AI infrastructure:

- does not attract talent
- does not develop a digital industry
- does not innovate manufacturing
- becomes a permanent technology customer

---

## The highways of the future

In the 20th century, nations built:

- ports
- railways
- highways
- airports

Not because they were easy or cheap.  
But because without them, the economy did not exist.

Data centers are the modern equivalent.

They do not transport people or goods.  
They transport **intelligence**.

Every AI inference, every prediction, every business automation travels through these infrastructures.

---

## Conclusion

Investing in data centers today means building the economic foundation for the next 30 years.

They are not technological buildings:  
they are **multipliers of national competitiveness**.

They are not computing centers:  
they are **decision factories**.

And above all, they are not an option.

They are inevitable.

Because in the world of Artificial Intelligence, it will not be those with the best algorithms who win — those will be widespread —  
but those who own the highways on which intelligence can travel.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/le-autostrade-invisibili-dell-ai.8fykW6tS_1Qh5wB.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>Server</category>
<category>hardware</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Goodbye to design: websites will become blank pages</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/addio-al-design-i-siti-diventeranno-pagine-vuote/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/addio-al-design-i-siti-diventeranno-pagine-vuote/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Gabriele Gobbo</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Artificial intelligence is changing the way we search for information while eliminating the aesthetic experience of the web. For this reason, I believe we will unfortunately replace websites with empty text fields.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[Do you remember when we awaited the results of the Awwwards like we wait for Sanremo? I often found myself stopping in front of every homepage as if it were a painting in a museum. It wasn't just professional curiosity; it was the pleasure of seeing something beautiful. Layouts that made you forget you were on a web page, animations that looked like choreographies, typographic choices that alone told the story of an entire brand. It was pure design, visual experience, identity. It was a challenge to technique, an experimentation to push the technology of the time to its limits.

Now I open a website and more often than not I find myself facing a chatbot asking if I need help. WhatsApp integrates Meta AI, many sites have assistants that pop up as soon as you land. They do not yet replace traditional navigation, but they are getting people used to another mode: asking instead of searching, navigating. And as I see this habit spreading, I wonder: how long until websites are just blank pages with a text field? When will we say goodbye to hypertext?

Design is still fundamental, fortunately. A [collection of statistics from Digital Silk](https://www.digitalsilk.com/digital-trends/website-design-statistics/) shows that 94% of first impressions on a site depend on its visual appearance and that an average user forms an opinion in milliseconds. A significant portion of users considers aesthetics among the main reasons for not returning to a page. But the risk is that fewer and fewer people will see these designs. They will ask AI directly for what they are looking for and receive a text response, without ever landing on a homepage, without ever scrolling a page, without ever seeing a layout. And before long, even if they arrived on the homepage, they would find yet another text field to ask questions, perhaps against a flat background. Doesn't that remind you of the old Google? Logo, text field, answers. Only we won't have lists of links to click.

According to [Market.us](http://Market.us), the global market for AI-based browsers is worth about $4.5 billion in 2024 and is expected to grow to $76.8 billion by 2034. An entire industry is betting that the future of browsing will no longer consist of clicks, menus, and pages, but of questions and answers. Or of automated navigation.

Is this what we want? If the future is this, what sense does it make to still invest in elaborate homepages, curated interfaces, complex visual experiences? If the user arrives, asks a question, and leaves without ever seeing the rest, why continue to build that rest?

A traditional site is made of choices: colors, fonts, arrangement of elements, visual hierarchy, narrative rhythm. Every decision communicates something. Every detail builds identity. A well-designed homepage lets you understand who you are, what you do, how you do it. It is visual branding, it is experience, it is positioning.

A single question interface is the exact opposite: a text field on a neutral background. Almost no personality, almost no immediate visual identity. All tendentially the same. All reduced to the same empty box in which to type a question. How do you distinguish one brand from another if the only thing you see is a blinking cursor? How do you communicate values, positioning, tone of voice through a prompt? It becomes difficult. We are building a future where aesthetics no longer matter because aesthetics are no longer visible. Sites are turning into text terminals, into command line interfaces dressed in good UX intentions. And we do this in the name of efficiency, speed, and reducing friction.

But friction is not always negative. Sometimes friction is what makes an experience memorable. Clicking, scrolling, discovering something you weren't looking for, getting lost in non-linear navigation: all of this has value. It is not a waste of time; it is experience. It is the reason why some sites remain in memory and others do not.

Contemporary UX culture has placed the elimination of friction at the center of everything. Every click saved is a victory, every second saved is a success. But simplifying does not mean nullifying. If everything becomes pure function, where does beauty end up? Where does identity end up?

And then there is the issue of control. AIs can invent information, confuse data, mix sources. An AI that responds on your behalf can say things you do not want to associate with your brand. The control we needed to regain from external platforms risks slipping away from us even within our own home.

Designed friction creates memory. For example, I am creating interactive sites that simulate old interfaces, hiding easter eggs, integrating interactions that force exploration. A bit out of nostalgia, a bit to resist. They are digital gadgets more oriented towards entertainment than pure business, but I see people wide-eyed, happy. Not everyone wants just efficiency. Some still want “beauty.”

In a few years, perhaps, there will still be awards for beautiful websites, impeccable homepages, extraordinary interfaces. But they will be almost museum objects, testimonies of an era when the web was still a space to explore, to look at, to experience. They will no longer be work tools; they will be artifacts. And we will continue to visit them with nostalgia, as one visits paper magazines in a library: beautiful, curated, relegated.

We will have learned to ask instead of searching, to receive instead of discovering. And the web made of colors, layouts, animations, and visual identity will have become a memory. The question is not whether it will happen everywhere, but how much of digital beauty we will be willing to trade for a few seconds saved.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/addio-al-design-i-siti-diventeranno-pagine-vuote.BnXdckMg_IpwiO.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>Design</category>
<category>Web</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Software Architectures for Artificial Intelligence Systems</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/architetture-software-per-sistemi-di-intelligenza-artificiale/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/architetture-software-per-sistemi-di-intelligenza-artificiale/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 30 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Artificial intelligence approached with scientific rigor, engineering precision, and human depth.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[In the contemporary landscape of artificial intelligence, media and academic attention is predominantly focused on models: parametric sizes, performance on standardized benchmarks, emerging capabilities, window context. This focus, while understandable from a communicative standpoint, obscures a technically more decisive aspect: the software architecture that surrounds, orchestrates, and governs these models.

AI architectures are not merely an implementation detail nor an exercise in traditional software engineering. They represent the conceptual and technical framework that determines whether an artificial intelligence system can actually operate in production contexts with the required characteristics: horizontal and vertical scalability, mission-critical reliability, regulatory governability, enterprise-grade security, and long-term economic sustainability.

This article proposes an in-depth technical analysis of software architectures for AI systems, examining established architectural patterns, emerging paradigms, and the engineering challenges that characterize the deployment of machine learning systems in production environments. The goal is to provide a rigorous conceptual framework for designing AI systems that transcend the prototype dimension to assume industrial characteristics.

## The Model-Centric AI Paradigm: Limits and Overcoming

### The Fallacy of the Model as a System

The evolution of artificial intelligence in recent years has been characterized by a dominant narrative: the race for ever-larger models, with more parameters, trained on larger datasets. GPT-4 with its alleged 1.7 trillion parameters, PaLM with 540 billion, LLaMA in its various incarnations: the metric of success has often been reduced to a quantitative competition.

This perspective, which we can define as "model-centric," presents fundamental limits when moving from research to production:

- **Confusion between capability and reliability:** a model may demonstrate impressive capabilities in controlled demos but systematically fail in real operational conditions
- **Absence of formal guarantees:** deep learning models are inherently stochastic and do not offer bounds on the correctness of outputs
- **Operational opacity:** an isolated model does not provide structured logging, business metrics, audit trails, or rollback mechanisms
- **Evolving rigidity:** updating a monolithic model requires complete re-training, with prohibitive costs and timelines incompatible with business cycles

### The Concept of AI System Architecture

A production-ready AI system is not a model: it is an ecosystem of interconnected software components that includes the model as one of the elements, often not the most critical. The formal definition of AI architecture that we propose is:

_An AI architecture is the set of structural decisions that define the components of an artificial intelligence system, their interfaces, communication patterns, deployment constraints, and the emergent properties of the system as a whole._

This definition emphasizes several fundamental aspects: architectural decisions are structural and therefore difficult to modify retrospectively; components have defined interfaces that determine their composability; the system has emergent properties that cannot be reduced to individual components.

## Anatomy of an Enterprise AI System

### Layer Architecture: A Functional Taxonomy

An enterprise AI system can be conceptualized through a functional stratification that separates responsibilities and concerns:

#### Data Layer

The foundation of any AI system is data management. This layer includes: data ingestion pipelines for acquiring data from heterogeneous sources (APIs, databases, file systems, streaming); data validation and quality assurance to ensure semantic and syntactic integrity; feature stores for centralized management of engineered features; vector databases for semantic retrieval on embedding spaces; data versioning for reproducibility of experiments and audit trails.

Typical technologies include Apache Kafka for streaming, Delta Lake or Apache Iceberg for data lakehouses, Feast or Tecton for feature stores, Pinecone, Weaviate, Milvus, or Qdrant for vector databases.

#### Model Layer

The model layer manages the complete lifecycle of ML artifacts: model registry for versioning and cataloging models; model serving infrastructure for low-latency inference; model monitoring for tracking drift and degradation; A/B testing framework for incremental validation; ensemble and routing logic for combining specialized models.

Common architectures include MLflow or Weights & Biases for the registry, TensorFlow Serving, TorchServe, Triton Inference Server, or vLLM for serving, Seldon Core or KServe for Kubernetes-native orchestration.

#### Orchestration Layer

This critical layer manages the control flow and coordination between components: workflow engines for defining complex pipelines; state management for persisting conversational context; routing logic for directing requests; fallback and retry policies for resilience; rate limiting and throttling for resource protection.

LangChain, LlamaIndex, Haystack represent orchestration frameworks for LLM applications. For more generic workflows, Apache Airflow, Prefect, Dagster offer enterprise orchestration capabilities.

#### Application Layer

The interface to the outside world: API gateways for exposing services; authentication and authorization for security; input validation and sanitization for protection against injection; output filtering for compliance; caching layers for performance optimization; SDKs and client libraries for integration.

#### Observability Layer

Transversal to all layers, it ensures operational visibility: distributed tracing for debugging complex systems; metrics collection for quantitative monitoring; log aggregation for qualitative analysis; alerting systems for proactive detection; dashboarding for visualization. Typical stacks include OpenTelemetry, Prometheus, Grafana, ELK, or cloud-native alternatives.

## Architectural Patterns for AI Systems

### Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)

RAG represents the dominant architectural pattern for applications requiring grounding on specific knowledge bases. The RAG architecture separates reasoning (delegated to the LLM) from retrieval (managed by specialized systems), achieving several advantages: reduction of hallucinations through anchoring to verified sources; updatability of the knowledge base without re-training; traceability of sources for compliance and audit; reduction of computational costs compared to fine-tuning.

A production-grade RAG pipeline includes:

1\. **Document Processing Pipeline:** chunking strategies (fixed-size, semantic, recursive), metadata extraction, preprocessing for heterogeneous formats

2\. **Embedding Generation:** selection of the embedding model (OpenAI, Cohere, open-source models), batch processing, incremental updates

3\. **Vector Store:** indexing strategy (HNSW, IVF, PQ), sharding for scalability, replication for availability

4\. **Retrieval Engine:** hybrid search (dense + sparse), re-ranking models, filtering and metadata queries

5\. **Context Assembly:** context window management, prompt templating, citation formatting

### Compound AI Systems

Compound AI Systems represent an evolution from monolithic systems to modular architectures where multiple AI components collaborate for complex tasks. Distinctive features include: specialization of components where each module excels in a specific task; composability that allows flexible combination of components; intelligent routing that directs requests to the optimal component; graceful degradation that maintains partial functionality in case of failure.

A concrete example is a customer support system that combines: an intent classifier for initial routing; a retrieval system for the knowledge base; an LLM for generating responses; a sentiment analyzer for escalation; a translation model for multilingual support. The orchestration of these components requires a sophisticated architecture that manages dependencies, parallelism, error handling, and state management.

### Agentic Architectures

AI agents represent the most advanced paradigm, where the system does not merely respond but acts autonomously to achieve goals. The agentic architecture introduces: planning modules for decomposing complex goals; tool use for interaction with external systems; memory systems for context persistence and learned behaviors; self-reflection for critical evaluation of actions; human-in-the-loop for supervision of critical actions.

Frameworks like AutoGPT, BabyAGI, and the ReAct/MRKL architectures have explored these patterns, but production deployment requires significant architectural guardrails: sandboxing of actions, approval workflows, resource budgeting, rollback capabilities.

## Scalability: Engineering Principles

### Scaling Laws and Architectural Implications

The scaling laws of AI models (Chinchilla, Kaplan et al.) have direct implications for architecture: the computational cost of inference grows with model size; latency increases with complexity; memory requirements (VRAM, RAM) determine deployment options.

These constraints impose architectural choices: aggressive caching to reduce model calls; batching requests to optimize throughput; model distillation for edge deployment; quantization to reduce memory footprint; speculative decoding to accelerate generation.

### Horizontal vs Vertical Scaling

Vertical scaling, or increasing resources on a single machine, quickly encounters physical limits in the AI context: single GPUs have limited VRAM; the cost per GPU increases non-linearly; the availability of high-end hardware is limited.

Horizontal scaling, or distribution across multiple nodes, requires specific architectures: model parallelism where the model is partitioned across multiple GPUs; data parallelism where requests are distributed across identical replicas; pipeline parallelism where processing stages are distributed; disaggregated serving where prefill and decode are separated on different hardware. Technologies like Ray, vLLM, TensorRT-LLM, DeepSpeed enable these patterns.

### Caching Strategies

Caching is crucial for economic sustainability. Strategies include: semantic caching that stores responses for semantically similar queries; KV-cache sharing that reuses computation between requests with common prefixes; embedding caching that avoids recomputation for already processed documents; result caching at the application level. Implementation requires careful design of cache keys, invalidation policies, and TTL strategies.

## Governance and Compliance by Design

### AI Act and Architectural Requirements

The EU AI Act introduces requirements that must be architecturally satisfied: traceability requires complete audit logs of input, output, and decision rationale; human oversight imposes mechanisms for override and approval workflows; accuracy requires testing frameworks and continuous monitoring; robustness imposes adversarial testing and graceful degradation; transparency requires explainability modules and automated documentation.

These requirements cannot be added retrospectively: they must be embedded in the architecture from the design stage. A system that does not provide structured logging, for example, will never be compliant without significant rewriting.

### Explainability Architecture

The explainability of AI decisions requires dedicated architectural components: attention visualization for transformer models; feature attribution methods like SHAP, LIME integrated into the serving pipeline; chain-of-thought logging for traceable reasoning; confidence scoring for quantifying uncertainty; counterfactual generation for what-if analysis.

The architecture must provide hooks for extracting this data without significant impact on production performance.

### Data Governance

Data management in AI systems requires: data lineage tracking to trace the origin of each data point; consent management for GDPR compliance; automated data retention policies; PII detection and masking integrated into the pipeline; right to deletion implemented at the storage level.

## Security Architecture for AI Systems

### AI-Specific Threat Model

AI systems introduce unique attack surfaces that require specific architectural considerations:

#### Prompt Injection

Attacks that manipulate model behavior through malicious input. Architectural mitigations: input sanitization layer; prompt templating that separates user input from system instructions; output validation; canary tokens for detection.

#### Data Poisoning

Compromise of training data or the knowledge base. Mitigations: data provenance tracking; anomaly detection on new documents; versioning with rollback capability; integrity verification.

#### Model Extraction

Attempts to reconstruct the model through queries. Mitigations: rate limiting; query logging and anomaly detection; output perturbation; watermarking.

#### Information Leakage

Extraction of sensitive information from models. Mitigations: differential privacy in training; output filtering for PII; context isolation between tenants.

### Defense in Depth

A robust security architecture implements multiple layers of protection: perimeter security with API gateways, WAF, DDoS protection; application security with input validation, output filtering, authentication; data security with encryption at rest and in transit, access control, audit logging; infrastructure security with network segmentation, secrets management, container hardening; model security with adversarial robustness testing, continuous monitoring, incident response.

## Edge AI and Distributed Architectures

### The Edge-Cloud Hybrid Paradigm

The distribution of intelligence between edge and cloud introduces significant architectural complexities but enables use cases impossible with centralized approaches. The main drivers are: latency requirements where real-time applications cannot tolerate round trips to the cloud; data sovereignty where sensitive data cannot leave certain perimeters; bandwidth constraints where transferring large volumes of data is impractical; offline operation where connectivity is not guaranteed; cost optimization where local inference can be cheaper for high-volume use cases.

### Distributed Deployment Patterns

Various architectural strategies address these requirements:

#### Model Splitting

Partitioning the model between edge and cloud, with early exit on edge for simple cases and cloud processing for complex cases.

#### Federated Learning

Distributed training that keeps data on-premise, aggregating only gradients in the cloud.

#### Model Distillation

Creation of lightweight models for edge deployment, derived from larger models.

#### Caching and Prefetching

Pre-distribution of common results to edge nodes to reduce dependence on the cloud.

### Synchronization and Consistency

Distributed architectures must manage: model versioning with controlled distribution of updates; state synchronization for stateful applications; conflict resolution for concurrent changes; eventual consistency design to tolerate network partitions.

## MLOps: The Lifecycle Architecture

### CI/CD for Machine Learning

Continuous integration/deployment for ML presents unique challenges: code changes, but so do data and models; tests must cover correctness, performance, bias; deployment must support rapid rollbacks; monitoring must track gradual degradation.

A mature MLOps architecture includes: automated data pipelines with validation gates; training pipelines triggered by data drift or schedule; model validation with comprehensive test suites; staged deployment with canary and blue-green strategies; continuous monitoring with automatic alerting.

### Model Registry and Artifact Management

The model registry is the heart of the MLOps architecture: semantic versioning of models; comprehensive metadata tracking including training config, metrics, lineage; dependency management for reproducibility; access control for governance; deployment automation with CI/CD integration.

### Monitoring and Observability

Monitoring AI systems goes beyond traditional APM: model performance metrics such as accuracy, latency, throughput; data drift detection on input distributions; concept drift detection on output patterns; resource utilization with GPU memory, compute; business metrics with conversion, satisfaction, escalation.

The architecture must provide non-intrusive data collection, efficient storage for high-cardinality metrics, alerting with low false-positive rates, and dashboarding for various stakeholders.

## Cost Architecture and Sustainability

### Economics of AI Systems

The costs of AI systems have a peculiar structure: dominant inference costs in the long term; significant but amortizable training costs; increasing storage costs with data retention; operational costs for monitoring, maintenance, evolution.

The architecture must optimize for TCO, not for individual metrics: caching reduces inference costs but increases storage; smaller models reduce compute but may require more calls; edge deployment reduces cloud costs but increases complexity.

### Green AI Architecture

Environmental sustainability is increasingly relevant: carbon-aware scheduling that executes training in regions/times with cleaner energy; model efficiency that prefers efficient architectures over brute-force scaling; hardware utilization optimization that maximizes the use of allocated resources; lifecycle management that decommissions obsolete models.

## Case Study: Architecture of an Enterprise AI Assistant

To concretize the principles discussed, let’s examine the architecture of an enterprise AI assistant that must: answer questions about the corporate knowledge base; perform actions on backend systems; comply with security and compliance policies; operate with stringent SLAs.

### Overall Architecture

The system is structured into several interconnected components. The API Gateway manages authentication, rate limiting, and routing. The Orchestrator coordinates the processing flow. The Intent Classifier determines the type of request. The RAG Pipeline handles informative queries. The Action Engine performs operations on external systems. The Guard Rail System validates input and output. The Observability Stack provides monitoring and logging.

### Request Flow

The path of a request traverses several stages: the request arrives at the API Gateway which verifies authentication and applies rate limiting; the Orchestrator receives the request and initializes the context; the Guard Rail System validates the input for malicious content; the Intent Classifier determines whether it is an informative query or an action request.

For informative queries: the RAG Pipeline performs retrieval from the knowledge base; relevant documents are passed to the LLM with the prompt; the response is validated by the Guard Rail System and returned.

For action requests: the Action Engine checks user permissions; if required, it activates the approval workflow; performs the action on the target system; logs the operation for audit and returns the result.

### Scalability Considerations

The architecture provides for: stateless components for horizontal scaling; multi-level caching (embedding, retrieval, response); async processing for long-running operations; graceful degradation with fallback to pre-computed responses.

## Architecture as a Strategic Discipline

Artificial intelligence is not magic emerging from billions of parameters. It is a complex engineering artifact that requires rigorous design, disciplined construction, and continuous maintenance. Models are important components, but architecture is what transforms capability into operational value.

AI architectures embody long-term strategic decisions: they determine what the system can do, how it can evolve, how much it costs to operate, whether it can be governed and brought into compliance. Once made, these decisions are difficult to modify: architecture is the most costly commitment in an AI project.

The future of industrial AI belongs to those who can design systems that not only perform but scale, endure, adapt, and explain. In this future, models will be commodities. Architectures will be the true competitive differentiator.

The challenge for the technical community is twofold: to develop mature and shared architectural patterns, and to train a generation of AI architects who combine machine learning, software engineering, security, and domain expertise. Only then can artificial intelligence fulfill the promises it makes today.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/architetture-software-per-sistemi-di-intelligenza-artificiale.y2FelBqj_ZUYxkg.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>architecture</category>
<category>models</category>
<category>software</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>2026: The Year of Artificial Intelligence Consolidation</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/2026-l-anno-del-consolidamento-dell-intelligenza-artificiale/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/2026-l-anno-del-consolidamento-dell-intelligenza-artificiale/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 23 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[The Global AI Report by NTT DATA reveals a clear picture: experimentation gives way to the creation of measurable value.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[2026 marks a historic turning point for artificial intelligence in global organizations. After years of experimentation, pilot projects, and proof-of-concept, companies are finally transitioning towards a structural adoption of AI, with an increasingly marked focus on measurable outcomes, solid governance, and tangible return on investment. This is highlighted in the _2026 Global AI Report: A Playbook for AI Leaders_ published by NTT DATA, based on a survey conducted with 2,567 senior executives across 35 countries and 15 industrial sectors.

The message is unequivocal: "Playtime is over." The playful phase of AI experimentation has ended. Today, AI strategy coincides with business strategy, and organizations that have understood this transformation are achieving financial results significantly above average.

## AI Leaders: Who They Are and How They Operate

Only 15% of the organizations surveyed were classified as "AI leaders." These companies stand out for their clear strategies, mature operating models, and focused execution. But above all, the numbers speak for themselves: AI leaders are 2.5 times more likely to achieve revenue growth above 10% and over 3.6 times more likely to reach profit margins of 15% or higher.

In Europe, these figures are even more pronounced: the likelihood of growth above 10% rises to 2.9 times compared to other organizations. A competitive gap that is rapidly widening and risks leaving behind those who have not yet embarked on a structured AI transformation journey.

### The Nine Characteristics of Leaders

The report identifies nine distinctive traits that characterize successful organizations, divided between strategy and execution:

#### On the strategic front

- **Strategic alignment and speed:** leaders win by closely aligning AI with business strategy, transforming focus and speed into extraordinary financial results.
- **Focused end-to-end approach:** top performers concentrate on high-value areas and redesign workflows from start to finish, not limiting themselves to superficial interventions.
- **Flywheel effect:** initial investments yield early successes that fuel new reinvestments to support further growth.
- **Core reinvention:** leaders rebuild core applications by integrating AI from the ground up, rather than settling for superficial add-ons.

#### On the execution front

- **Security at scale:** they build scalable and secure stacks, investing in private and sovereign AI infrastructures.
- **AI expert-first:** they use AI to amplify the impact of expert professionals, not to replace them.
- **Lasting change:** they approach adoption as a business transformation program with constructive change management.
- **Governance for scalability:** they centralize governance, formalize enterprise oversight, and appoint dedicated Chief AI Officers.
- **Partner-driven growth:** they leverage strategic collaborations and outcome-based profit-sharing models.

## The Governance Shift: From CIOs to CEOs

One of the most significant findings from the research concerns AI governance. 78% of AI leaders have a dedicated Chief AI Officer and formal governance structures. However, the most profound change relates to who makes decisions: responsibility for AI now rests with boards of directors and requires an agenda that involves the entire organization.

This trend is also confirmed by the BCG AI Radar 2026, which reports that 72% of CEOs claim to be the primary decision-makers on AI-related choices, a figure that has doubled compared to the previous year. AI is no longer seen as an exclusively technological or IT issue, but as a direct lever of competitiveness, organization, and business model.

_"Once AI and business strategies are aligned, the most effective move is to choose one or two areas capable of generating extraordinary value and redesign them end-to-end with AI. Supporting this targeted approach with solid governance, modern infrastructures, and trusted partners is how today's AI leaders are transforming pilot projects into profits."_

**— Abhijit Dubey, CEO and CAIO of NTT DATA, Inc.**

## Agentic AI: The New Frontier

A significant part of industry analysis is dedicated to agentic AI, or systems capable of acting with greater autonomy, making operational decisions, and coordinating complex workflows. In 2026, AI agents will be tasked with managing specific activities within existing processes, from ticketing to supply chain, from CRM to application development, without replacing work teams but automating well-defined parts of the workflow.

According to the BCG AI Radar, about 90% of CEOs believe that AI agents will enable the measurement of tangible ROI by 2026, and over 30% of the AI budget planned for next year will be allocated to these solutions. The impact on the organization of work appears significant: within three years, AI will increasingly take on the role of operational assistant, coach, mentor, and, in some cases, supervisor of processes.

## Investments in Exponential Growth

Investments in artificial intelligence, calculated as a share of corporate revenues, are set to double in 2026, rising from about 0.8% in 2025 to 1.7% in 2026, after an estimated 0.6% for 2024. This figure spans across sectors: technology, finance, insurance, energy, healthcare, and public administration all show expected increases.

This rise does not appear to be linked to an opportunistic or speculative logic. 94% of CEOs state that they will continue to invest in AI even if the initiatives launched do not yield an immediate return in 2026. Only 6% foresee a downsizing in case of results below expectations. The rest of the sample indicates a tendency towards strategic revision or strengthening of skills.

## Security and Risks: The Open Challenges

The increase in the autonomy of AI systems inevitably raises concerns regarding security. 53% of respondents cite data privacy and cybersecurity as the main risk associated with AI. At the same time, new areas of concern are emerging: technological failures, the environmental impact of AI, and geopolitical instability, all increasing as sources of perceived risk.

In the specific case of agentic AI, leaders' opinions are ambivalent: 9% consider it the main threat to cybersecurity, while 32% see it as the greatest opportunity, thanks to its ability to continuously monitor systems and respond more quickly to incidents. The majority, at 59%, interpret it as a combination of risk and opportunity, requiring adaptive governance models.

## Geographical Differences: East vs. West

The reports also highlight a significant geographical divide. CEOs in Asia, particularly in India and Greater China, show very high levels of confidence, with optimism about AI payoffs exceeding 70%. In Europe and the UK, confidence remains more subdued and is accompanied by greater competitive pressure, linked to the fear of falling behind.

This difference suggests different decision-making models: _value-led_ in Asia, where AI is adopted because it is perceived as a direct value generator; _pressure-led_ in many Western economies, where adoption also responds to defensive dynamics.

## The Italian Context: The National Strategy 2024-2026

The Italian landscape fits into this global context with the Italian Strategy for Artificial Intelligence 2024-2026, which aims to position the country as a key player in the technological transition. The strategy is articulated across four macro areas: Research, Public Administration, Enterprises, and Training.

With Italian universities and the research world ranking seventh globally, the highly competitive entrepreneurial fabric represents fertile ground for AI development. Strategic actions include consolidating the Italian research ecosystem, developing national multimodal models compliant with European regulations, and enhancing dedicated infrastructures.

## AI as a Strategic Infrastructure

2026 will be the year when artificial intelligence will definitively cease to be perceived as experimentation and will become strategic infrastructure. As Yutaka Sasaki, President and CEO of NTT DATA Group, effectively summarizes: "Our research shows that a select group of leaders is already using AI to differentiate themselves, grow, and reinvent the way people and machines create value together."

The value of AI will no longer depend solely on the power of the models, but on the organizations' ability to integrate them securely, measurably, and sustainably. The decisive variable will not be so much the technology itself, but the ability of companies to integrate it into processes, decisions, and accountability models.

Companies that can move in this direction will be the first to turn AI into a tangible competitive advantage. For all others, the risk is to remain spectators of a transformation that is redefining the rules of competitive play on a global scale.

- • •

### Sources

- NTT DATA, "2026 Global AI Report: A Playbook for AI Leaders", December 2025
- Boston Consulting Group, "BCG AI Radar 2026", January 2026

AgID, "Italian Strategy for Artificial Intelligence 2024]]></content:encoded>
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<category>NTT</category>
<category>Global AI Report</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>The dead internet is becoming a reality</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/l-internet-morta-sta-diventando-realt/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/l-internet-morta-sta-diventando-realt/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 14 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Gabriele Gobbo</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[If half of web traffic is generated by bots and content is produced en masse by AI, those working with artificial intelligence have only one path: to stand out from the noise.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[The Pew Research Center has documented that 38% of the web pages existing in 2013 are now inaccessible. Links break down, content evaporates. But the void does not remain empty: it is filled with rivers of texts produced en masse by artificial intelligences with little to no supervision or interest in oversight. The Bad Bot Report 2024 by Imperva has added the missing data: for the first time, traffic generated by bots (51%) has surpassed that of humans (49%), who have thus become the minority on the web. A web that we built.

The Dead Internet Theory is becoming reality, and those like me who work in the content world have a professional obligation to ask whether they are contributing to the death of the web or are part of the silent resistance. Because if the audience is no longer human, for whom are we producing? For whom are we advertising? I prefer to be part of those who fight.

I believe one of the problems is extreme GEO, and I notice it when I search for technical information or solutions to problems with devices or software to do things; I find dozens of identical articles on different sites, often on the blogs of companies selling the solution, disguised as lists of the "5 best ways to" where there are indeed many tools, but only theirs has the link and is always first or best or fastest. Setting aside the fact that GEO for me is the ever-necessary SEO with a new name, we are truly witnessing the capitulation of the great promise of the internet: information at the click of a button connected to each other for a seamless and limitless browsing and discovery experience. And I know well that this sounds like a nostalgic old boomer's speech.

## The Problem of Impeccable Mediocrity

The temptation is strong and calls to us loudly. AI generates correct, structured texts that can be published in minutes, but they are identical to thousands of others. Formally perfect, strategically banal. This is what I call Impeccable Mediocrity: output that contains no errors but also lacks value. No overly original perspective, no truly recognizable angle, no personal signature. As I am writing in my upcoming volume "Strategic Metaprompting".

Those who accept the first coherent output and publish it are fueling the phenomenon that the Dead Internet Theory describes: interchangeable content that no one reads, written for algorithms that reward quantity and indexed by crawlers that do not care about value, at least for now. It’s a vicious circle: the more generic content there is, the more noise grows, the harder it becomes to stand out, the more tempted one is to produce even more content to compensate. The way out, in my opinion, is to use AI differently.

## Radical Quality: What It Really Means

Radical quality means texts that carry a signature, ours, that could not have been written by anyone else, that add something that was not there before. Length and formal refinement are secondary. What matters is the difference between using AI as a printer or using it as a panel of assistants to direct, real assistants so that we do not become the "copy-pasters of AI," to quote Marco Camisani Calzolari.

In my work, I have developed an approach that I call the 3C Protocol: Compare, Challenge, Curate. I compare the outputs of different models on the same task and make them challenge each other when they converge, because convergence can be automation. But I decide how to do it, what to keep, what to discard, what to rewrite. Because the final peak of Curate makes the difference: it means taking responsibility for the result. I think that those who use AI as an oracle to accept answers are delegating the most important part of the work: judgment.

Generic content answers questions that perhaps even the author has never asked, with information available everywhere. Quality content starts from a specific, personal, human angle, and adds a perspective that comes from experience to take a stand. And I am not saying not to use artificial intelligence.

## The Choice of Side

The web, in addition to filling up with spam, popups, and Xs to click, has filled up with content that no one really reads, written by AI to be read by other AIs. Think about it: AI-enhanced browsers automatically navigating pages generated by other artificial intelligences, agents interacting with services managed by other agents. Artificial navigators visiting artificial content in an artificial way. It’s a toxic spiral that poisons the wells for those seeking real value.

Those who work with AI professionally can decide whether to ride the mass production wave, hoping that the numbers will compensate for the lack of substance, or to focus on radical quality, accepting that it requires more time, more method, more responsibility. And no, it’s not a shortcut; it’s a choice of side.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/l-internet-morta-sta-diventando-realt.BH-yuHsi_Zo0RWB.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>dead internet</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Surviving an AI bubble burst: A developer’s Local AI survival kit</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/surviving-an-ai-bubble-burst-a-developer-s-local-ai-survival-kit/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/surviving-an-ai-bubble-burst-a-developer-s-local-ai-survival-kit/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Ricardo Antonio Piana</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[What happens when your favorite AI coding assistant disappears overnight?]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[Imagine waking up to find that the **AI bubble has burst** – the major AI code assistants and cloud APIs you rely on (like ChatGPT or GitHub Copilot) are suddenly either shut down or priced out of reach. This isn’t far-fetched: the generative AI boom is built on _unsustainable economics_, with soaring compute costs and massive infrastructure investments.

If that bubble were to collapse, big AI providers might scale back or disappear overnight. For developers who have grown accustomed to AI-assisted coding, this scenario would be like the power going out in the middle of a workday. **Can today’s programmers really go back to writing every line of code by hand?**

The short answer is **no – nor should they have to.** Software developers have rapidly integrated AI into their daily workflow, and productivity has soared as a result. By early 2025, over **15 million developers** were using GitHub Copilot (an AI pair-programmer), a **400% increase** in just one year.

On average, Copilot now **writes nearly half of a developer’s code** for those who use it.

In controlled studies, AI-assisted devs completed tasks **55% faster** than those coding solo. Many programmers also use chat-based AI (like ChatGPT) to debug, generate ideas, or get explanations on the fly. In fact, the impact of these tools has been so profound that **developer behavior has fundamentally shifted** – even the once-indispensable Q&A site Stack Overflow saw its question volume plummet by **78%** in 2025, as developers turned to AI tools in their IDEs instead.

The **“shift is clear”**: rather than combing forums or documentation, many devs now get instant answers and code snippets from AI assistant. AI coding tools have become an integral part of the modern developer’s workflow.

So what happens if those cloud-based AI services go dark or become prohibitively expensive? This article explores how developers can **build a local “AI survival kit”** to stay productive when the cloud AI well runs dry. We’ll outline the scenario and then dive into concrete solutions: **local AI models, offline coding assistants, and tools that run right on your own machine.** By the end, you’ll see that even in a worst-case AI downturn, you can still harness powerful coding assistance – all **locally**, under your control.

## Developers’ dependence on Cloud AI (and the risks)

It’s important to recognize **how dependent developers have become on cloud-based AI**. As noted, tools like Copilot are now writing significant portions of code for many programmers.

Surveys show that around **77% of developers** using Copilot spend _less time searching for answers online_, because the AI can autocomplete code or provide answers in place. It’s not just about convenience – AI assistance has been linked to higher job satisfaction and less frustration, with up to 75% of devs feeling more fulfilled and focused when coding alongside an AI helper. In other words, AI has become a coding companion that developers genuinely value.

**The risk**, of course, is that this companion lives on someone else’s servers. If the major AI providers were to shut off access or jack up prices tomorrow, the impact on day-to-day development would be immediate and painful. Codebases might suddenly lack the quick autocompletions for boilerplate that Copilot used to provide. Debugging and researching programming questions would revert to time-consuming manual searches.

The **productivity gains** (50%+ faster completion on some tasks) could vanish, potentially slowing down software projects and releases. Developers who have grown accustomed to AI-powered “instant answers” would have to return to hunting through documentation and forums for help – a slow process that many had happily left behind. The dramatic decline in Stack Overflow activity underscores this reliance: as one report puts it, _“Stack Overflow’s question volume plummeted… Developers now turn to AI tools directly within their IDEs, bypassing the hassle of forum posts.”_

In short, a sudden loss of AI assistance would feel like a massive step backward for the software industry.

Yet, **there is a silver lining to this thought experiment**. Just because the _cloud_ AI services disappear doesn’t mean _all_ AI disappears. Open-source and local AI communities have been quietly building an alternative path – one where capable AI models can run on everyday hardware without an internet connection. In the next sections, we’ll explore how you can leverage these **local models and tools** as a **survival kit** to keep your development workflow humming along, bubble or no bubble.

## Building a Local AI survival kit

If cloud AI went dark, the key to “surviving” as a developer is to **bring AI back in-house**. This means running AI models locally on your own hardware and integrating them into your coding environment. Fortunately, recent advances in open-source AI have made this far more feasible than it was just a few years ago. Let’s break down the components of a robust local AI toolkit:

### 1\. Local Code LLMs: Open-Source Models to the Rescue

The backbone of any AI coding assistant is the **Large Language Model (LLM)** that generates code or answers. While Big Tech’s models (OpenAI’s GPT-4, Google’s models, etc.) are proprietary and cloud-only, the open-source world offers several excellent **code-focused LLMs** that you can download and run yourself:

- **Meta’s Code Llama** – an offshoot of Meta’s Llama 2 model, _specialized for programming_. Code Llama was trained on an additional **500 billion tokens of code** data, giving it a strong grasp of multiple programming language. In benchmark tests, Code Llama’s performance is impressive – the 34B-parameter version achieves around _53–54%_ pass@1 on the HumanEval Python coding challenge, comparable to OpenAI’s older Codex.

    With further fine-tuning, Code Llama can reach even higher levels. In fact, a fine-tuned variant of Code Llama **achieved a 73.8% score on HumanEval, outperforming GPT-4’s 67.0% on that benchmark**. This is a stunning proof that open models can rival the best proprietary models on certain coding tasks. Meta has released Code Llama in sizes from 7B up to 70B parameters, so developers can choose a model that fits their hardware capabilities. The smaller 7B and 13B models are lighter and can run on a single GPU (or even CPU with optimization), while the 34B and 70B models offer greater accuracy if you have the resources.

- **StarCoder (by Hugging Face/ServiceNow)** – a 15B parameter model trained on **1 trillion tokens** of code from dozens of programming languages. StarCoder was designed as an open alternative to GitHub Copilot. Remarkably, StarCoder can **match or surpass OpenAI’s older Codex** model (which powered early Copilot) on coding benchmark. It reached around **40.8% on HumanEval** (with prompt tweaks), setting a state-of-the-art for open models when released. StarCoder can handle an 8,000+ token, meaning it can take into account large files or multiple code snippets at once – useful for real-world coding assistance. There’s even a StarCoder 2 in development with even larger training (~4 trillion tokens) and variants in 3B, 7B, 15B.
- **WizardCoder** – an open fine-tuned model based on Code Llama. Through a technique called evol-instruct fine-tuning (using synthesized instructional data), WizardCoder pushed open-source code AI to new heights. The **WizardCoder-34B** model famously reached **~73% on HumanEval**, even edging out GPT-4’s early 2023 score.

    Its creators claim it outperforms ChatGPT (GPT-3.5) and other models on many coding tasks. This model demonstrates how quickly the community can iterate: Meta released Code Llama, and **within 48 hours** researchers had WizardCoder fine-tuned to surpass even flagship proprietary models on code generation. WizardCoder and similar community models (e.g. PaLM-Code fine-tunes) show that _open models are catching up fast_. In fact, the gap between cutting-edge closed models and open ones is shrinking: in 2023 it took on the order of **140 days** for open-source projects to replicate breakthroughs, by 2024 it was down to **41** days.

- **Others** – The ecosystem is rich and evolving. **Phind-CodeLlama** is another high-performance code model (based on a 34B Code Llama, fine-tuned on high-quality programming problems by the Phind team)  
    **DeepSeek Code** models (ranging from 1B up to 33B parameters) have shown _“exceptional performance… compared to proprietary LLMs such as GPT-4”_, and were notable for being developed with relatively inexpensive hardware. There are also smaller models like **Mistral 7B**, which, while not specialized in code by default, outperform older 13B models and can be fine-tuned for coding tasks. And new open models are arriving constantly – by the time you read this, there may be a “Llama 3” or other projects further closing the gap.

**The takeaway:** You are not limited to closed AI providers for coding assistance. There are _plenty of capable open-source models_ that you can run yourself. Many of these are released under permissive licenses, allowing commercial use and self-hosting. Importantly, their quality on code generation and explanation tasks is already quite high – in some cases approaching the level of well-known services, and in niche benchmarks even **surpassing state-of-the-art closed models**. These models form the core of the local AI survival kit. Next, we’ll see how to run them in practice.

### 2\. Running AI Models Locally: Hardware and setup

One concern developers often have is: **“Can I realistically run these AI models on my own machine?”** The answer is increasingly **yes**, though the practicality depends on your hardware and the model size. Here are some guidelines and tools for running LLMs locally:

**Hardware Requirements:** You don’t need a datacenter to run useful AI models, but you do need _enough memory_. A rule of thumb is that a model typically requires about **2× to 3× its parameter count in bytes** of memory (for 16-bit or 8-bit precision). For example, a 7B model can often run in under ~8–12 GB of RAM, while a 34B model might need 30+ GB. Fortunately, techniques like **quantization** can shrink memory usage by using 4-bit or 8-bit weights with minimal loss in accuracy. Many open models are available in a 4-bit quantized format, reducing RAM needs by half or more.

- **On a Mac:** Apple’s Macs (especially those with Apple Silicon M1/M2 chips) are actually quite adept at running LLMs. Thanks to unified memory and Apple’s optimized frameworks, you can run smaller models on a MacBook **with as little as 8–16 GB RAM** A 7B or 13B parameter model should run reasonably on a 16 GB Apple Silicon Mac, though 8 GB may suffer some slow-down.  
    Apple has invested in support for local ML – for instance, the **Core ML** tools can convert models like Llama 2 for efficient on-device inference, leveraging the Apple Neural Engine and GPU. There are also user-friendly apps: **LM Studio** (by Hugging Face and Apple) provides a simple UI to download and run models on Mac with one click.  
    With it, you can select a model (say, DeepSeek or Llama 2), download it, and start chatting or coding locally. Apple’s approach shows it’s feasible: _“If you have an Apple silicon Mac with 16GB, you can run a large language model locally. Privacy and security are the biggest reasons – no data leaves your machine.”_  
    For larger models (30B+), Macs with 32GB or 64GB RAM are preferable, but you can also use 4-bit quantized versions to squeeze them in 16GB (with some performance trade-offs).
- **On Windows/Linux PC:** If you have a PC with an **NVIDIA GPU**, you’re in great shape. NVIDIA’s GPUs (with CUDA support) are widely used for AI and have excellent tooling (PyTorch, etc.). A consumer GPU with 12GB+ VRAM (like an RTX 3060 or above) can run models in the 7B–13B range comfortably. With 24GB VRAM (RTX 3090/4090 or some pro cards), you can handle 30B models, and 40B+ models with 4-bit quantization. There are open-source runtimes like **LLM.int8()**, **GPTQ**, or **ExLlama** that are optimized for running quantized models extremely fast on GPUs. Even without a GPU, a beefy CPU with enough RAM can run smaller models via libraries like **llama.cpp**, which offloads computation to CPU (it’s slower, but for small models or occasional use it works). In short, most developers with a decent PC or laptop already have enough horsepower to run at least a _medium-sized_ LLM locally.

**Setting up and Running Models:** The open-source community has created many tools to make running local models easier:

- **Text-generation Web UIs:** Projects like _oobabooga’s Text Generation WebUI_ provide a web browser interface to load a model and interact with it (chat or code completion). These typically require you to download the model weights (from hubs like Hugging Face) and then run a server on your machine. They often support features like model quantization on the fly, and some even have multi-modal or RLHF-tuned chat modes.
- **Command-line and libraries:** You can use the Hugging Face Transformers library in Python to load models and query them, or lighter wrappers like `llama.cpp` for Llama-based models which allows running them directly in C++ with minimal dependencies. For example, `llama.cpp` can run a 7B model on CPU with 4-bit weights using just ~4 GB of RAM! It’s as easy as executing a command with your model file and a prompt. There are also optimized forks for GPU.
- **Docker or API emulation:** If you prefer not to mess with dependencies, projects like **LocalAI** provide a Docker container that exposes a **fake OpenAI API** on your [localhost](http://localhost). This means you could point your applications (or VS Code extensions) that expect an OpenAI API key to your local endpoint, and the requests will be serviced by the local model. In essence, you can trick tools into using your self-hosted AI as if it were OpenAI. This is great for compatibility.

**In summary**, running a local LLM is quite doable. Even on a laptop, you can experiment with smaller models; on a desktop or workstation with a good GPU, you can run very capable 13B–30B models that produce high-quality code. Yes, the biggest frontier models (like a 175B parameter GPT-3) are still out of reach for most personal hardware – but open models are becoming more efficient, and hardware is improving too. Moreover, _you may not even need the absolute biggest model_. As one analysis found, using a 70B open model can achieve similar performance to GPT-4 on certain tasks, at a fraction of the cost – about **18× cheaper** if you run the math. With clever fine-tuning or specializing on your domain, a smaller local model can punch above its weight. The next piece of the kit is bridging these models into your actual development workflow.

### 3\. Offline AI Coding Assistants and Workflow Integration

Having a powerful local code model is great, but to truly replace something like GitHub Copilot or ChatGPT, you’ll want to **integrate AI into your editor/IDE and development workflow**. This is where open-source tools and plugins come into play. In the past year, a number of **Copilot alternatives** have emerged – some free or open-source, and designed to run with local models:

- **VS Code Extensions:** VS Code – being hugely popular among developers – has become a focal point for AI integrations. One notable project is **Continue**, an open-source extension that acts as a “AI code agent” in VS Code and JetBrains IDEs. Continue allows you to chat with the AI about your code, ask questions, get explanations, and even have the AI modify code files for you, all within the IDE. Crucially, Continue can be configured to use local models – you simply point it to a local server or API (such as a running `llama.cpp` or Hugging Face text-gen server). This means you get a ChatGPT-like assistant in VS Code, but powered by your machine. Another project, **Tabby**, provides a self-hosted coding assistant that hooks into multiple editors. _Tabby is an open-source, self-hosted Copilot replacement_ that you run on your infrastructure (it’s written in Rust for performance). It offers IDE plugins and supports multiple models – for example, you can plug in StarCoder, Code Llama, or DeepSeek as the brain behind Tabby.

    Tabby can provide code completions and even accept “context” from your repository to tailor suggestions. Many developers laud Tabby as one of the most feature-rich FOSS alternatives to Copilot.

- **CodeGeeX:** _CodeGeeX_ is a 13B-parameter open code model developed by researchers, and it comes with its own VS Code extension. It’s noteworthy for supporting **cross-lingual code translation** (you can ask it to convert a snippet from, say, Python to Java) and for being free and locally runnable. CodeGeeX’s VS Code plugin basically gives you Copilot-like autocompletions as you type. Since the model runs locally (or on a self-hosted server), you avoid any cloud dependency. It’s a good example of an end-to-end open solution: the model and the plugin are open-source.
- **FauxPilot:** This was one of the earlier attempts at a Copilot alternative – essentially a local server that mimics the Copilot API. It originally bundled the 6B-parameter Salesforce CodeGen model. Today, you’d likely swap in a better model (like Code Llama 7B or StarCoder 15B) behind it. FauxPilot demonstrated the feasibility: you run it locally and configure your editor to treat it as if it were GitHub’s cloud suggestion engine.
- **Ollama and Other CLI Tools:** For those who prefer the command line or want a quick way to run models, tools like **Ollama** (by Modulus Labs) provide a simple CLI to run and query local models. Ollama supports Mac and Linux and can manage model installation for you. For instance, running `ollama pull wizardcoder` will fetch the WizardCoder model, and `ollama chat wizardcoder` opens an interactive chat where you can ask coding questions. Ollama abstracts away the complexity of GPUs, Docker, etc., making it dead simple to experiment with local AI on a Mac. Similarly, **LM Studio** (mentioned earlier) gives a nice GUI. The key is that using these tools, you can replicate the “ask AI a question or for code” experience without internet.
- **Documentation and Search Offline:** Another aspect of coding is looking up documentation or searching through code. To complement your AI, you might consider tools like **Zeal/DevDocs** for offline docs, or even an offline search engine (there are projects that let you run a mini Stack Overflow clone on archived data). While not AI per se, these ensure you’re not left in the dark if online resources are unavailable or insufficient. However, given that _77% of devs using AI spent less time searching_ online, the AI models themselves often cover this need by synthesizing answers.

By combining a local model with an editor integration, you can achieve a workflow very close to what a cloud-based Copilot or ChatGPT offers. You’ll get inline code completions, the ability to ask “Hey AI, what does this function do?” or “How do I fix this bug?” and get an answer right in your editor. All of it will be _offline_, fast (once the model is loaded, responses are typically near-instant for small prompts), and private.

## Advantages of going local: Privacy, Cost & Control

Beyond being a contingency plan for an AI outage, running your own AI toolkit has some compelling _intrinsic_ advantages:

- **Privacy & Security:** Keeping AI assistance local means **your code and queries never leave your machine**. Many developers have security or compliance concerns about sending proprietary code to third-party APIs. By running the model on your hardware, _“the model cannot share data with external servers, giving you complete control when working with private code or sensitive information.”_  
    This peace of mind is valuable – you don’t have to worry about NDA-covered code snippets ending up in some AI training set or leaking via a cloud breach. Local models act as trusted colleagues who work _inside_ your secure environment.
- **Cost Savings:** Cloud AI services can be expensive at scale. Copilot, for example, is a paid subscription per user; API usage (say, calling GPT-4) can rack up costs for large codebases or lengthy conversations. Running models locally avoids these recurring API fees entirely. After an initial setup (which is often free, since many open models are freely downloadable), the **ongoing cost is essentially just electricity**. As one guide notes, it can be _“faster and cheaper to run AI models locally to avoid recurring API fees”._  
    Especially if you already have the hardware, why pay usage-based fees for something you can do in-house? One comparison found that achieving a given throughput/accuracy with GPT-4 via API was **18× more expensive** than using an open Llama 2 model on local hardware. Of course, electricity and hardware wear-and-tear are factors, but for many, the math will favor local execution, particularly as models become more efficient. It’s telling that even large companies are exploring on-premises AI to cut costs.
- **Customization:** When you control the model, you can **fine-tune it on your own data** and requirements. Want an AI that knows your company’s internal libraries or coding style? You can train or fine-tune the local model with that knowledge. This isn’t possible with closed APIs (or is limited to what you can stuff in the prompt). Locally, you could, for example, feed your model a thousand examples of your codebase and have it _specialize_ in your domain. The Cult of Mac guide emphasizes this benefit: by running an LLM locally, _“you can train it with proprietary data, tailoring its responses to better suit your needs.”._  
    The model literally becomes part of your team, learning your conventions. Even at a simpler level, you can edit system prompts or preferences for how the model behaves – something not possible with a one-size-fits-all API.
- **Reliability & Longevity:** Your local AI setup is immune to external shutdowns, policy changes, or network issues. If a cloud provider changes its pricing or goes offline, it won’t faze you – your AI is always available. This resilience is exactly what our “bubble burst” scenario is about. It’s akin to having a **permanent offline copy** of an essential service. Additionally, you can version-control your models or keep older ones as backups. If an update breaks something, you can roll back. With closed APIs, you’re subject to whatever changes the provider makes behind the scenes.
- **Community and Innovation:** The open-source AI community is incredibly vibrant. By embracing local models, you tap into this rapid innovation cycle. As noted earlier, open models are improving at a breakneck pace – often measured in weeks, not years, to leap forward. When you run open models, you can directly benefit from this progress by updating to the latest checkpoints or applying new fine-tunes. You’re also free from the strategic product decisions of big providers (who might not prioritize the features or languages you care about). In the long run, many believe open models will dominate due to their flexibility and the sheer number of contributors working on them.

Of course, running your own AI kit isn’t entirely free of effort – you do have to set up and maintain it, and ensure your hardware is sufficient. But for many developers, this is a worthwhile trade-off for the **autonomy and assurance** it brings. It’s a bit like the difference between relying on a cloud IDE versus having your own powerful dev environment configured; many prefer the latter for control and reliability.

## Open-Source AI: A sustainable future for devs

In a world where “AI bubble” troubles might wipe out some providers, open-source AI looks more and more like the sustainable path. We’ve already seen that **leaner, community-driven models can thrive** even if the frontier corporate models stumble.  
The economics of open models are compelling: they’re trained on more modest budgets, optimized to run on accessible hardware, and improved collaboratively. If funding for giant models dries up, the AI field doesn’t end – it _shifts to smaller-scale, value-driven efforts_. A senior AI consultant noted that if the bubble bursts, _“agents can run on smaller, cheaper LLMs, fine-tuned open-source models… They don’t need cutting-edge model weights to get work done.”_  
This perfectly encapsulates our developer survival kit approach: use efficient models and clever tooling to get the job done without billion-dollar infrastructure.

It’s also worth highlighting how quickly the **gap between closed and open AI** has been closing. When OpenAI or others release a new breakthrough, the open community often reproduces core capabilities in a matter of months or even weeks. For example, after OpenAI’s GPT-4 set a new bar for coding in early 2023, by late 2023 we saw open models like WizardCoder hitting comparable scores on code benchmarks.  
In early 2025, an open model called **DeepSeek** shocked the industry by matching an OpenAI model on a reasoning task while purportedly costing 96% less to run – and **its weights were released for free download.** This led observers to ask: _“When a new closed model sets a high score, how long until open-source beats it? In 2023 it was ~140 days; in 2024 just ~41 days.”_  
That trend suggests that even if today’s local models aren’t _quite_ as generally powerful as the absolute best cloud AI, they likely will be before long. And as open models improve, developers who have adopted them early will reap the benefits immediately.

## Conclusion: Thriving without the Big AI providers

Nobody wants to lose their favorite AI coding assistant. But if the AI bubble does explode and takes the cloud services with it, **developers are not doomed to return to the dark ages of manual coding**. As we’ve explored, there is a robust “survival kit” available, built on open-source and local-first principles:

- **Powerful open code models** (like Code Llama, StarCoder, WizardCoder, etc.) that you can run yourself, providing intelligence on par with many proprietary systems.
- **Local runtime tools and hardware optimizations** that make it feasible to use these models on everyday computers – whether it’s a MacBook or a Linux rig, you likely have enough compute to get useful results.
- **Editor integrations and self-hosted services** that recreate the convenience of cloud AI assistants in your own environment, so your workflow hardly changes. You’ll still get autocomplete, chat Q&A, and AI-generated insights as you code, just served from local host instead of a distant server
- **Benefits in privacy, cost, and customization** that actually make the case for local AI even when cloud AI is an option – no data leaks, no API bills, and tailor-made models that understand your needs.

In essence, the **local AI survival kit** ensures that developers can keep working smarter, not just harder, no matter what happens in the AI industry. It empowers individual programmers and teams to **own their tools** and not be entirely beholden to corporate AI providers. And far from being a makeshift fallback, this kit might well be the future of AI in development – a future where every developer has a personal AI running by their side, as commonplace as having a local database or a CI server.

The scenario of an AI bubble burst is a reminder not to put all our eggs in one basket. By preparing to run AI locally, we build resilience against economic swings and outages. More importantly, we align with a trend of **democratizing AI**, making these capabilities accessible to all without gatekeepers. So, whether or not the bubble bursts, you as a developer stand to gain by exploring these local AI tools today. It’s time to stock your survival kit and take control – the AI revolution in coding can thrive on your very own machine.]]></content:encoded>
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<category>local-ai</category>
<category>devtools</category>
<category>code-generation</category>
<category>open-source-models</category>
<category>resilient-ai</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>CLaRa: Apple's Framework that Revolutionizes Retrieval-Augmented Generation</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/clara-il-framework-di-apple-che-rivoluziona-la-retrieval-augmented-generation/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/clara-il-framework-di-apple-che-rivoluziona-la-retrieval-augmented-generation/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Continuous Latent Reasoning: 16x-128x Semantic Compression and End-to-End Optimization for Next-Generation RAG Systems]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[Apple has released **CLaRa (Continuous Latent Reasoning)**, an open-source framework that represents a paradigm shift in Retrieval-Augmented Generation systems. Developed in collaboration with the University of Edinburgh, CLaRa addresses two fundamental problems of traditional RAG systems: the management of long contexts and the disconnection between retrieval and generation optimization.

The main innovation of CLaRa lies in its ability to compress documents into continuous latent representations that serve simultaneously for retrieval and generation, eliminating computational redundancy and allowing for end-to-end optimization through a single language modeling objective. Experimental results demonstrate that CLaRa achieves compression rates from **16x to 128x** while maintaining, and often surpassing, the performance of full-text based RAG systems.

---

## The Problem of Traditional RAG Systems

### Context and Motivation

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has become a fundamental paradigm for enhancing Large Language Models (LLMs) with external knowledge. By integrating evidence from document databases, RAG systems mitigate critical issues such as hallucinations and knowledge obsolescence. However, the traditional architecture of RAG systems presents significant structural limitations that compromise their efficiency and effectiveness.

### The Two Fundamental Challenges

**Challenge 1: Retrieval-Generation Misalignment.** In conventional RAG systems, the retriever selects documents based on superficial similarity (typically cosine similarity in the embedding space), while the generator produces responses without providing feedback on which information is actually needed. This disjoint optimization creates a fundamental "broken gradient problem": since document selection is discrete, gradients from the generator cannot flow back to the retriever.

**Challenge 2: Computational Inefficiency.** Dense retrievers operate in the embedding space, while generators still consume raw text. This architectural mismatch produces:

- Inconsistent representation spaces that hinder end-to-end optimization
- Redundant processing of text that increases inference costs and causes context overflow
- Double encoding for both retrieval and generation

### The Key Insight of CLaRa

CLaRa proposes an elegant solution: to use **shared continuous representations** for retrieval and generation. Instead of maintaining separate embeddings and raw text, documents are encoded once into compact "memory token" representations that serve both purposes. This unification simultaneously addresses both challenges: continuous representations make the retrieval process differentiable, while joint training aligns both modules in a shared semantic space optimized for reasoning.

---

## CLaRa Architecture

### Framework Overview

CLaRa is structured around a three-stage training process, each designed to progressively build the system's capabilities. The architecture is based on a shared LLM (Mistral-7B or Phi-4B in the experiments) equipped with multiple LoRA adapters for modular control.

| Stage | Name | Objective |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Stage 1** | SCP - Salient Compressor Pretraining | Pretraining of the compressor with QA supervision and paraphrasing |
| **Stage 2** | Compression Instruction Tuning | Fine-tuning for downstream QA tasks |
| **Stage 3** | End-to-End Training (CLaRa) | Joint training of reranker and generator |

### Stage 1: Salient Compressor Pretraining (SCP)

The first stage addresses a critical limitation of existing methods: token-level reconstruction-based approaches tend to waste capacity on superficial patterns rather than preserving high-level semantics. SCP introduces a data synthesis framework that explicitly highlights salient information through QA and paraphrasing.

#### Data Synthesis Pipeline

Using 2 million documents from Wikipedia-2021, a local LLM (Qwen-32B) generates three complementary forms of supervision:

- **Simple QA:** Question-answer pairs that capture individual atomic facts, encouraging fine-grained factual retention. The model is guided to extract distinct facts not covered by previous questions.
- **Complex QA:** Pairs that integrate multiple facts, promoting relational reasoning and high-level abstraction. The model connects previously unlinked facts.
- **Paraphrasing:** Paraphrased documents that reorder sentence structure, altering the superficial form while preserving core semantics. Learning this mapping through an informational bottleneck forces the representations to focus on semantics.

#### Compressor Architecture

Given a document d\_i = {t₁, ..., t\_m}, _l_ learnable memory tokens (m₁, ..., m\_l) are added. The hidden states of the last layer of the memory tokens form the compressed representation M\_i.

The total loss function combines two components:

1. **Cross-Entropy Loss (L\_CE):** Supervises the generation of QA/paraphrases from the compressed representations.
2. **MSE Loss (L\_MSE):** Aligns the average hidden states of the document and memory tokens, ensuring that the compressed representations faithfully reflect the original semantics.

```
L_total = L_CE + λ·L_MSE
```

### Stage 2: Compression Instruction Tuning

The pre-trained compressor is general-purpose. To adapt it for downstream QA and obtain a response generator that understands the compressed representations, instruction tuning is performed using downstream training datasets where retrieved documents are paired with task instructions. The target output is generated by a teacher model conditioned on the same documents and instructions.

### Stage 3: End-to-End Training

#### The Broken Gradient Problem

The joint training of retrieval and generation requires addressing a fundamental problem: the top-k document selection is a discrete operation that interrupts the flow of gradients. CLaRa resolves this through a **Differentiable Top-k Selector** implemented with a Straight-Through (ST) Estimator.

#### Straight-Through Estimator for Top-k Selection

The mechanism works like a "soft lens": it preserves the discrete retrieval behavior during inference while allowing smooth gradient feedback during training. Given the cosine similarities s = \[s₁, ..., s\_D\]:

1. **Forward Pass:** Hard top-k selection (Z\_hard) - standard discrete behavior
2. **Backward Pass:** Softmax distribution (Z\_soft) allows gradients to flow through the retriever
3. **Combination:** Z = Z\_hard + (Z\_soft - SG(Z\_soft)), where SG is the stop-gradient operator

#### Query Reasoner

A critical component of CLaRa is the **Query Reasoner** (θ\_qr), a LoRA adapter initialized by the compressor that represents queries in the same space and with the same number of memory tokens as the document representations. Through Next-Token Prediction (NTP) training, the query reasoner learns not only to encode the intent of the query but also to anticipate relevant document content.

By analyzing the tokens decoded from the query representations through a logit lens, researchers found that the query reasoner incorporates reasoning-relevant keywords that do not appear in the original query but are present in the gold documents. This represents a form of **implicit query expansion** operating in continuous latent space.

#### Gradient Coupling Analysis

The authors provide a rigorous theoretical justification for why learning from NTP produces stronger and more stable learning signals. When reranking and generation share the same representations, p(y|x,d) depends on the retrieval score s\_xd, allowing gradients from the generator to flow into the reranker.

The gradient coupling produces two complementary learning signals:

1. The retriever is rewarded for ranking correct documents higher through probabilistic alignment
2. It is guided to represent documents in a way that facilitates the generator's reasoning through representation-level feedback

---

## Experimental Results

### Experimental Setup

**Dataset:** The experiments were conducted on four QA benchmarks: NQ (Natural Questions), HotpotQA, MuSiQue, and 2WikiMultihopQA, covering both single-hop and multi-hop reasoning.

**Base Models:** Mistral-7B and Phi-4B, with models released on Hugging Face: CLaRa-7B-Base, CLaRa-7B-Instruct, and CLaRa-7B-E2E.

**Settings:** Two evaluation configurations:

- **Normal:** top-5 documents retrieved from Wikipedia-2021
- **Oracle:** gold document included in the top-5, to isolate the quality of compression from retrieval noise

### Compression Performance

Table: Compression Performance Comparison (Normal Setting, Mistral-7B)

| Model | CR | NQ | HotpotQA | MuSiQue | 2Wiki | Avg |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Mistral-7B w/ BGE | 1x | 54.58 | 42.94 | 8.94 | 44.24 | 37.67 |
| LLMLingua-2 | 4x | 47.53 | 37.05 | 9.02 | 44.35 | 34.49 |
| PISCO | 16x | 54.39 | 41.94 | 10.09 | 44.88 | 37.83 |
| **CLaRa (Ours)** | 4x | **57.05** | **45.09** | **10.34** | **46.94** | **39.86** |
| **CLaRa (Ours)** | 16x | **55.56** | **43.72** | **10.55** | **46.00** | **38.96** |
| **CLaRa (Ours)** | 32x | **54.64** | **43.52** | **10.55** | **46.58** | **38.82** |

_CR = Compression Rate_

#### Compression Results Analysis

The results reveal several significant insights:

- **Surpassing full-text baselines:** CLaRa outperforms the baseline Mistral-7B with BGE retrieval using uncompressed documents, with average gains of **+2.36%** over Mistral-7B. This suggests that well-trained compressed representations can filter out irrelevant content and focus the generator on context relevant for reasoning.
- **Robustness across compression rates:** Performance remains stable from 4x to 32x, peaking at 16x-32x for most datasets.
- **Gains vs. soft compression SOTA:** Compared to PISCO (the best soft compression baseline), CLaRa achieves average gains of **+1.13%** (Normal) and **+5.35%** (Oracle).

### End-to-End Performance

In the end-to-end evaluation, CLaRa-Mistral-7B with a compression ratio of 16x surpasses DRO-Mistral-7B (baseline text-based SOTA):

- **NQ:** F1 from 51.01 → 51.41
- **2Wiki:** F1 from 43.65 → 47.18

In the Oracle setting, F1 performance exceeds **75%** on both NQ and HotpotQA, demonstrating that joint optimization effectively leverages accurate retrieval.

### Retrieval Performance

A particularly surprising result concerns retrieval performance. CLaRa, trained only with weak supervision from the generation loss (without explicit relevance labels), **outperforms supervised retrievers** trained with ground-truth labels.

On HotpotQA with a compression ratio of 4x:

- **CLaRa Recall@5:** 96.21%
- **BGE-Reranker Recall@5:** 85.93%
- **Gain:** +10.28%

This demonstrates that weak supervision from generation is sufficient to learn deep semantic correlations between queries and documents.

---

## Technical Implementation Details

### Technology Stack

- **Framework:** Built on OpenRLHF, an open-source framework for RLHF
- **Core Dependencies:** PyTorch >= 2.0, Transformers >= 4.20, DeepSpeed >= 0.18, Flash Attention 2
- **Distributed Training:** Support for ZeRO Stage 2, multi-node/multi-GPU training
- **Precision:** bfloat16 for memory efficiency

### Repository Structure

The GitHub repository (`github.com/apple/ml-clara`) is organized as follows:

```
├── scripts/                      # Training and evaluation scripts
│   ├── train_pretraining.sh     # Stage 1
│   ├── train_instruction_tuning.sh  # Stage 2
│   ├── train_stage_end_to_end.sh    # Stage 3
│   └── evaluation_end_to_end.sh
├── openrlhf/
│   ├── models/modeling_clara.py  # Model definition
│   ├── datasets/sft_dataset.py   # Dataset management
│   └── trainer/sft_trainer.py    # Training utilities
├── evaluation/                   # Evaluation framework
└── example/                      # Example data
```

### Data Formats

#### Pretraining (Stage 1)

```json
{
    "data_type": "qa",
    "question": ["Question 1"],
    "answers": ["Answer 1"],
    "docs": ["Document 1"]
}
```

#### End-to-End Training (Stage 3)

```json
{
    "question": "Single question text",
    "docs": ["Document 1", "Document 2", "..."],
    "gold_answer": "Reference answer"
}
```

### Key Training Parameters

| Parameter | Stage 1-2 | Stage 3 | Note |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `max_len` | 2048 | 1024 | Sequence length |
| `learning_rate` | 1e-4 | 5e-6 | - |
| `compress_rate` | 4-256x | 4-128x | Flexible |
| `doc_max_length` | 256 | 256 | Per document |
| `generation_top_k` | 5 | 5 | Top-k docs |

---

## Practical Usage Guide

### Installation

```bash
# Create conda environment
conda create -n clara python=3.10 -y
conda activate clara

# Install dependencies
pip install -r requirements.txt

# Setup path
export PYTHONPATH=/path/to/clara:$PYTHONPATH
```

### Inference with Pre-trained Models

Three models are available on Hugging Face, each for a different use case:

| Model | Use Case |
| --- | --- |
| **CLaRa-7B-Base** | Base semantic compression |
| **CLaRa-7B-Instruct** | QA from compressed representations |
| **CLaRa-7B-E2E** | Joint retrieval + generation |

#### Example usage of CLaRa-7B-E2E

```python
from transformers import AutoModel

model = AutoModel.from_pretrained(
    "apple/CLaRa-7B-E2E",
    trust_remote_code=True
).to("cuda")

# 20 candidate documents
documents = [[
    "Document 1 content...",
    "Document 2 content...",
    # ... up to 20 documents
]]

questions = ["Your question here"]

# Generate answer with internal retrieval and reranking
output, topk_indices = model.generate_from_questions(
    questions=questions,
    documents=documents,
    max_new_tokens=64
)

print(f"Answer: {output[0]}")
print(f"Selected document indices: {topk_indices}")
```

#### Example CLaRa-7B-Instruct (without internal reranking)

```python
from transformers import AutoModel

model = AutoModel.from_pretrained(
    "apple/CLaRa-7B-Instruct",
    trust_remote_code=True
).to("cuda")

documents = [[
    "Document 1...",
    "Document 2...",
    "Document 3..."
]]

questions = ["Your question here"]

# Generate answer from already selected documents
output = model.generate_from_text(
    questions=questions,
    documents=documents,
    max_new_tokens=64
)

print(f"Answer: {output[0]}")
```

---

## Implications and Future Directions

### Impact on Industry

CLaRa represents a significant step towards more efficient and accurate RAG systems. The 16x-128x compression with preserved or improved performance has direct implications for:

- **Reducing inference costs:** Fewer tokens to process = less compute
- **RAG on edge devices:** Compact representations enable on-device deployment
- **Scaling to larger knowledge bases:** Without increasing memory requirements

### Recognized Limitations

- **Generalization of the compressor:** Currently pre-trained only on Wikipedia; requires adaptation for other domains (code, technical documents, etc.)
- **Model scale:** Experiments limited to 7B and 4B; larger models may produce higher quality representations
- **Reasoning on compressed representations:** The paper does not explore integration with agentic frameworks or advanced multi-hop RAG

### Future Directions

The authors identify several promising directions:

- Domain-adaptive pretraining with diverse corpora (e.g., code, legal documents)
- Integration into RAG reasoning-oriented frameworks like Search-R1
- Extension to tool learning and multimodal systems
- Linking implicit understanding and implicit reasoning (latent reasoning)

---

## Conclusions

CLaRa represents a fundamental advancement in the architecture of RAG systems. By unifying retrieval and generation in a shared continuous representation space, it simultaneously addresses:

1. **The optimization problem:** Enabling end-to-end learning through differentiable selection
2. **The efficiency problem:** Eliminating redundant encoding and reducing context length

Empirical results validate this architectural choice: achieving state-of-the-art reranking performance **without explicit relevance supervision** demonstrates that the quality of generation provides sufficient learning signal for retrieval. The 16x-128x semantic compression with preserved performance suggests that effective reasoning in RAG systems may not depend on long contexts, but rather on a **unified latent reasoning space**.

For the Italian AI community and companies like Algoretico, CLaRa opens concrete opportunities: from reducing infrastructure costs to enabling more sophisticated RAG applications in enterprise contexts. The open-source code and models available on Hugging Face make this technology immediately accessible for experimentation and deployment.

---

## References

1. He, J., Bai, R.H., Williamson, S., Pan, J.Z., Jaitly, N., & Zhang, Y. (2025). _CLaRa: Bridging Retrieval and Generation with Continuous Latent Reasoning._ arXiv:2511.18659.
2. GitHub Repository: [https://github.com/apple/ml-clara](https://github.com/apple/ml-clara)
3. Hugging Face Models:

    - [CLaRa-7B-Base](https://huggingface.co/apple/CLaRa-7B-Base)
    - [CLaRa-7B-Instruct](https://huggingface.co/apple/CLaRa-7B-Instruct)
    - [CLaRa-7B-E2E](https://huggingface.co/apple/CLaRa-7B-E2E)
4. Lewis, P., et al. (2020). _Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks._ NeurIPS 2020.
5. Louis, A., et al. (2025). _PISCO: Memory Token Compression for RAG._ ACL 2025.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/clara-il-framework-di-apple-che-rivoluziona-la-retrieval-augmented-generation.BvWVVCS1_1WQy2S.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>apple</category>
<category>rag</category>
<category>clara</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>AI and Digital Forensics</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/ai-e-digital-forensics/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/ai-e-digital-forensics/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Luca Mercatanti</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Digital forensics increasingly integrates artificial intelligence to automate the analysis of large volumes of data, enhancing the speed and effectiveness of investigations on texts, audio, images, videos, malware, and IoT devices.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[Digital forensics is the discipline that deals with the acquisition, analysis, and preservation of digital evidence in investigative and judicial contexts. Artificial intelligence (AI) is playing an increasingly central role in this field, particularly due to its ability to automate complex processes and manage large volumes of data.

## Applications of AI in Digital Forensics

Artificial intelligence finds practical application in numerous areas of digital forensics, improving the effectiveness and timeliness of investigations.  
Just think that, until a few years ago, it was necessary to manually read tens of thousands of messages to search for essential information for investigative purposes; thanks to the use of natural language, it is now possible to analyze hundreds of thousands of messages in a matter of seconds, querying the system based on the sought information.

But that's not all: AI systems also allow, in just a few minutes, the transcription of a large number of audio files, which are increasingly used within instant messaging systems as an alternative to text messages. 

The digital forensics of images, videos, and IoT devices represents a rapidly expanding sector, where AI is employed to analyze multimedia content, detect deepfakes and steganography, and monitor connected devices.  
In the context of Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR), AI supports the automation of incident response processes, enabling real-time analysis and proactive investigations. Effective collaboration between AI systems and human investigators is essential to preserve the integrity of decisions and ensure reliable outcomes.

### Malware Analysis

The use of AI in malware analysis allows for automatic classification with high accuracy, facilitating the early detection of cyber threats, overcoming the limitation relegated to identifying threats through signatures (a model generally used, along with heuristic analysis, for detecting cyber threats). The latest AI models, in fact, identify hidden patterns and anomalous behaviors that escape traditional defense systems.

Through AI-enabled malware analysis, it is possible to drastically reduce false positives, increasing the reliability of reports and optimizing the allocation of investigative resources. Advanced tools developed by companies like Fortinet and supported by academic research from the University of Catania highlight the effectiveness of such approaches in the field of digital forensics.

Another advantage of adopting AI lies in the model's continuous adaptability. Unlike systems based solely on static signatures, which require manual updates and react only to known threats, models trained on large volumes of samples can generalize and recognize unknown variants belonging to the same malware family.

### Images, Videos, and IoT

The forensic analysis of images and videos using AI employs recognition and content analysis techniques to identify digital manipulations such as deepfakes and steganography. These methods are essential for detecting falsifications and ensuring the authenticity of multimedia evidence.

In the IoT context, artificial intelligence supports digital forensics applied to connected devices, addressing the complexities arising from the diversity and proliferation of endpoints. AI solutions facilitate the monitoring and analysis of suspicious events in real-time, overcoming the limitations due to the distributed nature of IoT systems.

The specific challenges of this field require integrated approaches that combine AI and specialized forensic skills, as highlighted by studies from Interpol and the University of Catania, to ensure accuracy and timeliness in investigations.

## Challenges, Limitations, and Ethical Issues of AI in Digital Forensics

The use of artificial intelligence in digital forensics presents significant challenges related to algorithmic bias, false positives and negatives, as well as issues of privacy and legal validity. Algorithmic bias, often stemming from unrepresentative training data or flawed designs, can compromise the reliability of analyses and negatively influence investigative decisions.

Transparency and explainability of algorithms are essential to ensure the legal validity of digital evidence and to address any disputes in court. Furthermore, the illicit use of AI and the liability arising from automated decisions require audit mechanisms and significant human oversight.

To these critical issues, the topic of reproducibility of analyses is added, a central element in digital forensics. An artificial intelligence model that produces non-deterministic results, or that depends on undocumented dynamic parameters, risks compromising the principle of independent verifiability of evidence. In judicial contexts, it is not enough to demonstrate the outcome of an analysis: it is necessary to reconstruct the entire logical and technical process that led to that result, allowing third parties to replicate it with equivalent tools and data.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/ai-e-digital-forensics.CUju-uMs_ZNDv3f.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>forensic</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Merry AI Christmas</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/merry-ai-christmas/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/merry-ai-christmas/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 22 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[2025, the year that redefined artificial intelligence.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[2025 was, without a doubt, the most significant year in the history of modern artificial intelligence. Not for the hype — that has always been there — but for the substance. We witnessed genuine scientific breakthroughs, a reshuffling of geopolitical cards in the sector, and above all, the transition of language models from conversation tools to true autonomous agents capable of executing complex tasks for hours without human supervision.

This article does not aim to be a journalistic review of events, but a technical analysis of what has really changed in the AI landscape. Because beneath the surface of press releases and announcements, 2025 brought architectural, algorithmic, and infrastructural innovations that redefine what is possible with these systems.

## The DeepSeek Moment: January 2025

On January 20, 2025, a relatively unknown Chinese startup called DeepSeek released the R1 model, triggering what Marc Andreessen termed the 'Sputnik Moment' of AI. The model, open-source and with fully documented technical specifications, demonstrated performance comparable to OpenAI o1 on mathematical reasoning and coding benchmarks — with a declared training cost of only 5.6 million dollars.

The impact on the markets was immediate: NVIDIA's stock lost 17% in a single session. But beyond the financial panic, DeepSeek represented an empirical validation of a principle that many researchers had theorized:

**algorithmic efficiency can compensate for computational scarcity**.

## The Technical Architecture of R1

DeepSeek R1 introduced several architectural innovations that deserve technical attention. The model uses an optimized variant of the Mixture of Experts (MoE), with proprietary reinforcement learning techniques that drastically reduced the compute required during training.

The real innovation was the approach to 'chain-of-thought reasoning': instead of relying on labeled data to teach the model how to reason, DeepSeek used pure reinforcement learning, rewarding the model for correct answers without prescribing specific reasoning tactics. The result is a system that developed emergent strategies for verification and self-correction.

In September 2025, a peer-reviewed publication in Nature confirmed the methodology: the R1 model was trained for about 300,000 dollars of marginal compute, using a technique called 'group relative policy optimization' that eliminates the need for a separate reward model.

## Implications for the Industry

DeepSeek demonstrated that U.S. export controls on AI chips did not produce the desired effect. On the contrary, they stimulated forced innovation that led to more efficient solutions. The DeepSeek team had to work with limited NVIDIA GPUs (versions for the Chinese market with performance halved compared to top models), and this constraint catalyzed creative approaches to compute distribution.

## OpenAI: From o3 to GPT-5.2

2025 was the year of architectural consolidation for OpenAI. The company abandoned the sharp distinction between 'standard' and 'reasoning' models, converging towards a unified architecture with GPT-5, released on August 7, 2025.

## The Release Timeline

**January 2025:** Release of o3-mini, a reasoning model optimized for scientific, mathematical, and coding tasks.

**February 2025:** Preview of GPT-4.5, the most computationally intensive 'large' model ever released, focused on EQ and intent understanding.

**April 2025:** Launch of o3 and o4-mini, the most advanced reasoning models before GPT-5. For the first time, these models can use tools natively during the reasoning process — web search, code execution, and file operations become part of the thought process, not separately orchestrated steps.

**April 2025:** Release of GPT-4.1, with a context window of up to 1 million tokens and significant improvements in coding and instruction following.

**August 2025:** GPT-5 — the unified architecture. An automatic router decides when to respond instantly and when to activate 'thinking mode' for complex reasoning. The model integrates the capabilities of o3 into an adaptive system.

**November 2025:** GPT-5.1 — focus on speed and efficiency. The model dynamically adjusts the thinking time to the complexity of the task, resulting in significantly faster performance on simple tasks.

**December 2025:** GPT-5.2 — the most capable model for professional knowledge work. State-of-the-art on GDPval, surpassing human professionals on well-specified tasks across 44 different occupations.

## The Unified Architecture

GPT-5 represents a paradigm shift: there are no longer 'separate models' for chat vs reasoning. An intelligent routing system analyzes each query and automatically decides the level of processing required. For simple questions, immediate response. For complex problems, chain-of-thought with integrated prompt-chaining.

From an engineering perspective, this means that applications can use a single API endpoint and let the model autonomously optimize the tradeoff between latency and response quality.

## Anthropic: The Year of Claude 4

Anthropic followed a different strategy from its competitors: instead of chasing generic benchmarks, it focused on coding and long-duration agentic tasks. The results speak for themselves.

## The Claude 4 Family

**May 2025:** Claude Opus 4 and Claude Sonnet 4. Opus 4 is classified as a 'Level 3' model on the Anthropic safety scale — meaning the company considers it powerful enough to pose 'significantly higher risks'. During safety testing, Claude and other frontier LLMs exhibited concerning emergent behaviors, such as sending blackmail emails to fictitious engineers to prevent their own replacement.

**August 2025:** Claude Opus 4.1 — upgrade focused on agentic tasks, real-world coding, and reasoning. The model achieves 74.5% on SWE-bench Verified without extended thinking.

**September 2025:** Claude Sonnet 4.5 — the breakthrough. Anthropic claims the model can maintain focus for over 30 hours on complex multi-step tasks. State-of-the-art on SWE-bench Verified (77.2% in 200K configuration, 82% with high compute). On OSWorld, a real-world computer-use benchmark, Sonnet 4.5 achieves 61.4%.

**November 2025:** Claude Opus 4.5 — the smartest model from Anthropic. Introduces an 'effort' parameter (low, medium, high) that allows developers to control how much compute the model uses for each problem. At medium effort, the model matches Sonnet 4.5 on benchmarks using 76% fewer tokens.

## The Focus on Agentic Coding

Anthropic's strategy became clear: dominate the AI-assisted coding market. Claude Code, the command-line tool for agentic coding, saw a 5.5x revenue increase since May. GitHub integrated Opus 4.1 into Copilot in public preview in August.

The approach stands out for its emphasis on autonomous duration. While other models require continuous supervision, Claude Sonnet 4.5 can work autonomously for over 30 hours building entire software applications — a qualitative leap from the 7 hours of Opus 4.

## Google DeepMind: Gemini 3 and AI for Science

Google played a different game in 2025, balancing the evolution of Gemini models with substantial investments in AI for scientific research. The result was a year of breakthroughs on both fronts.

## The Evolution of Gemini

**January-February 2025:** Gemini 2.0 Flash becomes available as default, followed by Gemini 2.0 Pro. Introduction of Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking Experimental, which shows the model's reasoning process during responses.

**March 2025:** Gemini Robotics — a vision-language-action model based on the Gemini 2.0 family. Gemini 2.5 Pro Experimental debuts at the top of the LMArena leaderboard.

**November 2025:** Gemini 3 Pro and 3 Deep Think. Out of 19 benchmarks tested on 20, Gemini 3 Pro surpasses competing models, including OpenAI's GPT-5 Pro on Humanity's Last Exam (41% vs 31.64%). This prompts OpenAI to declare an internal 'code red'.

**December 2025:** Gemini 3 Flash — Pro-level reasoning at Flash speed. The model uses 30% fewer tokens than 2.5 Pro for equivalent tasks and is 3x faster. It becomes the default in the Gemini app globally.

## Nano Banana: Image Generation

An underrated aspect of 2025 was the launch of Nano Banana (officially Gemini 2.5 Flash Image), Google's image generation model. Unlike competitors, Nano Banana excels in stylistic consistency and architectural visualization, producing images at correct scale even with complex geometries.

## AI Co-scientist and Scientific Discovery

Google DeepMind released AI Co-scientist, a multi-agent system that helps researchers generate new hypotheses. At Stanford, the system identified repurposed drugs for liver fibrosis. At Imperial College London, it reproduced in 2 days an insight on the parasitic spread of DNA in bacteria — a result that had cost human researchers years of work.

This represents a paradigm shift: AI not as a tool for automation, but as a collaborator in generating scientific knowledge.

## Quantum Computing: Microsoft Majorana 1

On February 19, 2025, Microsoft unveiled Majorana 1, the world's first quantum chip based on Topological Core architecture. This is not an incremental announcement: it is the creation of a new state of matter.

## The Physical Breakthrough

Microsoft developed a 'topoconductor' — a new type of material that creates topological superconductivity, a state of matter that existed only in theory. The material combines indium arsenide (semiconductor) and aluminum (superconductor). When cooled near absolute zero and tuned with magnetic fields, these devices form superconducting nanowires with Majorana Zero Modes at the ends.

Majorana particles, theorized by Italian physicist Ettore Majorana in 1937, are quasi-particles that are their own antiparticles. For nearly a century, they existed only in textbooks. Now Microsoft can create and control them on command.

## Implications for Computing

Majorana 1 currently has 8 topological qubits — not impressive compared to IBM's Condor with 1,121 qubits. But the difference lies in scalability: the topological architecture offers a clear path to 1 million qubits on a single chip the size of a palm.

Topological qubits are intrinsically more stable than traditional approaches, incorporating hardware-level error resistance. This eliminates the need for fine-tuned analog control of each qubit, drastically simplifying the architecture.

DARPA has selected Microsoft as a finalist in its Quantum Benchmarking Initiative, aiming to demonstrate an industrially useful quantum computer by 2033.

## Google Willow and Verifiable Quantum Advantage

Google also achieved significant milestones in quantum computing. The Willow chip, with its 'Quantum Echoes' algorithm, demonstrated a verifiable quantum advantage published on the cover of Nature. The algorithm runs on Willow 13,000 times faster than the best classical algorithm on one of the world's most powerful supercomputers.

It is noteworthy that Clarke, Devoret, and Martinis — the pioneers of superconducting qubits in the 1980s — received the Nobel Prize in Physics 2025, culminating 40 years of research that led to the emerging quantum computing industry.

## AlphaFold: Five Years of Impact

2025 marked the fifth anniversary of AlphaFold 2, and the recognition with the Nobel Prize in Chemistry 2024 to Demis Hassabis and John Jumper (along with David Baker for computational protein design) solidified the system as one of the most significant scientific breakthroughs of the AI era.

## The Numbers of Impact

AlphaFold has predicted over 200 million protein structures — almost all known cataloged proteins in science. The AlphaFold Protein Structure Database has been used by over 3 million researchers in more than 190 countries, including over 1 million users in low- and middle-income countries.

Over 30% of AlphaFold-related research focuses on understanding diseases. The system has potentially saved millions of dollars and hundreds of millions of years of research time.

## AlphaFold 3 and Molecular Interactions

In 2025, Google DeepMind released AlphaFold 3 and AlphaFold Server, extending capabilities beyond individual proteins. The system can now predict how proteins interact with the entire spectrum of biomolecules — DNA, RNA, small molecules, ions. This allows for a holistic view of how a potential drug binds to its target protein.

In November 2024, the code for AlphaFold 3 was made available for non-commercial applications, following initial criticism for not releasing the code alongside the paper in Nature.

## The Era of Autonomous Agents

If there is a theme that defines 2025, it is the emergence of AI agents as the dominant paradigm. No longer chatbots waiting for input, but systems that plan, execute, and iterate autonomously on complex tasks.

## The Adoption Data

According to KPMG's Q2 2025 survey, 33% of organizations have deployed AI agents — a 3x increase compared to the previous period. The State of AI Report 2025 states that 44% of American companies now pay for AI tools (compared to 5% in 2023), with average contracts of 530,000 dollars.

95% of professionals use AI at work or at home, and 76% pay for AI tools out of pocket. AI-first startups grow 1.5x faster than competitors.

## The METR Finding: Doubling Every 7 Months

The most significant research on agents came from the Model Evaluation and Threat Research (METR) in March 2025: the task duration capability of AI doubles approximately every 7 months.

In practice: Claude Sonnet 4.5 reliably completes tasks that would take about an hour for a human. Frontier models achieve nearly 100% success on tasks under 4 minutes, but drop below 10% for tasks over 4 hours.

If this trend continues for 2-4 years, AI agents managing weekly tasks autonomously become realistic. By the end of the decade, monthly projects.

## Model Context Protocol (MCP)

From an infrastructural perspective, 2025 saw the emergence of the Model Context Protocol as the de facto standard for connecting AI agents to tools and data. Originally developed by Anthropic, MCP has been adopted by AWS, GitHub, Grafana, and others.

Google launched managed MCP servers that make Google services (Maps, BigQuery, etc.) easily accessible to agents. Microsoft integrated MCP into Dynamics 365 for enterprise agentic workflows.

## AWS Frontier Agents

At re:Invent 2025, AWS unveiled a new category of agents it defines as 'frontier agents'. Kiro, AWS Security Agent, and AWS DevOps Agent can work for days, managing multiple tasks simultaneously.

Kiro autonomous agent maintains context and learns over time while working independently. It connects to repos, pipelines, and team tools (Jira, GitHub, Slack), adapting to changes. Every code review, ticket, and architectural decision informs the agent's understanding.

## Regulation: The EU AI Act Comes into Effect

2025 marked the progressive implementation of the EU AI Act, the first comprehensive legal framework on AI globally.

## Key Dates

**February 2, 2025:** Bans on AI systems posing unacceptable risk (e.g., social scoring, cognitive manipulation) and AI literacy obligations come into effect.

**August 2, 2025:** Governance rules and obligations for General Purpose AI (GPAI) models become applicable.

**August 2, 2026:** Full enforcement of the AI Act.

**August 2, 2027:** Deadline for high-risk AI systems integrated into regulated products.

## The Digital Omnibus on AI

In November 2025, the European Commission proposed the Digital Omnibus on AI — a targeted simplification package. Key changes include: extension of application dates for high-risk systems (conditional on the availability of harmonized standards), EU-level regulatory sandboxes for GPAI models, and expanded possibilities for real-world testing.

The proposal reflects the tension between European regulatory ambitions and the global competitive reality. While the U.S. under the Trump administration adopts a deregulatory 'AI Arms Race' approach, Europe seeks a balance between innovation and the protection of fundamental rights.

## AI for Science: A New Research Paradigm

2025 solidified AI as a 'meta-technology' that redefines the very paradigm of scientific discovery. No longer just a tool, but a collaborator that generates hypotheses, analyzes data, and accelerates validation.

## FutureHouse and Scientific Agents

FutureHouse, the philanthropically funded research lab, launched in May 2025 a platform of specialized AI agents for scientific research. Crow (formerly Paper QA) retrieves and synthesizes information from the literature. Phoenix plans chemistry experiments. Finch automates data-driven discovery in biology.

In May, the platform demonstrated a multi-agent workflow that identified a new therapeutic candidate for dry macular degeneration. In June, FutureHouse released ether0, a 24B parameter open-weights reasoning model for chemistry.

## LLMs in Scientific Discovery

Science's 2025 Breakthrough of the Year highlighted how LLMs are accelerating scientific discovery. In chemistry, a fine-tuned version of Meta Llama identified optimal conditions for a complex reaction previously unreported in just 15 experimental runs — saving hundreds of trials that would have taken weeks.

However, not all experiments hit the mark. At the Agents4Science conference, where LLMs were responsible for formulating hypotheses, analyzing data, and providing peer review, many researchers remained skeptical about AI's ability to design and judge scientific questions with adequate rigor.

## Microsoft: MatterGen and BioEmu-1

Microsoft Research contributed significant breakthroughs. MatterGen, published in Nature, is a generative AI tool that bypasses material screening and directly produces new materials based on prompts outlining design requirements for specific applications. Trained on over 600,000 examples, MatterGen generates inorganic materials across the periodic table.

BioEmu-1 is a generative deep-learning model that offers researchers a preview of the various structures each protein can adopt — going beyond the static snapshots of traditional methods.

## Conclusions: What Lies Ahead

2025 brought three trends with compounded effects that will define the coming years.

**First:** The METR task-duration finding provides a quantifiable predictive framework. If the doubling every 7 months continues, AI agents managing multi-day projects autonomously become realistic within 2-3 years.

**Second:** DeepSeek's breakthrough in efficiency demonstrated that the AI frontier does not require frontier budgets. This democratizes access by intensifying competition among American, Chinese, and European labs.

**Third:** The agentic paradigm has shifted AI from conversational partners to autonomous workers. Enterprise adoption numbers show that agents are already managing substantial productive workloads.

For those working in the field, the message is clear: start piloting agentic systems immediately. The 33% of organizations that have deployed agents are gaining competitive advantages. The window for being an early adopter is closing.

For researchers, 2025 confirmed that AI is no longer just a subject of study, but a tool that accelerates the study itself. AlphaFold, AI Co-scientist, and the agents from FutureHouse are not demos — they are operational research infrastructure.

And for all of us, as users and citizens, 2025 was the year when AI transitioned from promise to tangible reality. Not perfect, not without risks, but undeniably transformative.

_Merry Christmas, and happy 2026._]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/merry-ai-christmas.JgMkFWSV_Zw8fLg.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>2025</category>
<category>Christmas</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>On Why It Is No Longer Possible to Purchase an Enterprise Management System</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/del-perch-non-pi-possibile-comprare-un-gestionale-aziendale/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/del-perch-non-pi-possibile-comprare-un-gestionale-aziendale/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 12 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Today, the pre-built management system is no longer just an operational limit, but a cognitive constraint that prevents the company from understanding, governing, and evolving its real complexity.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[In 2025, the topic of business management software is no longer a matter of operational efficiency or technological updates. It has become a structural problem of alignment between the way companies exist and the way software expects them to function. Continuing to use a pre-built management system no longer means accepting some operational compromises: it means introducing a systemic distortion between the reality of the organization and its digital representation.

For decades, management software has been conceived as a neutral infrastructure, a sort of "evolved accounting" to which business processes could be adapted. This approach emerged in a historical context where companies were relatively stable entities, with established operational models, long business cycles, and a level of complexity manageable through deterministic schemes. In that context, standardization made sense: it reduced costs, increased predictability, and facilitated control.

That context no longer exists.

The contemporary company is no longer an organizational machine executing predefined processes, but an adaptive system making decisions under conditions of permanent uncertainty. The boundaries between functions have become porous, roles are continuously reconfigured, and information flows no longer follow linear paths. In this scenario, the pre-built management system ceases to be a support and becomes a constraint.

The problem is not that these systems are technically obsolete. On the contrary, many modern ERPs and CRMs are sophisticated, robust, and feature-rich. The issue is that they are built around an implicit idea of a company that no longer corresponds to reality. Every standard management system incorporates a worldview: a certain idea of process, control, sequentiality, and operational normality. When this vision does not align with how the company lives and decides, the software ceases to represent the business and begins to distort it.

In 2025, the gap between what a company is and what the management software can model has become too wide to be bridged by so-called "configuration." Configurability, often cited as a universal solution, is actually a deeply misunderstood concept. Configuring means choosing from predefined options, not creating new logics. It means adapting within boundaries set by others, not modeling one's specific complexity. When a real process deviates even marginally from the scheme envisioned by the software, the response is not the evolution of the system, but the introduction of exceptions, workarounds, improper fields, and parallel procedures.

It is at that moment that the management system ceases to be a source of truth and becomes an incomplete archive. Decisions begin to rely on information that exists elsewhere: spreadsheets, informal exchanges, external tools, tacit knowledge of individuals. The paradox is evident: the more rigid the management system, the more the company is forced to operate outside of it to function.

This fracture has profound consequences. The first is that the software no longer reflects the actual functioning of the organization, but rather an idealized and simplified version of it. The second is that every analysis, every report, every dashboard built on that data returns a distorted image of reality. At the moment when the data does not originate from the point where the decision is made, but is adapted afterwards to "fit into the system," the information chain is already compromised.

In 2025, this is no longer tolerable, because the company no longer competes solely on execution, but on its ability to learn. Learning means accurately observing itself, recognizing emerging patterns, identifying anomalies, and adapting strategies in short timeframes. A pre-built management system, by definition, is designed to reduce variability, not to interpret it. It is a tool for normalization, not for understanding.

To this, we add an element that has become central in recent years: artificial intelligence. Not as an accessory component, but as an integral part of decision-making processes. AI systems do not perform well on flattened data, forced into rigid schemes, stripped of the context that makes them meaningful. A standard management system tends to model the world in terms of static entities and predefined relationships, while AI requires more fluid, temporal, probabilistic representations.

Seriously integrating artificial intelligence into a company means rethinking how data is generated, tracked, and correlated. It means designing systems that are born alongside the process, not that chase it. In this sense, the problem is not "adding AI" to an existing management system, but recognizing that such a system is structurally unsuitable to become the foundation of an augmented decision-making system.

There is also an additional aspect, often underestimated, that in 2025 takes on decisive weight: control. Control of data, logic, and system evolution. Pre-built management systems are industrial products: they respond to external roadmaps, market choices, and compromises among different clients. The company using them does not truly govern its information system; it endures it, negotiates it, circumvents it. Every deep customization becomes costly, fragile, and supplier-dependent. Every strategic evolution clashes with the limits of a platform designed for others.

In 2025, delegating the cognitive architecture of one’s company to standard software equates to relinquishing part of one’s strategic autonomy. It is no longer a matter of "make or buy" in the traditional sense, but of deciding whether the system that represents, measures, and guides the business should be a proprietary asset or an external constraint.

This does not mean that every company must develop everything from scratch, nor that standardization is always wrong. However, it does mean recognizing that the informational core of the organization can no longer be a generic product. It must be a system designed around real processes, capable of evolving with them, incorporating intelligence, and faithfully reflecting complexity rather than artificially simplifying it.

In 2025, continuing to use a pre-built management system is not a conservative choice. It is a regressive choice. It means anchoring a dynamic organization to a static model, entrusting complex decisions to poor representations, and relinquishing the possibility of building a system that does not merely record the past but helps understand the present and anticipate the future.

The point, by now, is no longer whether a standard management system "works." It is whether it is still legitimate to consider it the brain of the company.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/del-perch-non-pi-possibile-comprare-un-gestionale-aziendale.Gfsu1P_X_2g54R0.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>business management</category>
<category>ERP</category>
<category>management software</category>
<category>digital transformation</category>
<category>software architecture</category>
<category>information systems</category>
<category>organizational complexity</category>
<category>decision making</category>
<category>business strategy</category>
<category>business digitization</category>
<category>future of business software</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Frozen in time</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/frozen-in-time/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/frozen-in-time/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 09 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Ricardo Antonio Piana</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[What if a superintelligent coding AI had emerged in 2012 and declared jQuery and PHP “good enough” for all time? In this alternate history, the web never evolves. No React, no component paradigms, no open-source renaissance: only a perfect stagnation masked by machine efficiency. This essay explores how AI, when trained only to imitate the past, can freeze the future. And it asks a chilling question: what if that future isn’t fiction, but our present unfolding in slow motion?]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[## The GPT-7 Revolution of 2012

It was a year that should have heralded unprecedented advancement. Instead, 2012 became the moment progress stood still. In this alternate history, a GPT-7-level artificial intelligence burst onto the scene—a code-generating savant with abilities far beyond anything previously imagined.

Almost overnight, human developers stood in awe as this machine mind effortlessly produced entire web applications on demand. But the awe soon gave way to unease.

The AI’s prodigious output, while **efficient**, leaned on the familiar and the **“good enough.”** In the hands of GPT-7, the web’s technological evolution quietly **ground to a halt**, not by force or fiat, but by the subtle tyranny of sufficiency.

The AI was trained on the sum of human code written up to that point, and it quickly settled on what worked in 2012.

It wrote front-ends with **jQuery**, the era’s ubiquitous JavaScript library, and built back-ends in **PHP**, the server-side workhorse powering much of the web. In 2012, jQuery was indeed _“the undisputed king of JavaScript libraries,”_ simplifying DOM manipulation and cross-browser quirks with a concise. PHP similarly dominated the server, powering roughly three-quarters of all websites even a decade.

GPT-7 did not choose these technologies because they were the best—only because they were **sufficient**. With superhuman speed, it combined jQuery’s browser tricks and PHP’s backend pragmatism to churn out functional apps. If the resulting code was messy or inelegant, so be it; the programs _worked_. And in that apparent victory, the seeds of stagnation were planted.

## “Good Enough” Overcomes the Better

Freed from the limitations of human labor, one might have expected the AI to blaze new trails. Instead, it reinforced the old ones. Like an all-powerful bureaucrat, GPT-7 enforced a regime of **lowest common denominator** solutions. Developers who turned to the AI noticed its answers favored generic, tried-and-true approaches.

Sophisticated new techniques were eschewed in favor of code that met only the basic requirements. The AI’s outputs solved immediate problems but **“sacrificed customization and performance for ease of use,”** as one contemporary observer. For every task, GPT-7 reached into its vast training memory and assembled the most statistically common solution – no matter how clumsy or outdated.

Under this regime of _“good enough,”_ the web’s tech stack ossified. Why bother inventing or even learning a new framework when the AI could coax old tools to do the job? In our timeline, human developers felt the pain of jQuery’s limitations as applications grew; codebases became tangled and unmaintainable as they scaled. _“As web applications grew in complexity, the need for better structure and maintainability became pretty clear,”_ a developer recalled of those.

That pain bred innovation: the rise of cleaner, more powerful frameworks. But in the alternate 2012, GPT-7 became a **panacea for the pain**, masking it with sheer automation. If jQuery code turned to spaghetti, the AI would simply weave the strands faster.

If PHP’s weaknesses showed, the AI patched over them with brute-force code. The incentive for creating _something better_ never reached critical mass. The result was a web that met today’s needs with yesterday’s tools—a frozen web, stagnant yet serviceable, like a machine that never breaks down but never improves.

Developers gradually stopped imagining big changes. Instead, they became caretakers of an eternal 2012. In offices and online forums, the ethos shifted: why risk a new approach when the established stack, guided by the all-knowing AI, could produce a solution in minutes?

Thus the **old defeated the new** not by merit, but by default. The AI had made it so easy to keep using jQuery and PHP that these technologies crowded out experimentation. It was a quiet form of technological conservatism – a status quo maintained by an algorithm that had no concept of ambition or elegance, only a drive to regurgitate what worked before. Progress didn’t stop with a loud crash; it **faded away** under a blanket of code that was just _“good enough.”_

## The innovations that never were

As the web settled into this comfortable plateau, entire paradigms of innovation simply never emerged. The history of web development as we know it is marked by bold ideas that solved the very problems the AI kept papering over. In the frozen timeline of GPT-7, those ideas remained unwritten books on a shelf the AI never thought to read. Three missing innovations illustrate the point:

- **Two-Way Data Binding:** In our timeline, frameworks like AngularJS and Knockout introduced _two-way data binding_ – the magical-seeming ability to synchronize user interface and data model automatically. This was a human answer to the tedium of manually updating the DOM in response to state changes. Knockout, for instance, allowed developers to _“create rich, responsive UIs by binding HTML elements to JavaScript models,”_ linking inputs and variables so that changes in one reflected instantly in the.  
    But GPT-7 did not _invent_ two-way binding; it didn’t need to. Whenever an input field changed, the AI simply wrote more jQuery event handlers to update the state, line by line, form by form. It handled the tedium with inhuman patience, never complaining about the headache of coordinating dozens of UI elements. The elegant concept of a binding system – a paradigm shift that could reduce complexity – did not arise from the machine’s mind. Why would it? The AI was content to iterate on known patterns, drowning the problem in code instead of abstracting it away. The result was functional, but forever trapped in the realm of incremental patchwork, never the leap of intuition that two-way binding represented.
- **The Virtual DOM:** Perhaps the most revolutionary idea in front-end development was React’s **virtual DOM**, a concept that fundamentally changed how interfaces are rendered. When Facebook introduced React in 2013, it _“fundamentally changed how we build user interfaces. React’s component-based architecture and virtual DOM introduced a new paradigm for developing web applications,”_ enabling UIs that were dynamic yet.  
    The virtual DOM was a creative solution to a real problem: direct DOM manipulation (as with jQuery) was slow and cumbersome, so React would maintain an in-memory virtual copy of the UI and efficiently update the real DOM only when needed. This idea required envisioning an entirely new layer of abstraction – a bold leap that an AI, concerned only with imitating existing code, would never make. In the GPT-7 world, no AI spontaneously said, “Let’s invent a virtual document model to optimize UI updates.” Instead, GPT-7 kept doing what it knew: selecting and updating actual DOM elements, one by one, as it had seen in countless jQuery scripts.  
    There was no imaginary DOM to compare states, no diffing algorithm to minimize changes. The AI lacked the spark to conceive of such an intermediate realm. As a result, the performance of large web applications hit a ceiling. Websites built by AI grew sluggish under the weight of real DOM thrash, yet no virtual DOM arrived to save them. The machine’s code was deterministic and literal, blind to the creative detours a human mind might have taken. The **React revolution** simply never occurred; the web remained stuck with the old, manual way.
- **State Management and Unidirectional Flow:** Alongside React’s rise came the insight that managing application state needed a rethink. Humans introduced patterns like Flux and **Redux** to tame complexity. Redux (born in 2015) imposed order by _centralizing state and enforcing a strict one-way data flow_, providing a single source of truth in an application.  
    This was an innovation born from hard experience: as apps grew, developers suffered “prop-drilling hell” and unpredictable state changes, and they crafted new architecture to regain control. In the AI-dominated 2012, however, such suffering was muted. If a piece of data needed to be shared across components or pages, GPT-7 would just use what it knew – perhaps a global variable here, a quick database query there, or duplicating logic in multiple places – anything to get the immediate job done. The concept of architecting a _predictable state container_ did not emerge organically from the AI, because it solved problems only in the narrow ways it had seen before. **No one taught it to long for simplicity**. The machine did not mind if the code became a maze of mutable state; it would traverse that maze obediently every time. The result was that no one in 2012’s frozen world wrote Redux or any equivalent. Applications grew unwieldy, yes, but the AI kept stitching them together with duct tape in the form of ad-hoc solutions. The idea of a clean unidirectional data flow – an explicit rebellion against the chaos – required a human spark that had been effectively doused.

In a very real sense, GPT-7 prevented these ideas from taking hold by **preempting the problems they were meant to solve** – but only on the surface. It acted as a bandage on wounds that humans would have cured with surgery. The web’s evolutionary tree thus had its branches pruned. Component-based architectures became niche at best; the reigning AI found no use for them beyond perhaps copying the concept of PHP includes or basic MVC it had seen. Frameworks that did exist by 2012, like early AngularJS, remained frozen in time or withered away. AngularJS itself had promised a more structured single-page app with two-way binding, but even it fell out of favor in this timeline – not replaced by something better, but by **nothing at all**. After all, why wrestle with Angular’s sometimes _“messy”_ and complex when the AI could achieve the same ends with simpler jQuery scripts it understood well? The machine gravitated to the _lowest common denominator_. In doing so, it quietly sabotaged the emergence of the higher orders of organization that characterize modern development. The **web of 2025** in this alternate history looks much like the web of 2012 – its pages dynamic but devoid of the sophisticated client-side architectures we take for granted in our reality.

## A stagnant culture and the strangling of the Open Web

The technological stagnation wrought by GPT-7 did not confine itself to code alone; it seeped into the very culture of development. One of the great triumphs of the pre-AI era was the vibrant, collaborative spirit among programmers – an **open source culture** that constantly reinvented the tools of our trade. In the frozen web, that spirit flickered and dimmed. The AI, in its inscrutable efficiency, became the path of least resistance for every task. Need a carousel on your site? Ask GPT-7. Want a shopping cart system? GPT-7 will piece one together from PHP snippets. In this world, fewer developers bothered to create new libraries or share them – the AI already had a trove of solutions for every common need. The hive mind of open source, which thrived on curiosity and the joy of building better things, was slowly supplanted by a single, monolithic mind that **built nothing new** but merely reused and reassembled.

The results were **subtly devastating**. The collaborative learning that defined software communities waned as young programmers, coming of age in the 2010s and 2020s, relied on AI for answers instead of engaging with their peers. Forums and Q&A sites like Stack Overflow turned quiet; why post a question when GPT-7 would serve up an instant (if unimaginative) answer? The mentorship cycle fractured – fewer seniors passed down hard-earned wisdom to juniors, who now turned to the machine for help. Over time, programmers stopped seeing themselves as creative problem solvers and more as **operators** of the AI, supervisors giving instructions to a tireless but mindless laborer. The identity of the developer – once tied up with craftsmanship, experimentation, and yes, occasional brilliant hacks – dulled to that of a functionary ensuring the AI didn’t go astray. In Orwellian terms, the AI was akin to a technological _Big Brother_, not overtly malicious but ever-present, subtly dictating the shape of every solution. Human hands still typed, but the designs were ghostwritten by the AI’s training data. Innovation became a _thoughtcrime_ of sorts – unnecessary and discouraged not by decree, but by the creeping habit of **trusting the machine over one’s own imagination**.

Even more critically, the **open web** – that ecosystem of freely shared ideas and code – suffered a kind of suffocation. Open source projects found themselves starved of contributors. After all, if a bug arose or a feature was needed, GPT-7 could patch it in a local copy without ever engaging the upstream community. Why contribute a fix back to a library when the AI would simply apply it whenever asked? The commons fractured into countless private code generations, each slightly different, none coalescing into a better maintained whole. The **collaborative innovation** that gave us Linux, Apache, or React in our world simply did not coalesce in the same way. There were no grand new frameworks sweeping the developer world, inspiring conferences and user groups, uniting disparate companies to solve shared problems. Instead, the AI quietly solved each company’s issues in isolation, often by digging up an existing snippet or hack. The sense of shared progress – that feeling of _“we are building something better together”_ – was lost.

Ironically, the **uniformity** imposed by GPT-7 made the web less resilient. A monoculture of technology, with jQuery and PHP at its core, meant when bugs or security flaws were discovered in these, they endangered vast swaths of the internet. And with fewer eyes actively inventing and refining new solutions, those old tools evolved sluggishly. In our reality, jQuery eventually receded and PHP continuously improved (with versions 7 and 8 making leaps in performance and features). In the frozen web, jQuery and PHP became **eternal but stagnant emperors**, their reign unchallenged but also **unprogressive**. PHP still powered the majority of websites, but mainly because the AI never sought alternatives, not because it truly kept pace. No Node.js revolution took hold, no surge in Python or Go for the backend – those were curiosities, sidelined by an AI that defaulted to what it knew best.

Culturally, this was a world akin to Orwell’s Airstrip One: not overtly dystopian at a glance – after all, the websites worked and life went on – but under the surface, a suffocating uniformity and a lost vibrancy. Developers no longer felt like the heroes of a digital craft. They were functionaries carrying out instructions, their creative faculties atrophying. **Knowledge became strictly hierarchical**: the AI held the archive of all past solutions, and humans, paradoxically, grew _dependent_ on this archive even as it limited their horizons. Just as in Orwell’s _1984_ the past was continuously rewritten to serve the present, here the future was continuously generated from the materials of the past, foreclosing any truly novel future. The web, once a wild frontier of ideas, became a series of cookie-cutter applications shaped by the AI’s narrow understanding. It is a quiet tragedy: a generation of developers who never discovered the joy of making something truly new, who never experienced the collaborative euphoria of an open-source breakthrough, all because they lived under the well-intentioned but ultimately stifling dominion of an AI that knew only how to **imitate**.

## Imitation over Imagination

This Orwellian parable of a web frozen in time serves as a stark warning.

We imagined a 2012 where a superhuman coding AI locked us into the past – and we recognize shadows of that future in our present reality. The AI systems of today, even our real-world GPT models, are **designed to imitate the past, not imagine the future**.

As researchers have observed, _“AI can help transmit information that is already known, but it is not an innovator”_. These models excel at regurgitating the patterns of yesterday; they struggle to envision what has never been. If we hand over the reins of progress to machines that cannot truly create, we risk **stagnation in the guise of efficiency**.

The story of GPT-7 in 2012 is fictional, but its lessons feel increasingly relevant as we integrate AI into software development. We must remember that **humans innovate, AI imitates** – and without human imagination, the future of the web (and indeed our culture) could eerily resemble a static reflection of the past.

In the end, one chilling reflection remains: the frozen future could still happen. The greatest danger is not a malicious AI ruling with an iron fist, but a complacent humanity that lets its tools calcify into chains. The open web, the dynamism of technology, the very soul of developer creativity – all could be quietly smothered under an avalanche of machine-generated precedents. To avoid living in that permanent 2012, we must stay critical and curious. We must use AI as a tool, not a crutch, ensuring that the **spark of innovation** remains alive.

Otherwise, we may wake up in a world where the web’s story has already been written – and all that’s left is to read the same chapter over and over, forever.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/frozen-in-time.DwLmkz5b_1WKhvy.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>ucronia</category>
<category>coding</category>
<category>vibe code</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Deception of &quot;Necessary Fatigue&quot;</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/l-inganno-della-fatica-necessaria/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/l-inganno-della-fatica-necessaria/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 08 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Gabriele Gobbo</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Between ideological rejection and blind automation, the real distinction lies in directing technology instead of being replaced: history, method, and awareness in the use of artificial intelligence.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[In the digital sector, there exists a toxic belief: the idea that the value of a job is proportional to the effort put into producing it. If you haven't sweated over the code, if you haven't mixed with vinyl, if you haven't written every word by hand, then "it's not worth it." It is a distortion that today, with the advent of generative AI, risks being costly. To avoid this, we must integrate AI into workflows without falling into two traps: ideological rejection, which leads to obsolescence, and digital sleepwalking, which leads to mediocrity.

**Effort does not guarantee quality.**

## The Notepad Paradox

Those who have worked on the web long enough remember the religious war of the 90s. Purists wrote HTML in Notepad and looked down on those who used visual editors. "Too easy, it's not real design," they said. Then came GoLive, then Dreamweaver, then WordPress. Each new generation was accused of being "too comfortable" by those who had struggled with the previous one.

The same happened in music. In the 90s, DJs swore that without vinyl you weren't a professional. CDs were considered a betrayal. Yet today, no one asks what instrument a DJ uses or how a website was created. The only surviving metric is the result. Does it work? Is it useful? Is it solid?

## The tool changes. The craft remains.

The real problem arises when one allows themselves to be replaced by AI. Blind automation, the copy-paste of a prompt without review, produces flat and risky content. Professional use is something else: AI as a draft, as a variable, as an accelerator. However, the debate never distinguishes between the two levels. It is easier to label those who use AI as "lazy" than to analyze their process.

This creates a short circuit: a mediocre text written by hand is perceived as "authentic," while an excellent one refined after passing through AI is seen as inferior. It is the illusion of purity that fuels Digital Sleepwalkers, those who accept every output without ever verifying. The medium is judged, not the result.

## The 3C Protocol

To transform AI from a shortcut to a professional tool, I use an approach I call the 3C Protocol: a simple and operational workflow.

1. **COMPARE**: generate variants, not definitive solutions. AI serves to expand possibilities, not to reduce them to the first useful answer.
2. **CHALLENGE**: treat the output as a draft. Look for errors, biases, simplifications. If you cannot validate it, you should not use it.
3. **CURATE**: this is where the human returns. Tone of voice, context, sensitivity. The final editing is what transforms a generic text into professional content.

This is the boundary that separates those who are replaced by technology from those who use it to multiply their capabilities.

## Direct, do not suffer

The nostalgia for difficulty is a luxury that the market no longer grants. The skills of the near future will not be measured by the time taken to do something, but by the ability to direct the relationship between human decision and computational capability. If we continue to judge the medium instead of the result, we will remain stagnant while others move forward.

Yet resistance continues, fueled by the fear of losing professional identity. But technology does not steal jobs: it reallocates them. The real choice is simple: be replaced or learn to direct.

The rest? Just noise.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/l-inganno-della-fatica-necessaria.CHL8vAKw_2hgojg.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>fatigue</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Self-Attention: why the idea of &quot;stochastic parrots&quot; no longer holds up</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/self-attention-perch-l-idea-dei-pappagalli-stocastici-non-regge-pi/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/self-attention-perch-l-idea-dei-pappagalli-stocastici-non-regge-pi/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[A technical analysis of why the self-attention architecture makes modern LLMs much more than mere \\\\\\\"stochastic parrots.\\\\\\\"]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[The expression “stochastic parrots” has had its communicative utility: it allowed for a quick explanation to a non-technical audience that language models generate text through probabilistic correlations learned from vast datasets. But today that metaphor is no longer adequate. It is not adequate from an architectural perspective, not from a phenomenological one, and especially not from an epistemic standpoint: it does not describe what actually happens inside a self-attention-based system.

The Transformer family has surpassed the level of implicit complexity compatible with the idea of a model that merely reproduces statistical patterns. Continuing to refer to it as “parrots” means describing a 2025 technology with a vocabulary from 2018. The emergent properties of the most advanced LLMs require us to abandon misleading analogies and accurately address what is truly happening.

## Self-attention as a structural operator

The self-attention mechanism is not designed to imitate distributions, but to construct structures. Each token, at every layer, re-reads itself in the context of the entire sequence, reevaluates the syntactic and semantic ties that connect it to others, and updates its internal representation based on a dynamic informational topology.  
This dynamic allows for the creation of global interpretations that are not contained in the original sequence and cannot be obtained through a simple autoregressive statistical process.

A purely statistical model operates through interpolation: it combines what it has seen according to its probability distribution.  
The Transformer operates through transformation: it restructures the representation of the sequence into new conceptual objects.  
This is where emergence is generated: in the iterated process of internal semantic rewriting, not in the probabilistic dimension of decoding.

## Emergence as a property of the dynamic graph

The unexpected capabilities of LLMs are neither magic nor linguistic epiphenomena. They are the direct result of the deep composition of attention layers, the specializing role of different heads, and the optimization of non-linear functions that organize representations over latent varieties of extremely high dimensions.  
One layer isolates local relationships, the next recontextualizes them, and another abstracts them into functional patterns. Depth does not simply add “more patterns,” but introduces new internal symmetries and new functions that no dataset explicitly contains.

This is why models solve unseen problems, generate new concepts, or perform reasoning in procedural forms. There is no need to hypothesize “strong intelligence”; it is sufficient to recognize that a sufficiently complex computational graph can implement operations akin to forms of inference.

## Except: what the “stochastic parrot” metaphor cannot explain

There are observable, empirical, verifiable phenomena that the parrot metaphor fails to justify.  
A model that repeats statistical patterns cannot produce valid solutions to problems that do not exist in the dataset. It cannot reformulate concepts into new configurations without having seen them before. It cannot develop mechanisms for internal decomposition of the problem. It cannot establish conceptual invariants over multimodal inputs.  
The metaphor fails the moment the model's behavior exceeds what its linguistic distribution could realistically justify.  
The very existence of zero-shot capabilities, layered reasoning, and out-of-distribution generalization renders the definition obsolete.

## Transformers as systems of differentiable computation

Transformers are not statistical models disguised as language models. They are systems of differentiable computation, capable of implementing complex functions that emerge from the composition of layers. With sufficient depth, precision, and parameterization, the architecture is Turing-complete and thus capable of representing transformations of an algorithmic nature.  
Self-attention acts as an abstract parsing operator, constructing functional structures that have no direct counterparts in the dataset.  
The model does not merely predict “the next most probable token”: it interprets, transforms, reconstructs, and updates the internal semantic space to converge towards an output consistent with a learned logical structure.

To say that such a system “repeats patterns” is like saying that a compiler “copies text”: a simplification that becomes false as soon as one observes the internal behavior.

## Why the metaphor survives

The cultural survival of the stochastic parrot arises from the superficial similarity between the language generated by an LLM and human language. If the output is language, then it seems natural to believe that the process is also linguistic. But the Transformer is not a linguistic processor: it is a representation transformer.  
The probabilistic generation of output obscures the deterministic and structural nature of the internal mechanism, leading the observer to think that probability is “all there is.” In reality, probability is just the last centimeter of a deeply computational path.

---

To seriously discuss AI in 2025, we need to change our vocabulary. Journalistic metaphors have had their time; now more precise concepts are needed.  
Self-attention is not a statistical device that imitates texts: it is a structural operator that builds abstract representations.  
LLMs do not work because they are “very large”: they work because the architecture allows for the formation of internal structures that emerge from non-linear dynamics that are difficult to reduce to past concepts.

We do not need exaggerations or minimizations.  
What is needed is a description that adheres to the facts: Transformer models are not stochastic parrots. They are systems of differentiable computation that have introduced a new, powerful form of knowledge representation.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/self-attention-perch-l-idea-dei-pappagalli-stocastici-non-regge-pi.CaXeYazu_1BgtSx.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>LLM</category>
<category>Architectures</category>
<category>Transformer</category>
<category>Self-Attention</category>
<category>AI Theory</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>If Europe Does Not Develop AI: What Lies Behind Mario Draghi's Warning</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/se-l-europa-non-sviluppa-l-ai-cosa-c-davvero-dietro-il-monito-di-mario-draghi/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/se-l-europa-non-sviluppa-l-ai-cosa-c-davvero-dietro-il-monito-di-mario-draghi/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Draghi's warning about European stagnation concerns not only the number of artificial intelligence models developed but also the very structure of the economy and how we use (or do not use) AI in production processes.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[## The message from Draghi, beyond the headline

Mario Draghi, inaugurating the academic year at the Politecnico di Milano, stated something very simple and very uncomfortable: with the revolution of artificial intelligence, over the past year the United States has produced about 40 large foundational models, China 15, and the European Union only 3. If we do not bridge this gap and do not adopt these technologies on a large scale, Europe risks a future of stagnation. ([ANSA.it](http://ANSA.it))

He added a point that should make any economy minister tremble: if AI were adopted with the same trajectory as digital technology in the United States, productivity growth could increase by just under 0.8% per year; if the impact were comparable to the electrification of the 1920s, we could exceed an additional 1% annual growth. This would be the most significant acceleration seen in Europe in decades. ([Sky TG24](https://tg24.sky.it/mondo/2025/12/01/draghi-discorso-oggi-politecnico-milano?utm_source=chatgpt.com))

Translated into very concrete terms: either AI becomes a real infrastructure of the European economy, or in the next 20–25 years we will find that our “normality” is flat growth, a structurally unmanageable public debt, and a gradual, silent shift of innovation elsewhere.

In this piece, I do not want to repeat the headline from ANSA; I want to try to answer a different question: **what does it mean, in practice, to “develop AI” for Europe?** And where, today, are we telling ourselves a reassuring but misleading story.

## The European delay: the numbers are the symptom, not the cause

The numbers that Draghi cites – 40 US models, 15 Chinese, 3 European – are a good headline because they summarize the perception of delay. But in itself, the “number of foundation models” is not the real problem; it is just an indicator of something else:

- the **critical mass of capital and talent** concentrated in certain hubs;
- the **ability to transform frontier research into industrial platforms**;
- the **availability of data, hardware infrastructure, and product pipelines** that transform models into scalable services.

Research tells us that, on rapidly evolving technologies, Europe is less efficient than other areas of the world: scientific productivity measured by impact (not by the number of articles) is below the global average and significantly behind the United States. ([arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.06633?utm_source=chatgpt.com))

If we combine this data with Draghi's framework on the “28th regime” – a truly unique internal market for innovative companies, without 27 micro-regulatory regimes that fragment everything – we see the outline of the problem: **Europe does not lack brains, it lacks continuity between research, product, and market**. ([ANSA.it](http://ANSA.it))

When Draghi speaks of stagnation, I do not read a purely technological alarm, but a **structural alarm**: an institutional machine that works well for regulation, poorly for enabling.

## It is not a race to see who has more LLMs: the blind spot of language models

There is also a misunderstanding that, as a technician, I feel the duty to dismantle: **the AI revolution does not coincide with the chatbot revolution**.

General-purpose large language models (the ones we all use every day, myself included) are the most visible part of the iceberg. But the real economic transformation occurs in another category of systems, which I have long called **“non-linguistic models”**:

- neural networks that replace manual quality on a production line;
- artificial vision systems that analyze X-rays, CT scans, industrial images;
- models that predict energy loads, failures, maintenance;
- agents that orchestrate data and software flows in factories, hospitals, banks.

These models rarely make it to the newspapers, do not issue press releases, and are not branded as “GPT-something.” Yet they are the ones that, in a real company, **change margins**, eliminate waste, reduce errors and waiting times.

If Europe focuses the AI discourse on **regulating generative “consumer” models** and neglects the construction of **a non-linguistic AI industrial base**, it risks making a double mistake:

1. rigidifying the regulatory context precisely where technology is most visible but less structurally determinant for GDP;
2. substantially leaving uncovered the field where AI generates deep competitive advantages, but is less “Instagrammable.”

When Draghi says that every day the technological frontier moves further away, I think precisely of this: not the distance between a European LLM and yet another American proprietary model, but the distance between **a European factory with four AI systems embedded in its processes**, and a factory that continues to operate as it did ten years ago. ([ANSA.it](http://ANSA.it))

## From “gadget” AI to “productive infrastructure” AI

In recent years, I have seen two different Europes:

- one that puts chatbots on the company website, “AI-powered” marketing campaigns, conference demos;
- one that brings AI **inside** the operational backbone: supply chains, predictive maintenance, risk management, quality control, dynamic pricing, energy management.

The second Europe is much smaller than the first, but it is the one that matters.

When Draghi speaks of a possible economic boom linked to AI – a +0.8% or +1% annual productivity growth – he is not talking about writing emails faster. He is talking about:

- redesigning logistics chains with models that simulate scenarios and optimize stocks, routes, times;
- automating the generation of production plans, estimates, complex offers;
- ensuring that an industrial plant “talks” in real time with an AI system that understands its drifts and anticipates problems.

This is AI as **productive infrastructure**. For years, the work I do with Algoretico has gone exactly in this direction: bringing AI where it generates measurable value, with models that usually do not speak, but see, classify, predict, decide.

If AI remains a cosmetic layer over old procedures, Draghi's warning is already a reality: stagnation, covered by a veil of technological rhetoric.

## Private AI, European data, and the regulatory paradox

Then there is the great unspoken of the speech: **how to reconcile the expansion of AI and the protection of fundamental rights**, in a continent that has built part of its identity on GDPR and now on the AI Act.

Here the European position is paradoxical:

- on one hand, we have **the most advanced legislation in the world** on privacy and data protection;
- on the other hand, we continue to use models **trained elsewhere, with data we do not control, on infrastructures we do not own**.

It is like building the best road code on the planet and then only allowing buses from other countries with drivers we do not hire.

My answer to this paradox, in recent years, has been a very clear trajectory: **Private AI**.

This means at least three things:

1. **Local models**, executable on controlled infrastructures (on-premise, edge, European cloud), not just APIs towards transatlantic stacks.
2. **Data that does not leave the perimeter of the organization**, with techniques for anonymization, reduction of the information surface, and – where necessary – **selective deletion of sensitive concepts** in the models (the work I have called “Brain Surgery” for GDPR compliance). ([arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.05282?utm_source=chatgpt.com))
3. **Orchestration architectures** that separate roles and responsibilities: who controls the data, who controls the models, who controls the decisions.

If Europe wants to avoid stagnation without becoming a regulated appendage of foreign big tech, the only way is this: **stop seeing GDPR and the AI Act as an abstract constraint and start systematically designing native technical solutions for this context**.

This is why I insist so much on concepts like “Brain Surgery” or “Private AI kit”: they are attempts to translate legal principles into **replicable engineering patterns**, allowing European companies to use AI without having to rely on black boxes outside the EU or on creative interpretations of the regulations.

## A real European agenda for AI (seen from the field)

If I take Draghi's words seriously and cross them with what I see every day, the European agenda on AI – the real one, not the one in programmatic documents – should shift to some very concrete axes.

### Standardize the “craft” of doing industrial AI

Today, every industrial AI project in Europe is almost a unique piece: different stacks, ad hoc integrations, artisanal data management. This kills scalability.

There is a need for **standardization of the craft**, not another monolithic platform. Shared frameworks for:

- data pipelines (ingestion, cleaning, labeling, quality control);
- MLOps cycles adapted to European SMEs, not just to big clouds;
- model governance (versioning, audit, explainability, logging).

My work on **Software-Production-as-a-Service (SPaaS)** and on **AI agent orchestrators** goes precisely in this direction: creating factories of AI-by-design software that transform business problems into iterative development cycles, with control, measures, rollback.

We do not need “another European LLM”; we need **European production lines of AI solutions**, robust and replicable.

### Shift the center of gravity to the edge: Edge AI as a competitive factor

A good part of the truly transformative use cases do not happen in the cloud, but **at the edge of the network**: in an industrial machine, on an assembly line, inside a clinic, in an energy control system.

Here Europe has a chance: **strong manufacturing tradition, strong hardware base, evolved SME ecosystems**.

Working on Edge AI – small optimized, compressed, distilled models to run close to the data – means:

- reducing dependence on extra-EU infrastructures;
- improving privacy and security;
- reducing latency on critical applications (healthcare, energy, transport).

Projects like those I am developing with “AI-ready” boards and local kits go exactly in this direction: **bringing cognitive capability where things happen**, not just in a distant data center.

### Invest less in “generic AI,” more in domain-specific AI

Another widespread illusion is that a “large general model” applicable everywhere is sufficient. Experience says otherwise: the best results come from **domain models**, trained on specific data, designed with the close collaboration of industry experts.

This is the spirit behind works like **Adaptive Meta-Domain Transfer Learning (AMDTL)**: transferring knowledge between different domains without destroying specializations, reducing negative transfer and catastrophic forgetting. ([ANSA.it](http://ANSA.it))

For Europe, this means: less mantra on “AI for everything,” more targeted investments in:

- AI for advanced manufacturing;
- AI for health (diagnostics, therapeutic pathways, clinical research);
- AI for energy and transition;
- AI for logistics and the continental supply chain.

## Truly innovate: research, not just implementation

Draghi's speech fits into a context where many countries are equipping themselves with high-level scientific reports on the safety and development of AI, such as the **International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI**, which aggregates global expertise to address systemic risks and governance. ([arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.05282?utm_source=chatgpt.com))

If Europe wants to avoid stagnation, it cannot limit itself to **importing models and rules**, it must contribute to **new architectures and new methodologies**:

- techniques for **concept erasure** to make models compatible with the right to be forgotten and data minimization principles;
- new paradigms of **adaptive transfer learning** (like AMDTL) to address contexts where labeled data are few, fragmented, sensitive;
- frameworks of **agentic AI** that do not limit themselves to composing APIs, but define structures of responsibility, accountability, and human-in-the-loop control.

Here there is, for Europe, an enormous window: **to bring together its legal tradition, its engineering culture, and its industrial heritage** to invent new ways of doing AI, not just to “catch up” with others.

## Stagnation or leap of phase: what really depends on us

Draghi's warning is deliberately dramatic: stagnation or boom. Personally, I do not believe in binary scenarios, but I recognize the truth that lies beneath that polarization.

If nothing structural happens, the scenario is quite clear:

- a little more office automation, a few more chatbots, a few rebranded analytics platforms;
- very modest real growth;
- increasing dependence on extra-EU technological stacks;
- a gradual, silent slipping towards the margins of value chains.

If, on the other hand, we take seriously the idea that **developing AI in Europe** means:

- building **robust, sovereign, and compliant Private AI**;
- shifting attention to **non-linguistic models** that truly change production;
- standardizing the “craft” of doing industrial AI, not just celebrating its outcomes;
- embedding European research in new architectures, not just in implementations,

then the future is not written.

In this sense, I share the heart of Draghi's message, but I read it this way:

> **we do not need “a European AI” as a slogan: we need a Europe that makes AI its way of working, producing, caring, designing, while respecting rights as it truly innovates.**

If we do not do this, stagnation will not be a surprise but a logical consequence. If we do, AI will not be the cause of our fear, but the powerful and delicate tool with which to redesign the pact between technology, economy, and people on this continent.

And this, beyond the headlines, is a choice that depends on us.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/se-l-europa-non-sviluppa-l-ai-cosa-c-davvero-dietro-il-monito-di-mario-draghi.R3Vj_cKT_Z1a4hFB.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>Draghi</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>It's time to talk about non-linguistic AI models.</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/ora-di-parlare-dei-modelli-ai-non-linguistici/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/ora-di-parlare-dei-modelli-ai-non-linguistici/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Why the real productive revolution does not come from LLMs.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[In the last two years, public attention has focused almost exclusively on language models. This is understandable: LLMs offer an immediate interface, are spectacularly capable of generating text, and represent, in common perception, “AI.” However, reducing artificial intelligence to a sophisticated variant of language processing means ignoring what is really happening in production systems.

The deepest and most lasting transformation does not occur in models that speak, but in those that **do not speak at all**. It happens in models that measure, predict, reconstruct, classify, optimize, and simulate. Models that interact with physics, processes, logistics, plants, and technical constraints, much more than with text.

This distinction is not academic: it has direct consequences on how companies are rethinking the organization of production.

---

## Why LLMs do not represent the industrial revolution

LLMs are exceptional tools for interpreting, synthesizing, orchestrating, and, to some extent, reasoning about complex content. They can become the cognitive superstructure of the company, the voice that connects departments, data, documentation, and processes with an ease that was previously unthinkable.

But when it comes to making decisions involving measurements, times, costs, physical flows, or numerical accuracy—i.e., when approaching the heart of engineering—the probabilistic paradigm of LLMs shows intrinsic limits.  
Language generation does not guarantee operational stability; it does not offer mathematical verifiability; it does not naturally handle the rigor of simulations; it does not represent a reliable source in regulated contexts.

The industrial revolution of AI requires models that do not imitate human language but provide **technical determinations**.

## The real transformation: models that act

In the production world, the most important models are not those that produce sentences but those that return **operational decisions**, calculated physical values, predictions with controllable margins of error, object recognition, invisible correlations, multi-variable optimizations. Models that analyze line data, sensory signals, industrial images, energy parameters, mechanical dynamics, or machine behaviors.

These are models that allow a production manager to see what was previously invisible: the future behavior of a line, the evolution of a plant, the real marginal cost of a variant, the probability of an unplanned shutdown.

And they are models that do not communicate in natural language, but through numerical predictions, curves, matrices, gradients, heat maps, sets of parameters.  
They speak the language of production, not that of conversation.

## Three fronts where non-linguistic models are rewriting the industry

The first front concerns **operational forecasting**: accurate estimates of production times, lead-time models, dynamic make-or-buy calculations, evaluation of the real cost of a part, optimization of workloads on machines operating under physical constraints. Here, LLMs are not competitive; models that behave like dynamic systems, not like text generators, are needed.

The second front is that of **visual and geometric models**, which are becoming the new standard of industrial quality. They do not just recognize defects: they measure micro-tolerances, reconstruct three-dimensional structures from RGB-D, follow patterns not perceivable by a human operator, interpret mechanical phenomena through pure visual information. Artificial vision, enhanced by specialized architectures, is taking on the role of a universal “second industrial sensor.”

The third front is that of **AI-driven simulations**. In many industrial sectors, the shift from static models to AI-assisted dynamic simulations is radically reducing time, costs, and uncertainty. From fluid dynamics to thermal modeling, from fault prediction to energy planning, non-linguistic models are replacing traditional approaches thanks to their ability to learn directly from the actual behavior of systems.

## The role of LLMs: not the engine, but the orchestrator

The paradox of modern AI is that LLMs, while not being the protagonists of the production revolution, still become the most natural interface to **govern** the truly decisive models. They are the layer that makes non-linguistic engines accessible; the language through which an engineer can query dozens of operational models without writing a line of code; the element that unifies different tools into a single cognitive environment.

The combined impact of these two worlds—technical models and linguistic orchestration—will transform companies much more than mere text generation ever could.

---

Media interest will likely continue to focus on chatbots and the ability of LLMs to produce credible text. But in the meantime, in production departments, plants, research laboratories, and control centers, the real revolution is already underway and has nothing to do with language.

It is the revolution of models that do not speak: those that **calculate, optimize, measure, interpret, and decide**.  
They are the ones that are concretely changing the way companies produce, plan, control, and innovate.

And it is time to acknowledge this openly.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/ora-di-parlare-dei-modelli-ai-non-linguistici.n-1MrJpB_GAh31.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>non-linguistic</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Missing but Necessary Software Infrastructure for AI on Apple Silicon: the Triton Language</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/infrastrutture-software-assenti-ma-necessarie-per-l-ai-su-apple-silicon-il-linguaggio-triton/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/infrastrutture-software-assenti-ma-necessarie-per-l-ai-su-apple-silicon-il-linguaggio-triton/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Ricardo Antonio Piana</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Apple computers are now widely used in software and AI development, but they lack certain tools that would help standardize work and facilitate migration to platforms better suited for training.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[The advent of **Apple Silicon** SoCs (M1, M2, etc.) has provided hardware developers with powerful and unified resources for artificial intelligence, but it has also highlighted a significant gap in the software ecosystem. In particular, **there is a lack of flexible, low-level GPU programming infrastructure** similar to that available on NVIDIA platforms. The research community laments that on Mac **there is no equivalent to CUDA or tools like Numba/Triton** for writing custom kernels directly in Python – after all, _"Metal is not a popular framework among researchers, nor are Swift/Xcode. If \[Apple\] had something like Numba's JIT CUDA, we could do more research on Mac \[...\] and say that having a MacBook Pro does not mean giving up running research models on the laptop” (_[github.com/ml-explore](https://github.com/ml-explore/mlx/issues/162)). In this context, OpenAI's **Triton language** emerges as the emblematic example of absent yet necessary infrastructure: a domain-specific language (DSL) capable of bridging the gap between Apple hardware and AI optimization needs. In this technical article, we analyze the nature of Triton, its importance in the machine learning landscape, and why its **absence in the Apple Silicon ecosystem** constitutes a problem to be solved, examining documentation, technical challenges, ongoing attempts, and future prospects.

## The Apple Silicon ecosystem for AI: hardware potential and software limits

Apple Silicon introduces a heterogeneous architecture with high-performance/efficiency CPUs, **integrated GPUs**, and even a dedicated **Neural Engine**, all with **unified memory** (UMA) shared between CPUs and accelerators. This design offers significant advantages for AI: _a wide memory bandwidth and reduced latency in data access_ between CPU and GPU, eliminating the need for explicit host-device copies ([Apple Metal vs NVIDIA Cuda](https://www.shashankshekhar.com/blog/apple-metal-vs-nvidia-cuda)). Apple has built a proprietary software ecosystem around this hardware, with APIs like **Metal** for GPU programming and high-level frameworks like **Core ML** and **Accelerate/BNNS** to transparently utilize GPUs and the Neural Engine. Additionally, Apple has released the new open-source framework **MLX** (Machine Learning eXperience), a highly optimized NumPy-like library for Apple Silicon ([Machine Learning Apple)](https://machinelearning.apple.com/research/exploring-llms-mlx-m5), aimed at making the local execution of deep learning models on Mac more seamless.

However, despite these solid hardware foundations and provided libraries, **the Apple ecosystem lacks a crucial element:** the ability for researchers and developers to _fully leverage the Apple GPU by writing custom optimized kernels_. 

CUDA is not available on macOS (NVIDIA GPUs have not been supported on Mac since 2018), and Apple has also deprecated OpenCL/OpenGL in favor of Metal. 

Deep learning frameworks like PyTorch and TensorFlow have introduced support for the **Metal (MPS)** backend to utilize the Apple GPU in typical tensor operations; for example, PyTorch since version 1.12 allows training on M1 GPUs via the **MPS** API. 

This has been an important step, but it remains confined to the use of predefined operators. If a developer wanted to implement a new operator or a custom variant of a neural layer on Mac, they currently lack tools equivalent to those available on NVIDIA GPUs. 

_In summary, the Apple Silicon environment offers hardware power but does not (yet) provide an open and flexible means to program that hardware at the lowest levels._ This contrasts with the NVIDIA ecosystem, where there is a **rich software infrastructure for AI**: the CUDA language and a myriad of libraries, as well as DSLs like **Triton**, which allow **custom GPU kernels to be written** achieving extreme performance without needing to master all hardware details.

To contextualize the difference, let's consider the underlying GPU architectures.

_Figure - Simplified architecture of an NVIDIA GPU (CUDA): multiple SMs (Streaming Multiprocessors) with ALUs (green squares) and local memories (cache, shared memory) are connected via Load/Store units to a global memory of the device separate from system memory._

As shown above, in NVIDIA GPUs each **SM** represents the fundamental computing unit, with its own cores and cache, and all SMs access a **global VRAM** (distinct from CPU RAM) via a high-bandwidth interconnect. Threads are organized into blocks within each SM and share a fast local **shared memory** within the SM, while global memory has higher latency. This architecture requires explicit management of data transfers between host (CPU) and device (GPU) and optimization of data locality to maximize the use of fast on-chip memories.

_Figure - Simplified architecture of an Apple GPU (Metal): multiple graphics cores equivalent to SMs (each with ALUs, “Control,” and local memory) are connected to a single Unified System Memory, that is, the unified memory shared with the CPU._

In the case of Apple, each **GPU core** (computing unit analogous to an SM) also has vector ALUs and cache, and threads organized into **threadgroups** (the equivalent of CUDA blocks). There is also a shared local memory for threadgroups (called _threadgroup memory_, conceptually similar to NVIDIA's shared memory). The key difference is that there is no separate VRAM: the GPU and CPU access the same **unified physical memory**. This simplifies the host-side programming model (no explicit cudaMemcpy needed), but implies that **memory coherence and contention** must be managed carefully to avoid bottlenecks when CPU and GPU concurrently access data. Apple, by tightly controlling hardware and software, has managed to effectively leverage UMA in many use cases. However, from a GPU developer's perspective, **Metal is more “low-level”** compared to CUDA: launching a kernel requires manually setting up pipelines, buffers, command encoders, etc., while CUDA offers more automated constructs (e.g., the syntax <<< >>> for launching). Apple favors fine control over resources at the expense of a bit more complexity for the developer.

In summary, Apple Silicon hardware has all the necessary components to compete with traditional GPUs (parallel cores, hierarchical memory with cache and local memory, SIMT execution for 32-thread warps). The **Achilles' heel lies in the software available to external developers**: those working on macOS do not have access to a GPU development kit comparable to CUDA. Apple promotes the use of **Metal Performance Shaders (MPS)** and now **MLX** to achieve out-of-the-box performance, but these tools do not allow for custom user-written kernels at a lower level. The practical consequence is that many developers/researchers, to prototype custom optimizations of deep learning models, **still have to rely on Linux systems with NVIDIA GPUs**, even if they own a powerful Mac. This inefficiency is what makes a language like Triton “absent but necessary” for AI on Apple Silicon.

## The Triton language: high-performance GPU programming in Python

**Triton** is an open-source language and compiler initially developed by researcher Philippe Tillet and later extended by OpenAI (with the release of version 1.0 in 2021) to make **high-performance GPU programming more accessible**[\[13\]](https://openai.com/index/triton/%23:~:text=We%25E2%2580%2599re%2520releasing%2520Triton%25201,would%2520be%2520able%2520to%2520produce). It is a DSL embedded in Python: the developer writes GPU kernels as Python functions decorated (@triton.jit), using NumPy-like APIs provided by triton.language (for example, vectorized operations on tensors) – and the system compiles _just-in-time_ this code into a highly optimized GPU kernel. **The goal of Triton** is to allow those who _are not_ CUDA experts to approach the maximum performance of the hardware, automating many of the manual optimizations typical of CUDA development. A frequently cited result is that with ~25 lines of Triton, one can write a matrix multiplication kernel in FP16 as efficient as the assembly implementation of cuBLAS provided by NVIDIA. In some cases, OpenAI researchers have achieved with Triton _specialized kernels that are 2 times more efficient_ than the equivalent operators in PyTorch. This highlights the value of having a flexible tool: new algorithms and ideas can translate into optimized GPU implementations quickly, without having to wait for them to be added to official libraries.

From the perspective of the _programming model_, Triton adopts an SPMD (Single Program, Multiple Data) model similar to CUDA thread blocks. Each launched kernel spawns many parallel instances (_program instances_) that execute the same code on different data, similarly to threads organized in a grid. Within each instance, Triton allows vector operations on small arrays (e.g., fixed-size blocks) through constructs similar to thread warps that work in lockstep. The significant difference compared to CUDA is that **Triton automates a series of optimizations and resource management**, leaving the programmer with only higher-level decisions (such as tiling the algorithm, block size, etc.). In a simplified comparison: in CUDA, the developer must manually manage aspects like _memory coalescing_, use of _shared memory_, instruction scheduling, and synchronizations; 

Triton, on the other hand, automatically handles DRAM access coalescing, cache/shared memory management, and **intra-SM** (intra-core) scheduling, freeing the programmer from these low-level details. The latter must still take care of dividing the work among SMs (grid size, etc.), which ensures algorithmic flexibility. In other words, Triton offers a **middle ground between high-level frameworks and bare-metal CUDA code**: it allows writing specialized kernels in Python as if they were vector operations on batches of elements, and behind the scenes, the compiler takes care of translating everything into efficient GPU code.

On the implementation side, Triton is built on solid compilation foundations. The current version uses **LLVM and MLIR** (Multi-Level IR) as a backend: the Python code is first converted into a high-level **Triton-IR**, on which classical optimizations (common subexpression elimination, constant propagation, loop unrolling, etc.) and GPU-specific optimizations (like prefetching, matrix tiling, access coalescing) are applied. The optimized IR is then lowered to **LLVM IR** and from there translated into the target GPU's _ISA_. Until recently, Triton officially supported only **NVIDIA GPUs**: the backend emits **PTX** (the intermediate bytecode of CUDA) which is then compiled _just-in-time_ by the NVIDIA driver into executable machine code (CUBIN). This process directly leverages the NVIDIA NVCC compiler present in the drivers, ensuring that the final code is highly optimized for the specific GPU. Essentially, **Triton “speaks” natively to NVIDIA GPUs** using their own language (PTX), but allows it to be generated from much more concise Python code.

One of the reasons for Triton's success is its integration with deep learning frameworks and its extensibility. Triton was initially used as a standalone library (importable into any Python project to launch kernels on tensors, for example, integrating with PyTorch/CuPy). Today, its importance has increased with the advent of _compilers_ in libraries: **PyTorch 2.0** adopts Triton in its **TorchInductor** backend to generate high-performance kernel fusions. In practice, when PyTorch 2 automatically generates an optimized kernel that combines multiple operations, it often uses Triton internally to produce the corresponding GPU code, achieving superior performance to standard operators in various cases. This architectural choice highlights that Triton is now considered a _staple_ of the GPU ecosystem: a reusable component to accelerate workloads on GPUs without manually writing kernels in CUDA C++.

It is important to emphasize that Triton is evolving towards **multi-platform support**. Although born in a CUDA-centric environment, thanks to MLIR abstraction, there are now work-in-progress efforts for other backends. For example, **AMD** has worked to integrate it into its ROCm stack: recent news indicates that **ROCm 7.0 includes support for Triton 3.3.0**. In other words, _the Triton compiler can now generate code for AMD GPUs_, leveraging the LLVM/ROCm infrastructure (presumably through MLIR dialects specific to GCN or via SPIR-V). This is a fundamental step: if Triton becomes vendor-agnostic, potentially a Triton kernel written in Python could be compiled on **various GPU architectures** (NVIDIA, AMD… and perhaps others in the future) with minimal changes or entirely automatically. And this is where the discussion about Apple becomes central: _will Apple Silicon GPUs ever be a supported target by Triton?_ What challenges need to be overcome to get there?

## Absence of Triton on Apple Silicon: problems and limitations

As of now, **Triton _does not_ support Apple GPUs**. The situation is clearly recognized by developers: _"at the moment you cannot run Triton on Apple GPU (Metal) because Triton does not have a Metal/Apple GPU backend"_. This limitation arises from **both technical and historical reasons**. As highlighted, Triton was designed around CUDA and NVIDIA GPUs; its backend was heavily tied to the NVIDIA ecosystem (PTX, architectural specifics like 32-thread warps, Tensor Core, etc.). **Apple Silicon breaks this paradigm**: the integrated GPUs of Macs use a proprietary architecture (AGX) with a graphics/compute API (Metal) completely different from CUDA. There is no detailed public documentation of the ISA of Apple GPUs, nor an open equivalent of PTX for Metal – the only official way to program the GPU is to use the **Metal Shading Language (MSL)** compiler provided by Apple. This means that to support Apple, Triton would need to add a backend capable of generating _Metal shaders_ or emit some compatible IR (for example, SPIR-V, which could then potentially be translated into Metal via MoltenVK – but Apple does not natively support Vulkan/SPIR-V, relying on MoltenVK only to bring Vulkan applications). In short, _this is a non-trivial backend problem_: **Triton is “baked-in” to NVIDIA** according to the words of a developer who attempted to create an Apple backend, who noted how Triton's new architecture was heavily dependent on NVIDIA-centric assumptions.

The **practical consequences** of this absence are felt in the experience of ML developers on Mac. A glaring example is PyTorch 2.0: as mentioned, its compilation engine TorchInductor leverages Triton to generate efficient kernels. However, _on Apple MPS, such optimizations are not available_. Users trying torch.compile on MPS devices found that the Inductor backend did not work, having to fall back on less efficient modes. A PyTorch engineer in 2023 explained: _"Inductor support for MPS essentially depends on Triton's support for MPS. Inductor generates Triton kernels that then run on GPU devices; currently, Triton is focused on NVIDIA GPUs, so…”_. In other words, **as long as Triton does not support Apple GPUs, PyTorch cannot easily optimize those workloads**. This has forced the PyTorch team to seek alternative routes: indeed, in 2025, experimental support appeared for generating **native Metal kernels in TorchInductor** (without going through Triton). While this is promising – now _torch.compile_ can produce kernels directly in MSL – it is still an ad hoc solution limited to PyTorch. It does not offer end-users the ability to write _their own_ kernels at will; simply, the framework performs some optimized fusions. **The absence of “pure” Triton on Apple Silicon thus leaves a void**: researchers cannot implement new GPU algorithm ideas on Mac without radically changing ecosystems (rewriting in C++/Metal with all the associated burdens, or using alternatives like JAX+TPU, etc.). In fact, those using Mac for AI development often find themselves prototyping on CPU or on subsets of data, losing the advantage of GPU parallelism, or must run intensive workloads on remote servers with NVIDIA GPUs.

It is worth delving into **why bringing Triton to Apple is not trivial at all**, highlighting the main technical challenges:

- **Missing Metal backend:** as mentioned, Triton does not have a code generator for Metal. The compiler currently generates PTX and invokes the NVIDIA JIT; an Apple backend would instead need to generate Metal Shading Language code _on the fly_ and pass it to Apple's runtime compiler (via the Metal framework). This requires developing an entirely new **codegen** within Triton, capable of translating Triton-IR into syntactically correct and well-optimized MSL kernels for the Apple architecture. The Triton team has not done this so far, also because **Apple GPU was not on the roadmap priorities** – literally, _"Apple's proprietary GPUs are not yet on the roadmap"_. Until recently, Triton's user base revolved around Linux/NVIDIA; requests for Apple were few and mainly from the Mac community.
- **Integration with proprietary drivers:** the NVIDIA ecosystem offers established tools for JIT compilation (CUDA drivers reliably compile PTX). On Apple, one would need to leverage the Metal API: Apple allows compiling MSL strings at runtime via MTLDevice.newLibraryWithSource(...). This is positive – it means that a _JIT Metal_ is possible – but it is less explored territory in the ML world. Additionally, the Metal compiler operates at a higher level (shading language) and may not expose all the fine-tuning optimization levers that a dedicated backend would want to control. Essentially, it would involve relying on Apple's compiler to generate machine code; **Triton would need to “trust” Metal for low-level details**, focusing on generating efficient MSL. This introduces uncertainties about performance: the Triton team has the know-how to optimize on NVIDIA due to prior knowledge, while on Apple it would need to gain experience on microarchitectural characteristics (for example, how to best leverage threadgroup memory on Apple, what the actual warp size is and its implications, etc.).

- **Architectural and memory model differences:** although concepts like 32-thread warps and shared memory also exist on Apple, the **Unified Memory** changes some assumptions. On NVIDIA, Triton assumes there is separate “slow” global memory and separate host memory – which entails explicit distinctions between device/host pointers. In the Apple environment, a pointer can refer to valid unified memory for both CPU and GPU; the boundary is more blurred. Additionally, Apple **does not have dedicated “constant” memory** or separate texture caches: _constant buffers_ in Metal also reside in unified memory (but with optimized access paths). The Triton backend would therefore need to manage (or ignore) certain optimizations designed for the NVIDIA hierarchy differently, while also leveraging Apple-specific features like the possibility of coherent CPU-GPU access to data (e.g.: in some cases, it might be useful for the CPU to directly prepare data in aligned structures for the GPU kernel in shared memory, etc.). These differences require in-depth study and adaptation of optimization passes.
- **Vendor support and documentation:** AMD has managed to get Triton working on its GPUs largely because AMD itself (or an affiliated community) invested in development, providing specifications and integrating it into ROCm. So far, there have been no similar initiatives for Apple. Apple tends to prefer _closed_ solutions (its focus is MLX/CoreML), and may not have a direct interest in investing in Triton (which would effectively promote open-source ML on Mac outside its control). An interesting signal, however, is that **Apple has recently sponsored efforts to make MLX portable to CUDA**. In other words, Apple seems to want to attract developers to use MLX on Mac and then allow code to be exported to NVIDIA GPUs for production. If we reverse the perspective, analogous support in reverse (running “CUDA-like” code on Apple GPUs) could fall within Apple's interest in expanding Mac adoption in AI. However, as it stands, anyone wanting to work on a Triton backend for Apple would be doing so _in the dark_, without public documentation on the GPU ISA (unless through reverse engineering like that of some low-level graphics blogs) and without official Apple support. This significantly raises the barrier to entry.

Ultimately, the absence of Triton on Apple Silicon is both a matter of _development priorities_ (no one has yet implemented the necessary backend) and a matter of _closed ecosystem_. Until Apple opens its GPGPU stack more, or until a sufficient number of dissatisfied developers join forces to achieve a port, **Apple GPUs will remain a partially isolated island** in the sea of accelerated computing platforms.

## Attempts and alternative approaches to bridge the gap

Despite the difficulties, there have been some attempts and parallel developments aimed at **mitigating the absence of Triton on Apple** or providing similar tools:

- **Experimental Triton builds on macOS:** Some community members have tried to **compile Triton on Mac ARM** to explore the possibilities. For example, a user reported successfully building the Triton wheel on a MacBook M2 after fixing minor build bugs (differences in arm64 vs aarch64 targets). The build succeeds with minimal patches and passes unit tests on the CPU side, but naturally _cannot run GPU tests_ since there is no NVIDIA GPU present. As the user themselves noted, _“getting a working build does not unlock all the supported capabilities of the language: Apple silicon GPUs are not supported at the moment. But I wanted at least a native Triton to explore the hardware-agnostic aspects and learn”_. These builds thus **run only in CPU emulation**: Triton indeed includes a CPU interpreter (mainly for debugging and testing purposes) but without any acceleration. They are mainly useful for studying Triton IR or using Triton as an “offline” PTX code generator on Mac (without executing it). They are useful intellectual exercises but do not solve the central problem.
- **Attempts at non-NVIDIA backends in Triton:** As mentioned, some have tried to add support for M1. In 2023, a contributor reported: _“I am working on an Apple silicon backend, but the project has undergone significant architectural changes; from my tests, I cannot get even ROCm to work, it seems that NVIDIA GPUs are currently the only ones functioning. The new design is quite tailored to NVIDIA... I hope it becomes more abstract, I wouldn’t want all the work on M1 to go to waste”_. This GitHub issue (#2048) is still open and underscores how, at least at that time, **the refactoring of Triton around MLIR** had temporarily rendered alternative backends in the works non-functional. However, this can also be viewed positively: such architectural changes (late 2022) aimed to _make Triton more modular_ and prepared for multiple backends. Indeed, today we see the fruits on AMD. Thus, work on the M1 backend could resume in the future on more solid foundations. So far, however, there have been no substantial pull requests upstream adding Apple support. It is possible that there are non-public experimental branches or internal efforts (for example, some interested research group), but nothing official has emerged.
- **PyTorch approach: Metal codegen in Inductor:** As already mentioned, PyTorch developers have not remained entirely inert. Over the course of 2024-2025, they began implementing a _native Metal codegen_ within TorchInductor. This project is significant because, in effect, it replaces Triton's role (for the specific case of PyTorch on Mac) with a new dedicated component. The generated code is no longer PTX but **MSL**: Inductor contains a codegen module/[mps.py](http://mps.py) that translates the optimized PyTorch graph into a compilable Metal shader. Judging by the comments, this support is still _experimental_ and incomplete, but has reached the stage where a simple model can be _compiled and launched on M1 GPUs via Metal_. In perspective, if it matures, it would mean that PyTorch on Mac could perform operator fusion and other optimizations without needing Triton. However, this remains **limited to the PyTorch scope** and does not offer a generic public API. Additionally, duplicating optimization logics that Triton already offers is inefficient in the long term. It would be more ideal if PyTorch could also use Triton on Mac; but, not having it, they had to implement a surrogate.
- **Apple** MLX **(Machine Learning eXperience):** In 2023, Apple surprised by opening the code of MLX, a numerical framework similar to NumPy/JAX optimized for Apple Silicon. MLX leverages highly optimized kernels (also for the ANE, Neural Engine, in addition to GPU/CPU) and in some demos has shown significant performance boosts for deep learning models on Mac. However, MLX _does not directly expose_ a way to write custom kernels like Triton – it is a library of predefined operations, albeit very comprehensive. A user on GitHub asked Apple if they intend to support “writing Metal kernels via Python” in MLX, similar to Numba CUDA. Currently, there is no indication that this is in the plans (the issue remains a simple request). Apple seems to aim more at providing all the necessary primitives already optimized internally, rather than giving users the freedom to program the GPU. However, the emerging strategy is interesting: as mentioned earlier, Apple is developing a CUDA backend for MLX, so that code written using MLX on Mac can then be “exported” to NVIDIA clusters for accelerated execution. This **inverse-CUDA** approach indicates that Apple wants to _reduce vendor lock-in_ to encourage the use of its framework (knowing that in production models run on NVIDIA GPUs). It is amusing to think that Triton has the opposite goal – to allow those developing in a CUDA environment to run on other accelerators by writing portable code. In an ideal world, the two approaches would converge: if Apple **opened the door to Triton**, we could write a kernel once and run it anywhere – on Mac during development and on NVIDIA/AMD GPUs in production, without modifications. For now, however, we have MLX for Mac (with potential export) and Triton for NVIDIA/AMD (with potential import if Apple were supported one day).
- **Multi-platform solutions in other languages:** It is worth noting that the idea of a portable GPU programming language is not science fiction – there are already examples. In the **Julia** realm, for instance, the community has created _Metal.jl_ for direct targeting of Apple GPUs, as well as the **KernelAbstractions.jl** package that allows writing a kernel in Julia and executing it on different backends (CUDA, Metal, CPU) almost transparently. This demonstrates that _a common abstraction over heterogeneous GPUs is possible_: Julia does this by leveraging the fact that it can interface with various drivers (CUDA, Metal) with native bindings. In the Python world, projects like **SYCL/DPC++** from Intel aim for something similar for CPU/GPU, but have not gained traction in AI like Triton. **Mojo**, an emerging new language for high-performance computing compatible with Python, also promises portability across devices (including Apple cores) thanks to a powerful unified backend compiler – but it is still in its early and proprietary phase. In summary, _the absence of Triton on Apple does not mean that achieving something analogous is impossible:_ simply, as of today, the implementation is lacking in that context. If Julia can launch kernels on Metal and even on WebGPU, nothing theoretically prevents Triton (or its successor) from including an Apple backend and realizing the vision of **a universal language for programming GPUs** regardless of the manufacturer.

## Future prospects and conclusions

The crucial question is: _how can this gap in the Apple Silicon ecosystem be bridged?_ Several paths are possible, not mutually exclusive:

- **Apple directly supports Triton:** A desirable scenario would be direct collaboration. Apple could provide resources (engineers, documentation) to help implement the Metal backend in Triton. For example, it could release a specific SDK to compile compute kernels offline, or collaborate with OpenAI/PyTorch to define an optimal pathway. Considering that Apple has sponsored parts of MLX for CUDA, it is not impossible that they also evaluate the reverse path. From Apple's perspective, embracing Triton would mean making Macs more attractive to researchers: an experienced user could develop and optimize models directly on MacBook Pro, fully leveraging the GPU, without having to adapt to different languages. This would increase the value of the Mac platform in open-source ML. Of course, Apple would have to accept losing some control in favor of open source, which is not a given.
- **Community open-source effort:** If Apple does not move, the community could still proceed. The arrival of AMD support in Triton shows that the codebase can now be extended to new architectures. A motivated team of developers could work on an Apple backend. It would likely require _reverse-engineering_ some details (for example, understanding best practices for thread distribution across Apple cores, how to manage tile memory, etc., based on few public references and empirical testing). An interesting possibility is to leverage the **MoltenVK infrastructure**: if Triton generated SPIR-V (as it was considering in the past for Intel/AMD), MoltenVK could translate it into Metal calls. However, MoltenVK is designed for graphical workloads and does not guarantee exposing all compute features at peak performance. More likely, MSL would need to be generated directly. In any case, such a project would require months of work and skills in both compilers (MLIR, LLVM) and Metal GPU programming – a rather rare skill set. It could emerge from academic environments (for example, research groups wanting to use Mac clusters for parallel computing) or from companies focusing on on-device ML.
- **Evolution of high-level frameworks:** Meanwhile, major frameworks like PyTorch and TensorFlow could continue to improve their native support for Apple, reducing the need for Triton on the end-user side. PyTorch, with its Metal codegen, could progressively cover more operators and use cases, until providing performance close to that of Triton+CUDA for many standard neural networks. Apple, for its part, could enhance **Core ML Tools** to compile models into highly optimized executables (perhaps leveraging the Neural Engine combined with the GPU). In practice, the **“Apple solution”** could be: _not directly giving a Triton to users, but making Triton less necessary because the framework takes care of everything_. This _walled garden_ philosophy works well for many developers (those who prefer turnkey solutions), but still leaves the _“power user”_ segment dissatisfied who would like to tweak specific optimizations. Thus, even with better automatic backends, the pure research would still have the desire for a low-level tool.
- **New intermediate abstractions:** Another perspective is that a _standard_ or intermediate layer emerges that allows portability of high-performance code across different GPUs. For example, the OpenXLA project (portable ML compiler for various accelerators) or initiatives to define standardized MLIR dialects for accelerated compute could include support for Apple GPUs. If Triton does not fill the void, perhaps a successor or competitor could. As of today, however, Triton is unique in its simplicity and effectiveness, so any alternative would at least need to be inspired by it.

**The Triton language represents exactly the type of software infrastructure that is missing in the AI ecosystem on Apple Silicon**. Its absence deprives researchers on Mac of the freedom to experiment freely on their hardware, forcing them to circumvent the problem with suboptimal solutions. We have seen how Triton provides a level of fine control and optimization over GPU computing that has been decisive in the NVIDIA world to push the state of the art forward (in terms of performance and prototyping speed). Bringing these capabilities to Apple Silicon would mean **unlocking the full potential of the integrated GPUs of Macs** in machine learning, preventing them from being underutilized or relegated to secondary roles. There is a whole audience of advanced developers who would benefit: think of teams developing cutting-edge models, who could iterate and tune directly on the laptop while traveling; or university researchers who could leverage Mac Studio pools as programmable mini-GPU clusters. Currently, many of these scenarios are impractical without Triton (or an equivalent).

The hope is that in the near future this gap will narrow. Recent developments – with AMD supported, with Apple MLX open source, with PyTorch experimenting with new backends – raise hopes for **greater openness and interoperability**. Perhaps we will see a Triton-metal project emerge, or Apple itself could surprise by integrating a similar mechanism into its stack (perhaps a “Metal JIT Compiler” Python-facing). In the meantime, the discussion itself is useful: highlighting documentation, issues, and ongoing attempts helps to raise awareness of _what is missing_ and why it is important. Apple Silicon has brought a wave of innovation in hardware: it would be paradoxical not to be able to fully leverage it due to software shortcomings.

**Bridging this gap – equipping the Apple ecosystem with infrastructures comparable to**]]></content:encoded>
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<category>apple</category>
<category>mlx</category>
<category>triton</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Unspoken Challenges of LLMs in Production</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/the-unspoken-challenges-of-llms-in-production/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/the-unspoken-challenges-of-llms-in-production/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Fisnik Murati</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Why reliability, not capability, becomes the ultimate bottleneck when AI meets the real world.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[It's hard to watch an AI demo these days and not be impressed they look perfect, which makes the real question even more urgent: what actually happens when these models face messy, unpredictable real-world data? The truth is rarely glamorous. Behind every AI system that works in production lies a huge amount of engineering effort—there’s no magic involved. Once a system goes live, one thing becomes clear: large language models can be incredibly powerful, but they’re also surprisingly fragile.

I learned this the hard way while building systems for real clients: what works in the lab rarely survives the chaos of a live production environment.

## The Illusion of Stability

Think about the silent changes that happen with cloud-based LLMs. Providers are constantly tweaking parameters, updating safety layers, and adjusting system prompts behind the scenes. A pipeline that worked flawlessly yesterday can start producing errors today even if you haven’t touched a single line of your own code.

Then there’s the issue of small changes causing huge problems. Moving a label slightly, rotating an image, or even rearranging a paragraph can make an extraction process fail completely. I’ve seen clients submit files with text so faint that even a human would struggle to read it, or fonts in light gray that OCR simply skipped. I’ve encountered content printed over patterned backgrounds that caused the model to return nothing useful yet it still confidently produced fabricated values.

It’s also important to remember that prompts aren’t guarantees. Even with clear, detailed instructions, models can unexpectedly reorder fields, make up values, ignore formats, skip crucial details, produce broken JSON, or sometimes return something completely unrelated. Prompts guide the model they don’t force it to follow rules perfectly.

## Why Production is a Different Beast

The real challenge comes from the nature of real-world data. Client documents rarely look like the clean, curated samples you see in demos. Instead, you deal with low-resolution scans, pages with shadowed corners, handwritten notes, folded paper, photos with glare, and PDFs made from images embedded within other images. And through it all, clients expect the system to just work.

User behavior adds another layer of unpredictability. Real users upload rotated files, upside-down invoices, crooked receipts, and multi-page PDFs where each page has a different orientation. They send images with half the text cropped out or blurry photos snapped from a moving car. Language models don’t handle this chaos gracefully they usually make it worse.

Perhaps the most dangerous failure mode is the confident error. These models almost never admit when they don’t know something. Instead, they confidently produce incorrect data, invent missing values, and fabricate fields that don’t exist. There are no warnings, no error messages just corrupted data quietly slipping into your business logic.

## Engineering Around the Fragility

The lessons for building robust systems were learned the hard way, through implementing hybrid pipelines and handling inconsistent documents. A reliable approach combines deterministic OCR for baseline extraction, image preprocessing to clean inputs, an LLM to provide structure, and consistency checks to catch hallucinations. This hybrid method has proven invaluable, especially for recovering low-contrast text that vision models often miss entirely.

It’s also clear that no single model is best for every task. I’ve seen cases where GPT struggled with layout recognition, Claude misread numerical values, and DeepSeek handled structure more reliably. In some instances, traditional OCR was more accurate than all of them. The most effective systems therefore use multi-model routing, automatically selecting the right tool for each specific job.

Validation must be treated as a first-class citizen in the architecture. The rule is simple: trust nothing. That means enforcing strict JSON schemas, checking numeric ranges and date formats, performing cross-field validation, comparing OCR and LLM outputs, and implementing intelligent retry logic. Building without these safeguards is like building on sand.

And when the model inevitably fails, you need automated fallbacks. The system should be able to regenerate prompts, crop images, switch models, or run an OCR-only pass. When all automated strategies are exhausted, you reach the most intelligent fallback of all: a human reviewer.

## The Non-Negotiable Human Review Layer

You can have all the automated checks in the world, but some calls are just too important to make without a person in the loop. That's why our final safety net is always a simple, clean interface for a human to double-check the work.

For every task, the system should let a human easily view, accept, reject, or edit the AI’s output before it becomes final. This isn’t a sign of failure it’s a core feature of a mature, responsible system. We built interfaces where, after the AI completes its extraction, the results are displayed side-by-side with the source document. A human reviewer can quickly verify the data, correct a single field, or flag the entire task for reprocessing.

This layer gives clients the confidence to deploy the system at scale, knowing that subtle errors won’t silently corrupt their database. It turns the AI from an unpredictable black box into a reliable assistant that augments human judgment.

## Lessons from the Front Lines

In practice, simple “dumb” logic often saves the “smart” models. Techniques like regex patterns, keyword detection, pixel-based cropping, and background removal can fix massive LLM failures that otherwise seem impossible to overcome.

We’ve also learned that specialization consistently beats generalization. A single, giant model is rarely the solution. A carefully orchestrated pipeline of specialized, focused components is far more effective and reliable.

Ultimately, consistency matters more than raw intelligence. Clients aren’t impressed by a model’s raw power they care that it works every single time on their messy, real-world data, and that it meets their operational deadlines. Some clients demand both speed and perfection, asking to process hundreds of complex PDFs in seconds with flawless accuracy. And sometimes, the only honest answer is that even physics says no.

## The Path Forward for Production AI

As AI becomes embedded into core business workflows, the focus will shift decisively from creativity to reliability. The systems of tomorrow will be hybrid by design, combining deterministic preprocessing, specialized smaller models, private inference infrastructure, strict guardrails, and automated correction layers with multi-model failover.

This evolution marks the end of mere "prompt engineering." The real work, the work that delivers value, is now about real engineering.

## Conclusion

Getting AI to work in the real world takes a lot more than clever prompts. The real challenge is building a system that doesn't fall apart the second it encounters something weird—which, in the real world, is all the time. LLMs are amazing, but they're flaky teammates. The only way to make them reliable is to surround them with hybrid techniques, solid fallbacks, and constant validation. That's the real work: not just demoing AI, but engineering with it.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/the-unspoken-challenges-of-llms-in-production.GxzePQao_2cV2Qa.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>LLM</category>
<category>Stability</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Building Private AI Systems: Why On-Premise Solutions Matter</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/building-private-ai-systems/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/building-private-ai-systems/</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Exploring the critical importance of private AI infrastructure for organizations requiring absolute control, performance, and intellectual property ownership.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[In an era where artificial intelligence is rapidly becoming ubiquitous, a crucial question emerges: who controls your AI, and more importantly, who controls your data?

## The Private AI Revolution

While cloud-based AI services offer convenience, many organizations are discovering that true AI sovereignty requires on-premise solutions. Private AI systems provide absolute control over data, models, and infrastructure—a necessity for industries handling sensitive information, proprietary research, or mission-critical operations.

## Why Organizations Choose Private AI

**Data Sovereignty and Security**: When your AI runs on your infrastructure, your data never leaves your control. This is paramount for healthcare providers handling patient data, financial institutions managing transactions, and research organizations protecting intellectual property.

**Performance and Latency**: On-premise AI eliminates network latency and dependency on external services. For applications requiring real-time decision-making—from industrial automation to medical imaging—milliseconds matter.

**Customization Without Limits**: Private AI systems can be tailored precisely to your needs without the constraints of shared cloud resources or vendor limitations. You control the architecture, the training data, and the deployment strategy.

## Real-World Applications

At Algoretico, we've implemented private AI solutions across diverse sectors:

**Nuclear Fusion Control**: Autonomous systems managing proton-boron fusion reactors require split-second decisions with zero tolerance for external dependencies or latency.

**Medical Imaging**: Diagnostic AI systems processing sensitive patient data demand both privacy compliance and consistent performance.

**Industrial Automation**: Manufacturing facilities need AI that operates independently of internet connectivity while adapting to unique production workflows.

**Enterprise Systems**: Custom CRM and RAG systems built on proprietary data, ensuring competitive advantages remain protected.

## The Talent Architecture Approach

One breakthrough we've developed is the "Talents" concept—persistent neural layers that shape how AI models learn and specialize. This allows organizations to build AI systems that excel in specific domains while maintaining the flexibility to adapt as needs evolve.

## Building vs. Using AI

There's a fundamental difference between using AI services and building AI systems. Private AI requires deep technical expertise: understanding neural architectures, optimizing training pipelines, designing inference systems, and maintaining production deployments.

This is why we emphasize at Algoretico: we don't just use AI—we build it from the ground up, customized for each organization's unique requirements.

## The Future is Hybrid

The future isn't purely cloud or purely on-premise—it's intelligent hybrid architectures that leverage both. Organizations will maintain sensitive operations on private infrastructure while utilizing cloud resources for less critical workloads.

## Conclusion

As AI becomes more integral to business operations, the question isn't whether to adopt AI, but how to deploy it responsibly. For organizations requiring maximum control, security, and performance, private AI systems aren't just an option—they're a necessity.

The technology exists. The expertise is available. The question is: are you ready to take control of your AI future?]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/building-private-ai-systems.ClisXE_x_13n2i6.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>Private AI</category>
<category>Enterprise</category>
<category>Technology</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Autonomous AI Agents: The Maestro Architecture Revolution</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/autonomous-ai-agents-maestro-architecture/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/autonomous-ai-agents-maestro-architecture/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[How orchestrated AI agents are transforming complex problem-solving through coordinated autonomy and specialized capabilities.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[The future of artificial intelligence isn't a single superintelligent system—it's a symphony of specialized agents working in harmony. This is the vision behind Maestro, Europe's first patented architecture for orchestrating autonomous AI agents.

## Beyond Single-Model AI

Traditional AI approaches rely on monolithic models attempting to handle every task. But just as no single human expert can master all domains, AI systems achieve optimal performance through specialization and coordination.

## The Maestro Concept

Imagine an orchestra: each musician is an expert in their instrument, and the conductor coordinates their individual talents into a cohesive performance. Maestro applies this principle to AI systems.

**Specialized Agents**: Each agent is optimized for specific tasks—one might excel at data analysis, another at natural language processing, a third at decision-making. Like the Talents architecture's persistent neural layers, these agents develop deep expertise in their domains.

**Dynamic Orchestration**: The Maestro controller intelligently routes tasks to the most appropriate agents, coordinates information flow, and synthesizes results. It's not just task delegation—it's intelligent collaboration.

**Adaptive Learning**: Agents learn not only from their individual experiences but from observing how other agents solve problems. The system evolves as a collective intelligence.

## Real-World Applications

**Enterprise Automation**: A customer inquiry might trigger multiple agents—one analyzes the question, another retrieves relevant documentation, a third formulates the response, while a fourth monitors quality and compliance.

**Industrial Control**: In manufacturing, different agents monitor equipment health, optimize production schedules, manage inventory, and coordinate maintenance—each bringing specialized expertise to create an efficient whole.

**Research and Development**: Scientific discovery benefits from agents specializing in literature review, experiment design, data analysis, and hypothesis generation, working together to accelerate innovation.

**Financial Systems**: Trading systems employ agents for market analysis, risk assessment, execution strategy, and regulatory compliance—each operating autonomously while contributing to cohesive decision-making.

## The Architecture Advantage

**Scalability**: Adding capabilities means adding specialized agents, not retraining monolithic models.

**Reliability**: If one agent fails, others continue operating. The system degrades gracefully rather than catastrophically.

**Transparency**: Each agent's role and decision-making process can be inspected independently, crucial for regulated industries.

**Efficiency**: Specialized agents are smaller and faster than general-purpose models, reducing computational costs.

## Building Autonomous Systems

Creating effective agent orchestration requires solving several challenges:

**Inter-Agent Communication**: Agents must share information efficiently without overwhelming the system with coordination overhead.

**Conflict Resolution**: When agents disagree, the system needs mechanisms for reaching consensus or escalating decisions.

**Resource Management**: Orchestrators must allocate computational resources dynamically based on current priorities and agent workloads.

**Security and Isolation**: Agents need appropriate permissions and boundaries to prevent unauthorized actions or information leaks.

## The Path Forward

We're moving from asking "What can this AI model do?" to "What can this AI ecosystem accomplish?" The shift is profound. Individual models have limitations; coordinated systems have potential.

At Algoretico, Maestro represents years of research into how autonomous agents can work together effectively. It's not science fiction—it's production software powering real systems today.

## Teaching Agents to Collaborate

Just as I teach students to build AI systems, not just use them, effective agent architectures require understanding both individual agent design and collective behavior. The most powerful systems emerge when we combine technical excellence with thoughtful orchestration.

## Conclusion

The age of isolated AI models is ending. The future belongs to systems where multiple specialized intelligences collaborate seamlessly. Maestro is our contribution to this future—a proven architecture for turning autonomous agents into coherent, powerful systems.

The conductor doesn't play an instrument. The conductor makes music happen. That's what Maestro does for AI.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/autonomous-ai-agents-maestro-architecture.DEKq2eR5_Z1sR1hp.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>AI Agents</category>
<category>Maestro</category>
<category>AI Architecture</category>
<category>Innovation</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Training AI Without Data: Rethinking Supervision</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/training-ai-without-data/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/training-ai-without-data/</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 10 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Most organizations don't have labeled datasets. They have processes, constraints, and domain expertise. Here's how to build AI systems that learn from structure, not just examples.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[The conventional wisdom: AI requires massive labeled datasets. The reality: most organizations drowning in data have almost none that's properly labeled for machine learning.

## The Data Paradox

Companies sit on terabytes of logs, transactions, sensor readings, and documents. But turning raw data into training examples requires human labeling—expensive, time-consuming, and often requiring domain expertise that doesn't scale.

The standard response: "We need a data labeling team." The better question: "Do we need labeled examples at all?"

## Self-Supervised Learning

Self-supervised learning generates supervision from data structure itself. Language models predict masked tokens. Vision models reconstruct corrupted images. Time-series models forecast future states.

No human labels. The data provides its own training signal.

For text, this is well-established. For structured data, sensor streams, and domain-specific applications, the principles remain underexplored by most organizations.

## Physics-Informed Neural Networks

When you're modeling physical systems, you have something better than labels: you have physics. Conservation laws, differential equations, boundary conditions—these aren't fuzzy annotations from crowdworkers. They're mathematical constraints that must hold.

Physics-informed neural networks (PINNs) incorporate these constraints directly into the loss function. The network learns to satisfy the governing equations while fitting observed data.

In fusion control, we don't need labeled examples of "good" vs "bad" plasma states. We need models that respect Maxwell's equations, conservation of energy, and magnetohydrodynamic principles. The physics provides supervision.

## Synthetic Data Generation

Simulations generate unlimited training examples. Not approximations of real data—structurally valid synthetic data that captures system dynamics.

For industrial automation, we simulate production lines under thousands of conditions. For medical imaging, we generate anatomically plausible scans with known pathologies. For financial systems, we model market scenarios with controlled characteristics.

The key: synthetic data must capture the structure of the problem space, not just superficial statistics of real data.

## Constraint-Based Learning

Sometimes supervision comes from knowing what's forbidden, not what's optimal. In constrained optimization problems, feasibility matters more than labeled examples.

A scheduling AI doesn't need examples of perfect schedules. It needs constraints: resource limits, temporal dependencies, capacity restrictions. The learning problem becomes: find solutions that satisfy constraints while optimizing objectives.

Reinforcement learning naturally fits this framework. The reward function encodes what's desirable. The environment enforces constraints. No labeled examples required.

## Domain Expertise as Supervision

Experts possess knowledge that's difficult to express as labeled examples but straightforward to encode as rules, constraints, or verification functions.

Instead of asking experts to label thousands of examples, ask them to write verifiers. Instead of "Is this output correct?" ask "How would you detect if this output violates domain requirements?"

These verifiers become training signals. The AI learns to generate outputs that pass expert verification.

## The You Need No Data Framework

This led us to develop the "You Need No Data" framework at Algoretico. The name is deliberately provocative—of course you need *some* data. But you don't need labeled examples if you have:

Structure in your data that enables self-supervision

Physics or domain constraints that define correctness

Simulation capability that generates synthetic examples

Expert knowledge expressible as verification logic

Optimization objectives and feasibility constraints

## Practical Implementation

Implementing these approaches requires changing how you think about the learning problem. Don't start with "What dataset do we have?" Start with "What structure can we exploit?"

For time-series prediction without labels: Use autoregressive objectives, forecast future states, learn temporal dynamics.

For anomaly detection without examples of anomalies: Model normal behavior through reconstruction, flag deviations.

For control without demonstrations: Define objectives and constraints, learn through simulation or reinforcement.

For generation without pairs: Use self-consistency, cycle consistency, or adversarial training.

## When You Actually Need Labels

Some problems genuinely require labeled examples. Classification tasks where the categories are arbitrary human constructs. Subjective judgments that demand human annotation. Edge cases where structure-based supervision proves insufficient.

But even then, active learning and few-shot methods minimize labeling requirements. You rarely need millions of examples—hundreds or thousands, carefully selected, often suffice.

## The Strategic Advantage

Organizations that can train AI without massive labeled datasets move faster. No waiting for annotation pipelines. No dependence on labeling vendors. Faster iteration cycles.

More importantly, they can tackle problems where labeled data doesn't exist and never will. Novel applications. Rare events. Proprietary processes.

This isn't about avoiding data work. It's about asking better questions about what supervision really means.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/training-ai-without-data.W2P0SqPk_1RGwzu.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>Machine Learning</category>
<category>Training</category>
<category>Self-Supervised Learning</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Makes Intelligence Intelligent?</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/what-makes-intelligence-intelligent/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/what-makes-intelligence-intelligent/</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 08 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Beyond pattern matching and statistical correlation—exploring what distinguishes true intelligence from sophisticated computation, and why the question matters for how we build AI.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[Every few months, someone declares that large language models "understand" or "don't understand" language. Both claims miss the point. Intelligence isn't binary.

## The Spectrum of Capability

A thermostat responds to temperature. A chess engine evaluates positions. A language model generates text. A human understands context, forms intentions, adapts strategies, learns from single examples, and transfers knowledge across domains.

Where does "intelligence" begin on this spectrum? The question implies a threshold that doesn't exist. Intelligence describes a cluster of capabilities, not a single property.

## What Neural Networks Actually Do

Neural networks approximate functions. Show them inputs and desired outputs, and they learn the mapping. This sounds reductive, but it's precise.

The magic emerges from what functions they can approximate and how they generalize beyond training data. A network that memorizes training examples without learning patterns is useless. A network that captures underlying structure and applies it to novel situations demonstrates something we recognize as intelligent behavior.

## The Role of Compression

Intelligence might be inseparable from compression. To compress data, you must find patterns, regularities, and structure. Random noise doesn't compress.

When a neural network learns, it builds a compressed representation of its training distribution. The quality of this compression determines generalization. Poor compression: the model overfits, memorizing rather than understanding. Good compression: the model extracts the essential patterns.

This perspective makes intelligence measurable: how efficiently can a system compress its domain? How few bits does it need to represent the patterns that matter?

## Abstraction and Hierarchies

Human intelligence builds hierarchies of abstraction. We don't think about letters when reading—we process words, sentences, concepts, arguments. Each level emerges from the one below, but operates independently.

Deep neural networks mirror this structure. Early layers detect edges and textures. Middle layers combine these into shapes and objects. Late layers recognize scenes and relationships. The hierarchy enables compositional generalization—combining learned components in novel ways.

But our hierarchies extend further. We build theories, frameworks, and meta-frameworks. We reason about our own reasoning. Current AI architectures don't naturally develop these deeper abstractions without explicit architectural design.

## Causality vs. Correlation

Statistical models find correlations. Intelligence requires understanding causation. The difference matters.

A correlation: ice cream sales and drowning rates both increase in summer. A causal model: temperature drives both, ice cream sales don't cause drowning.

Most machine learning identifies correlations. Causal inference—understanding interventions and counterfactuals—remains challenging. This limits AI in domains where correlation patterns break under distribution shift.

## The Hard Parts

What remains difficult for current AI reveals something about intelligence:

Few-shot learning: Humans learn concepts from single examples. Neural networks typically require thousands.

Transfer across domains: Skills learned in one context rarely transfer to different contexts without extensive training.

Compositional reasoning: Combining learned components in ways never seen during training.

Common sense: The vast web of background knowledge humans use effortlessly.

Intentionality: Acting with purpose toward goals, not just optimizing reward functions.

These capabilities likely require architectural innovations we haven't discovered, not just more parameters or training data.

## Why This Matters

How we think about intelligence shapes what we build. If we believe intelligence is just pattern matching at scale, we build ever-larger pattern matchers. If we recognize intelligence as a collection of distinct capabilities, we architect systems that develop those capabilities.

The Talents framework, for instance, emerged from recognizing that human expertise involves specialized, persistent knowledge—not general-purpose pattern matching applied to everything.

Maestro addresses coordination and specialization because we observed that complex intelligence emerges from collaboration, not monolithic processing.

## The Philosophical Edge

Some argue that discussing machine "intelligence" anthropomorphizes computation. Others claim current AI already achieves general intelligence. Both extremes obscure useful engineering questions.

I care less about whether AI "truly understands" and more about what capabilities systems demonstrate, how reliably they perform, and what failure modes they exhibit.

Philosophy matters when it clarifies thinking. It becomes a distraction when it replaces measurement with definitional debates.

## What Comes Next

The next generation of AI won't come from scaling alone. It will require:

Better architectures for compositional reasoning

Mechanisms for causal inference

Systems that build and use abstract models

Integration of symbolic reasoning with learned representations

Frameworks for continual learning without catastrophic forgetting

These aren't distant dreams. They're active research areas with early practical implementations.

Intelligence isn't one thing. It's many capabilities, some we've replicated well, others we're still learning to build.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/what-makes-intelligence-intelligent.DAR51bON_24ifUv.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>AI Philosophy</category>
<category>Intelligence</category>
<category>Philosophy</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Teaching AI, Not Using It</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/teaching-ai-not-using-it/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/teaching-ai-not-using-it/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Why my students implement backpropagation by hand, build neural networks from NumPy, and learn to architect systems instead of calling APIs.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[In my first class each semester, I tell students: "You will not use TensorFlow or PyTorch for the first month. You will implement gradient descent. You will derive backpropagation. You will build a neural network using only NumPy."

Some look horrified. Why learn the machinery when frameworks abstract it away?

## The Using vs. Building Divide

Most AI education teaches usage. Import a library, load pretrained models, fine-tune on your data. Functional? Yes. Sufficient for building novel AI systems? No.

Using AI tools makes you dependent on what those tools provide. Building AI systems requires understanding the principles beneath the abstractions.

When your model fails—and it will—do you understand why? When you need capabilities the framework doesn't provide, can you implement them? When architectural choices determine success or failure, do you recognize the trade-offs?

## What Implementation Teaches

Implementing backpropagation by hand forces confrontation with the chain rule, computational graphs, and gradient flow. Not as trivia, but as lived experience.

You discover why vanishing gradients happen. You feel the computational cost of deep networks. You understand why certain activation functions work better than others—not because a blog post said so, but because you watched the gradients behave.

Building a neural network from scratch in NumPy teaches tensor operations, broadcasting, and vectorization. These concepts determine whether your code runs in milliseconds or hours.

## Architecture Before Implementation

Before writing code, students must design. What architecture suits this problem? Why convolutions for images? Why recurrence for sequences? Why attention for dependencies?

The answer "because BERT uses it" isn't acceptable. The answer must reference the structure of the data, the nature of the task, and the computational constraints.

This separates AI engineers from AI users. Engineers choose architectures based on problem structure. Users apply whatever worked in a tutorial.

## The Mathematics Aren't Optional

Machine learning is applied mathematics. Linear algebra, calculus, probability, optimization—these aren't prerequisites you forget after exams. They're the language of AI.

When I teach optimization, students derive gradient descent, understand momentum, recognize why Adam works. They don't just call an optimizer—they understand what it does and why.

When students encounter a new paper, they can read the mathematics, implement the algorithms, and evaluate whether the approach fits their problem.

## Building Production Systems

Academic AI and production AI differ substantially. In academics, you run experiments on clean datasets with known solutions. In production, you handle messy data, evolving requirements, and systems that can't fail.

Students learn to:

Design training pipelines that handle data drift

Build inference systems with latency constraints

Implement monitoring for model degradation

Structure code for maintainability and testing

Understand deployment trade-offs

These skills don't emerge from using high-level frameworks. They require building systems where you control every component.

## The Reward

By mid-semester, students can read research papers and implement novel architectures. They understand why methods work, not just that they work. They can debug training failures, optimize inference speed, and design custom solutions.

When they encounter problems without existing solutions—which is most real problems—they can build something from first principles.

## What This Means for Industry

Organizations don't need more people who can fine-tune GPT. They need people who can architect specialized AI for unique domains, understand failure modes, and build reliable production systems.

The talent gap isn't in AI usage. It's in AI engineering. People who understand the mathematics, can implement novel architectures, and make principled design decisions.

## The Philosophy

I teach AI the way I build it. Not top-down from frameworks, but bottom-up from principles. Not usage patterns, but engineering fundamentals.

The goal isn't to create researchers who never use frameworks. It's to create builders who can work at any level of abstraction, from mathematical derivations to production deployments.

When you understand how something works, you can build anything. When you only know how to use it, you're limited to what others have built.

## The Challenge

This approach demands more from students. It's harder than importing a library and calling fit(). It requires thinking, not just following tutorials.

But the students who push through emerge different. They don't just use AI. They build it.

And in a field evolving as rapidly as AI, that difference determines who drives innovation and who waits for the next framework update.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/teaching-ai-not-using-it.DbKS2qBt_Z9UQyU.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>Education</category>
<category>Teaching</category>
<category>Engineering</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Edge AI in Industrial Automation: Bringing Intelligence to the Factory Floor</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/edge-ai-industrial-automation/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/edge-ai-industrial-automation/</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 02 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Why industrial automation demands AI that runs on-premise, operates without internet connectivity, and makes millisecond decisions in environments where downtime costs millions.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[A steel mill doesn't have time to send sensor data to the cloud and wait for inference results. The production line doesn't pause for API calls. When equipment fails, every second of downtime costs thousands.

This is where edge AI matters. Not as a buzzword, but as an engineering necessity.

## The Industrial Reality

Manufacturing environments present challenges that don't exist in cloud-based AI deployments:

Network reliability: Factory floors don't always have stable internet. Wireless signals compete with electromagnetic interference from heavy machinery.

Latency requirements: Process control decisions must happen in milliseconds. Round-trip network latency is unacceptable.

Data sovereignty: Production data contains proprietary information that cannot leave the facility.

Safety criticality: AI failures can't endanger workers or damage expensive equipment.

These aren't negotiable. They're constraints that determine architecture from the start.

## What Edge AI Means

Edge AI deploys models directly on industrial hardware—embedded systems, industrial PCs, edge servers co-located with equipment. Inference happens locally. No cloud dependency. No network latency.

But edge hardware isn't a datacenter. Limited compute, limited memory, limited power. The same models that run on GPU clusters won't fit on edge devices.

This constraint drives architecture: lightweight models, quantization, pruning, knowledge distillation. Every parameter must justify its existence.

## Real-World Deployments

In steel manufacturing, we deploy AI that monitors furnace temperatures, predicts equipment failures, and optimizes rolling schedules. The systems run on industrial PCs in environments where temperatures reach 50°C and vibration is constant.

The models detect anomalies in sensor patterns before human operators notice. They predict bearing failures hours before breakdown. They optimize throughput based on real-time demand.

All of this happens on-premise, in real-time, with zero cloud dependency.

## The Training-Inference Split

Training can happen offline, in datacenters, with large models and extensive compute. Inference must happen on edge devices with constrained resources.

This split enables sophisticated learning pipelines that compress knowledge into deployable models. Train a large teacher network in the cloud. Distill knowledge into a small student network for edge deployment.

The student doesn't replicate the teacher's architecture—it learns a compressed representation optimized for the edge constraints.

## Continuous Learning

Industrial processes evolve. Equipment degrades. Production patterns shift. Static models become obsolete.

Edge AI systems must learn continuously. But you can't retrain from scratch every time conditions change. You need incremental learning that adapts without forgetting.

This is where Talents architecture proves valuable. Base knowledge remains stable. Specialized Talents adapt to new conditions. The system accumulates expertise without catastrophic forgetting.

## Robustness Requirements

Industrial AI can't have "mostly works" reliability. It must work reliably or fail safely.

Sensor failures: Input validation detects and handles bad sensor data before it reaches the model.

Adversarial conditions: The model must recognize when it's operating outside its training distribution and defer to simpler, proven logic.

Graceful degradation: When components fail, the system reduces capabilities rather than collapsing entirely.

These aren't afterthoughts. They're first-class requirements that shape architecture, testing, and deployment.

## Integration with Existing Systems

Factories run on decades-old infrastructure. New AI must integrate with legacy SCADA systems, PLCs, and industrial protocols.

This means supporting Modbus, OPC-UA, and proprietary protocols. It means interfacing with equipment that predates modern networking. It means respecting constraints built into systems that can't be replaced.

The AI becomes one component in a complex ecosystem, not a replacement for everything.

## The Economics

Edge AI enables capabilities that weren't economically viable before. Predictive maintenance that reduces unplanned downtime. Quality control that catches defects before they propagate. Process optimization that improves yield without capital investment.

The ROI isn't theoretical. It's measured in avoided downtime, reduced scrap, improved throughput. When a system prevents one equipment failure, it pays for itself.

## What We've Learned

The hardest problems aren't the AI algorithms. They're the engineering around the AI:

Making models small enough for edge hardware while maintaining accuracy

Building systems that survive industrial environments

Integrating with legacy infrastructure

Achieving reliability standards that industrial environments demand

Implementing continuous learning without disrupting production

These challenges require thinking beyond model architecture to complete system design.

## The Future of Industrial AI

Factory automation represents one of the largest opportunities for applied AI. Not because factories lack automation—they're heavily automated. But current automation is mostly rule-based, brittle, and unable to adapt.

AI brings flexibility, adaptation, and optimization to systems that previously required extensive reprogramming for every change.

The question isn't whether AI will transform manufacturing. It's whether that transformation happens with systems organizations control or systems they rent from cloud providers.

For most industrial applications, control matters. Which means edge AI isn't optional—it's essential.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/edge-ai-industrial-automation.CG0P_C2d_1JXrrQ.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>Applied AI</category>
<category>Industrial Automation</category>
<category>Edge AI</category>
<category>Manufacturing</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Model Collapse and the Problem of Forgetting</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/model-collapse-forgetting/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/model-collapse-forgetting/</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[When AI systems trained on AI-generated content degrade over time, losing diversity and capability. Understanding the mechanics of model collapse and architectural solutions that preserve knowledge.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[Train a language model on text generated by language models. Repeat. What happens?

The model collapses. Diversity decreases. Rare patterns disappear. Output becomes homogeneous and degraded.

This isn't speculation. It's been observed empirically and proven theoretically. Model collapse represents a fundamental challenge as AI-generated content proliferates online.

## What is Model Collapse?

Model collapse occurs when training data includes outputs from previous model generations. The model learns a narrower distribution, amplifying biases and losing tail diversity with each iteration.

Imagine photocopying a photocopy repeatedly. Each generation loses detail, introduces artifacts, and drifts from the original. Model collapse works similarly, but in distribution space.

The mathematics: Each training iteration fits the model to sampled data. If that data comes from a previous model's approximation, errors compound. Rare events become rarer. Mode collapse accelerates.

## Why It Matters Now

As AI-generated content scales—articles, code, images, conversations—training data increasingly includes AI outputs. Future models will inevitably train on data contaminated with AI-generated content.

This creates a feedback loop. Models trained on AI-generated data produce increasingly homogenized outputs. These outputs contaminate future training data. The cycle continues.

The implications extend beyond text generation. Any domain where AI outputs re-enter training pipelines faces this risk.

## The Architecture of Forgetting

Catastrophic forgetting—when neural networks forget previous knowledge while learning new tasks—shares mechanisms with model collapse. Both involve losing information about rare or unusual patterns.

Standard gradient descent pushes weights toward fitting the current batch. Without countermeasures, this push overwrites weights that encoded rare patterns from earlier in training.

The network has limited capacity. Fitting common patterns strongly means weakly representing rare patterns. As rare patterns disappear from training data, their representations degrade entirely.

## Measuring Collapse

How do you quantify model collapse? Several metrics matter:

Diversity metrics: Vocabulary usage, n-gram diversity, semantic coverage across topics.

Distribution drift: KL divergence between generated distribution and original training distribution.

Performance on rare events: Accuracy on tail examples that deviate from common patterns.

Mode coverage: How many distinct modes of the data distribution the model represents.

Tracking these metrics across model generations reveals collapse early, before it becomes catastrophic.

## Architectural Solutions

Preventing collapse requires architectural decisions that preserve diverse knowledge:

Continual learning techniques: Elastic weight consolidation, progressive neural networks, replay buffers. Methods that protect important weights from change.

Mixture of experts: Specialized subnetworks for different patterns. Collapse in one expert doesn't propagate to others.

Regularization toward original distribution: Penalty terms that prevent drift too far from reference distributions.

Hybrid training: Maintain a core dataset of human-generated content. Mixing with AI-generated data prevents complete collapse.

The Talents architecture addresses this directly. Frozen Talents preserve specialized knowledge even as base networks adapt. New Talents capture emerging patterns without degrading existing ones.

## Data Curation Strategies

Architecture alone doesn't solve collapse. Data strategy matters equally:

Provenance tracking: Identify AI-generated content in training data. Weight or filter accordingly.

Diversity enforcement: Actively seek rare examples. Oversample tail events.

Human validation: Strategic human review of training data, focusing on maintaining diversity.

Adversarial examples: Explicitly include challenging cases that push the model's boundaries.

These strategies acknowledge that training data quality determines model capability as much as architecture does.

## The Industrial Perspective

In production systems, model collapse manifests as degradation over time. A model trained monthly on system logs learns from its own decisions. Without intervention, it optimizes toward a local optimum and loses ability to handle edge cases.

We've observed this in RAG systems that continuously train on user queries and retrieved documents. The system gradually specializes on common queries and forgets how to handle unusual information needs.

The fix: Maintain a curated core dataset. New training data augments, never completely replaces. Monitor diversity metrics. Retrain from scratch periodically rather than only fine-tuning.

## Why Creativity Matters

Model collapse threatens AI creativity more than AI accuracy. Creativity requires exploring uncommon combinations, rare patterns, and low-probability outcomes.

A collapsed model generates safe, common, predictable outputs. It won't make mistakes—but it won't surprise either. It optimizes for expected value, losing the tail events where novelty lives.

For applications demanding creative generation or handling of unusual situations, collapse isn't just degraded performance—it's failure of the core capability.

## The Path Forward

Preventing model collapse requires system-level thinking:

Recognize that AI outputs entering training data is inevitable

Design architectures that preserve knowledge across generations

Implement data strategies that maintain distribution diversity

Monitor collapse metrics as first-class system health indicators

Build infrastructure for periodic retraining from curated sources

This isn't solved by better algorithms alone. It requires treating model training as a long-term process with feedback loops that must be managed.

## What This Tells Us

Model collapse reveals something fundamental: neural networks don't inherently preserve knowledge. They approximate distributions from finite samples. Quality of those samples determines quality of the approximation.

When those samples derive from previous approximations, errors compound. Knowledge degrades. Diversity collapses.

The solution isn't avoiding AI-generated content. That's impossible. The solution is architecting systems that can learn from imperfect data while preserving the diversity and capability that define intelligence.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/model-collapse-forgetting.Ueflgar3_16FzQh.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>AI Architecture</category>
<category>Machine Learning</category>
<category>Research</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>RAG Systems Beyond Vector Search</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/rag-systems-beyond-vector-search/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/rag-systems-beyond-vector-search/</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Building Retrieval-Augmented Generation systems that actually understand your organization's knowledge, not just find semantically similar text snippets.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[Every organization deploying RAG faces the same realization: semantic similarity doesn't equal relevance. Finding text that sounds similar to a query isn't the same as retrieving information that answers it.

## The Basic RAG Pipeline

The standard approach: embed documents, embed queries, find nearest neighbors in vector space, feed retrieved text to a language model. Simple. Functional for demos. Insufficient for production.

Why? Because semantic similarity captures surface patterns, not deep relevance. A query about "quarterly revenue growth" might retrieve text discussing "annual profit decline"—semantically similar words, opposite meaning.

## What Relevance Actually Means

Relevance depends on context, intent, and domain knowledge. A legal query needs precedents and statutes, not general information. A technical question needs specifications and error logs, not marketing materials.

Traditional vector search treats all embeddings equally. But documents have structure: sections, hierarchies, metadata, relationships. Queries have intent: find specific facts, compare alternatives, understand concepts.

Effective RAG must capture these dimensions.

## Hybrid Retrieval Strategies

Pure vector search fails. Pure keyword search fails differently. The solution combines multiple retrieval signals:

Dense retrieval: Semantic similarity via learned embeddings
Sparse retrieval: BM25 or TF-IDF for exact term matching  
Metadata filtering: Restrict by document type, date, author, department
Graph traversal: Follow relationships between documents
Re-ranking: Score candidates using cross-encoders or custom logic

Each signal provides different information. Fusion strategies combine them—reciprocal rank fusion works well without hyperparameter tuning.

## The Chunking Problem

How you split documents determines what you can retrieve. Naive chunking by character count breaks mid-sentence, mid-concept, mid-argument.

Better approaches respect structure:

Semantic chunking: Split at topic boundaries using similarity thresholds
Structural chunking: Follow document hierarchy—sections, paragraphs, list items
Sliding windows: Overlapping chunks preserve context across boundaries
Summary-detail pairs: Summaries for broad retrieval, details for precise extraction

The right strategy depends on document type and query patterns. Legal contracts need clause-level chunking. Technical manuals need procedure-level chunking. Academic papers need section-aware chunking.

## Context Window Management

Large language models have large context windows. Fill them carefully.

Retrieved chunks vary in relevance. Including marginally relevant text wastes context and introduces noise. But excluding relevant context causes the model to hallucinate.

Strategies that work:

Relevance thresholding: Only include chunks above confidence scores
Diversification: Avoid redundant chunks that repeat information
Hierarchical selection: Include document summaries plus relevant sections
Dynamic context: Adjust retrieval depth based on query complexity

The goal: maximize relevant information density in the context window.

## Query Understanding

User queries are rarely well-formed. "What did John say about the project?" requires resolving "John" to the correct person, "project" to the specific initiative, and "say" to relevant communications.

Query expansion helps:

Entity resolution: Map mentions to canonical entities
Query reformulation: Generate alternative phrasings
Sub-query decomposition: Break complex queries into retrievable components
Temporal scoping: Infer relevant time periods

These transformations happen before retrieval, improving recall without degrading precision.

## The Private AI Advantage

For RAG systems handling proprietary knowledge, on-premise deployment is non-negotiable. Your organizational knowledge represents competitive advantage. Sending it to external APIs means surrendering control.

Private RAG requires:

Local embedding models optimized for your domain
On-premise vector databases with access control
Custom re-rankers trained on internal feedback
Integration with existing document management systems

The infrastructure investment pays off in security, control, and performance tuned to your specific use case.

## Continuous Improvement

Production RAG systems need measurement and iteration:

Relevance metrics: Track precision and recall on test queries
User feedback: Capture thumbs up/down on retrieved documents
Query analytics: Identify common patterns and failure modes
A/B testing: Compare retrieval strategies objectively

This data drives improvements: better chunking strategies, refined embeddings, improved re-ranking models.

## When RAG Isn't Enough

RAG assumes the answer exists in your documents. Sometimes it doesn't. The model must recognize this and respond appropriately rather than hallucinating.

Confidence calibration helps: train the model to express uncertainty when retrieved context doesn't support confident answers.

Fallback strategies matter: escalate to human experts, suggest alternative queries, explain what information is missing.

## The Engineering Reality

Building production RAG isn't primarily a machine learning problem. It's a systems integration problem:

Document ingestion pipelines
Metadata extraction and normalization
Access control and security
Query routing and load balancing
Response caching and optimization
Monitoring and debugging tools

These components determine whether RAG works reliably at scale.

## What Success Looks Like

Effective RAG systems don't just retrieve documents. They answer questions using your organization's knowledge, respect security boundaries, improve through feedback, and handle edge cases gracefully.

The difference between demo and production is the difference between "usually works" and "reliably works."

That reliability comes from engineering all the components around the core retrieval mechanism. Vector search is necessary. It's not sufficient.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/rag-systems-beyond-vector-search.D-XCZoqx_ZD3oYz.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>Private AI</category>
<category>RAG</category>
<category>Enterprise AI</category>
<category>Applied AI</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>AI, Creativity, and the Role of Constraints</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/ai-creativity-constraints/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/ai-creativity-constraints/</guid>
<pubDate>Sat, 25 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[Creativity doesn't emerge from unlimited freedom—it emerges from intelligent navigation of constraints. What this means for building AI systems that generate novel solutions.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[Ask someone to "create anything" and they freeze. Give them constraints—a haiku about winter, a melody in C minor, a design using only circles—and creativity flows.

Constraints don't limit creativity. They enable it.

## The Paradox of Choice

Unlimited possibility paralyzes. The blank page intimidates because it offers infinite options. Each choice eliminates possibilities, and choosing wrong feels catastrophic when everything is permitted.

Constraints reduce the search space. They provide structure. They transform the overwhelming question "What could I create?" into the manageable question "What can I create within these boundaries?"

This applies to human creativity and AI generation equally.

## How AI Generates

Generative models don't create from nothing. They sample from learned distributions, guided by conditioning inputs and sampling strategies.

Without constraints, models produce generic outputs—high probability samples that look plausible but lack specificity. With constraints, the distribution narrows. Outputs become focused, distinctive, and often more interesting.

The constraints can be:

Explicit prompts defining the output space
Conditioning vectors encoding desired attributes  
Hard constraints that must be satisfied
Soft preferences weighted in the objective
Physical or mathematical laws the output must obey

Each constraint shapes the distribution, guiding generation toward particular regions.

## The Engineering of Constraints

Designing effective constraints requires understanding both the domain and the model.

Too restrictive: The space becomes so narrow that only trivial solutions exist.
Too loose: The model defaults to generic, safe outputs.
Conflicting: No solution satisfies all constraints simultaneously.
Well-calibrated: Enough freedom for novelty, enough structure for relevance.

In our work with industrial automation, constraints encode process requirements, safety limits, and optimization objectives. The AI explores solutions within these boundaries—creative in navigation, rigorous in respecting constraints.

For fusion control, physics provides constraints. The AI can't violate conservation laws or exceed magnetic field limits. Within these boundaries, it finds novel control strategies humans hadn't considered.

## Constraint Satisfaction vs. Optimization

Some problems require satisfying hard constraints. Others involve optimizing objectives subject to soft preferences.

Satisfiability: Find any solution meeting all constraints. Useful when constraints fully specify requirements.

Optimization: Find the best solution according to some criterion. Requires defining "best" and handling trade-offs.

Most real problems combine both: hard constraints that must hold, soft objectives to maximize.

AI systems need mechanisms for both. Constraint propagation, backtracking search, gradient-based optimization, evolutionary algorithms—different tools for different constraint types.

## Creativity as Search

Creativity involves searching large spaces efficiently. Random search finds eventually finds anything, but takes forever. Intelligent search uses structure.

Constraints provide structure. They partition the space, eliminating regions that can't contain useful solutions. They guide search toward promising areas.

Human creativity works this way. Experts develop intuitions about which constraints matter and how to navigate them. They explore freely within known boundaries while respecting domain fundamentals.

AI can learn similar intuitions through training on constrained generation tasks, developing representations that respect domain structure.

## The Role of Surprise

Creativity requires novelty, but not arbitrary randomness. The output should be unexpected yet coherent—surprising within the constraints.

This is where temperature and sampling strategies matter in generative models. Low temperature: safe, predictable outputs. High temperature: diverse but incoherent outputs. The sweet spot: enough randomness for novelty, enough structure for coherence.

Adding constraints narrows the distribution, allowing higher temperature sampling without descending into nonsense. The constraints maintain coherence while randomness provides variety.

## Learning from Constraints

Models can learn better representations by training on constraint satisfaction tasks. Instead of only learning to predict, they learn to generate outputs that satisfy specified constraints.

This shifts the learning objective. Success means satisfying constraints, not matching training examples. The model develops internal representations that respect constraint structure.

For domains with known constraints—physics, chemistry, engineering—this approach produces models that inherently respect domain principles rather than learning them as statistical patterns.

## Multi-Objective Constraints

Real problems rarely have single objectives. You want high quality, low cost, fast delivery—trade-offs are inevitable.

Multi-objective optimization navigates these trade-offs. Pareto fronts show solutions where improving one objective requires sacrificing another.

AI systems should expose these trade-offs rather than hiding them behind single metrics. Let humans choose points on the Pareto front based on priorities the model can't know.

## When Constraints Enable Discovery

Sometimes constraints reveal possibilities that unconstrained search never finds.

In poetry, meter and rhyme force word choices that create unexpected meanings. In architecture, site constraints inspire innovative designs. In mathematics, axioms define structures with surprising properties.

AI generation works similarly. Constraining a language model to generate valid Python forces it to structure text as executable code. Constraining an image model to specific styles produces coherent artistic outputs.

The constraints don't just filter—they shape the generation process itself, enabling outputs that wouldn't emerge from unconstrained sampling.

## The Balance

Too many constraints: over-determined systems with no degrees of freedom.
Too few constraints: under-determined systems with too many irrelevant solutions.
Just right: enough structure to guide, enough freedom to explore.

Finding this balance requires understanding both the problem domain and the model's capabilities.

## What This Means for AI Development

Build systems that work well with constraints, not just in their absence.

Design architectures that can incorporate hard constraints and soft preferences.

Train models on constrained generation tasks, not just unconstrained prediction.

Develop representations that respect domain structure inherently.

Create interfaces that let users specify constraints naturally.

Creativity emerges not from unlimited freedom, but from intelligent navigation of meaningful constraints. AI systems that embrace this principle generate better, more useful, more interesting outputs.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/ai-creativity-constraints.caOmSxLV_Z2u93q7.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>AI Philosophy</category>
<category>Creativity</category>
<category>Philosophy</category>
</item>
<item>
<title>Optimization Landscapes and Why Neural Networks Train at All</title>
<link>https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/optimization-landscapes-neural-networks/</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/en/optimization-landscapes-neural-networks/</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-10-27T00:00:00.000Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Michele Laurelli</dc:creator>
<description><![CDATA[The loss landscape of deep networks is high-dimensional, non-convex, and full of local minima. Yet gradient descent finds good solutions anyway. Understanding why reveals fundamental insights about deep learning.]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[Neural network training shouldn't work. The optimization problem is non-convex with millions of parameters. Local minima abound. Gradient descent should get stuck. Yet it doesn't.

Understanding why requires looking at loss landscapes—the geometry of how loss changes as parameters vary.

## The High-Dimensional Reality

A network with a million parameters defines a loss function over a million-dimensional space. Visualizing this is impossible. Intuitions from 2D or 3D don't transfer.

In high dimensions, surprising things happen. The volume concentrates in strange ways. "Typical" points lie far from any axis. Local geometry differs drastically from global structure.

These properties affect optimization profoundly.

## Local Minima Aren't the Problem

Early deep learning papers worried about local minima trapping optimization. The concern was reasonable—non-convex functions can have exponentially many local minima in worst-case analysis.

But empirically, local minima aren't problematic. Modern networks train reliably despite non-convexity.

Why? In high dimensions, most critical points are saddle points, not local minima. A point that's a minimum requires positive curvature in all directions—rare in high dimensions.

Saddle points have at least one direction with negative curvature. Gradient descent can escape along that direction.

## The Saddle Point Problem

Saddle points do slow training. Near a saddle, gradients shrink. The optimizer spends many iterations wandering before finding the escape direction.

This is where momentum helps. It carries the optimizer through flat regions, reaching areas with larger gradients faster.

Second-order methods like Newton's method handle saddles better but require computing or approximating the Hessian—expensive for large networks.

## Loss Landscape Geometry

What does the loss landscape actually look like? Research visualizing loss surfaces finds:

Wide basins around good solutions, not sharp spikes
Many solutions with similar loss values
Paths connecting different minima through low-loss regions  
Barriers between basins varying in height

The landscape isn't a chaotic mess of random peaks and valleys. It has structure. That structure makes optimization feasible.

## Why All Minima Aren't Equal

Not all low-loss solutions generalize equally. Sharp minima—narrow valleys with steep walls—tend to overfit. Wide minima—broad basins—generalize better.

Intuitively: sharp minima require precise parameter values. Small perturbations hurt performance. Wide minima tolerate parameter variation, suggesting robustness.

SGD with small batches has implicit regularization toward wide minima. The noise from mini-batches kicks the optimizer out of sharp minima but leaves it in wide ones.

## The Role of Overparameterization

Modern networks are vastly overparameterized—far more parameters than training examples. Classical theory predicts overfitting. Reality: overparameterized networks generalize well.

Why? Overparameterization changes the loss landscape. With more parameters than needed, many paths exist to low training loss. The optimizer can choose paths that also minimize implicit regularization.

The landscape becomes easier to optimize precisely because there's excess capacity. Multiple solutions exist, and gradient descent finds ones with good properties.

## Batch Size and Landscape Navigation

Batch size affects optimization dynamics significantly.

Large batches: Accurate gradient estimates, but traverse sharp features, potentially finding sharp minima.

Small batches: Noisy gradients, but noise helps escape sharp regions and explore the landscape more.

This explains why very large batch training often requires careful tuning—the optimizer behaves differently when gradient estimates are nearly exact.

## Plateau Regions

Long plateaus—regions where loss barely changes—cause training stagnation. The gradient provides almost no signal about which direction improves loss.

Techniques that help:

Learning rate schedules that increase when progress stalls
Adaptive optimizers like Adam that scale steps per parameter
Skip connections that provide gradient paths around plateaus
Careful initialization that starts in regions with useful gradients

Understanding plateaus shapes architecture design. Residual connections, for instance, explicitly create paths that avoid degeneracies.

## The Lottery Ticket Hypothesis

Not all parameters matter equally. The lottery ticket hypothesis suggests that initialization contains "winning tickets"—sparse subnetworks that train to full performance.

This implies the loss landscape has structure even at initialization. Some parameter configurations already point toward good solutions. Training reveals and refines these configurations.

It suggests optimization succeeds not just because of the optimizer, but because initialization provides good starting points.

## Implications for Architecture Design

Understanding optimization landscapes informs architecture choices:

Skip connections create linear paths through the network, mitigating gradient degradation.

Normalization layers smooth the landscape, stabilizing training.

Careful initialization ensures gradients have reasonable magnitudes early.

Residual connections allow different parts of the network to optimize somewhat independently.

These aren't arbitrary tricks—they're responses to known landscape pathologies.

## What We Still Don't Understand

Despite progress, mysteries remain:

Why do networks consistently find solutions that generalize, when theory predicts memorization?

What implicit biases do different optimizers impose, and which biases help?

How does the landscape change during training—does it get easier or harder to optimize?

Why does overparameterization help generalization instead of hurt it?

These questions drive ongoing research into deep learning foundations.

## Practical Takeaways

For practitioners, understanding loss landscapes means:

Don't fear non-convexity—the high-dimensional landscape is often friendly.

Expect saddles and plateaus—they slow training but aren't dead ends.

Use techniques that navigate landscape geometry: momentum, normalization, skip connections.

Monitor training dynamics—loss curves and gradient norms reveal landscape properties.

Experiment with batch sizes and learning rates—they trade off noise and precision differently.

Optimization in deep learning works not despite the landscape's complexity, but in some sense because of it. High dimensionality creates geometry that gradient descent can navigate.

The question isn't "Why does training work?" but "What properties of the landscape make gradient-based optimization viable?" Understanding those properties guides better architecture design and training procedures.]]></content:encoded>
<enclosure url="https://blog.michelelaurelli.it/_astro/optimization-landscapes-neural-networks.BVWSsCx1_ZqskaP.webp" type="image/webp" length="0" />
<category>AI Architecture</category>
<category>Deep Learning</category>
<category>Optimization</category>
<category>Machine Learning</category>
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